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Abstract
My dissertation is comprised of three chapters. In the ﬁrst chapter, I analyze the
eﬀect of top management changes on subsequent corporate innovation in venture capital-
backed private ﬁrms using a hand-collected dataset. I ﬁnd that top management changes
are associated with signiﬁcantly more and higher quality corporate innovation (as measured
by their patenting activity). I show that top management changes are likely to be venture-
driven and that the eﬀect of top management changes on corporate innovation is stronger
for ﬁrms where venture capitalists have greater power. An instrumental variable analysis
using an exogenous shock to the supply of outside managers available for hire implies a
causal eﬀect of top management changes on corporate innovation. I establish that one
mechanism through which top management changes enhance corporate innovation is through
new management teams hiring more inventors for a given investment size. I also show that
both top management changes and corporate innovation have a positive impact on ﬁrms’
successful exits.
In the second chapter, co-authored with Thomas Chemmanur and Karthik Krishnan, we
hypothesize that VC-backing garners greater “investor attention” (Merton (1987)) for IPOs,
allowing IPO underwriters to perform two information-related roles more eﬃciently during
the book-building and road-show process: information dissemination, where the lead under-
writer disseminates noisy information about various aspects of the IPO ﬁrm to institutional
investors; and information extraction, where the lead underwriter extracts information useful
in pricing the IPO ﬁrm equity from institutional investors. Using pre-IPO media coverage
as a proxy, we show empirically that VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs indeed obtain greater investor
attention, causally yielding them more favorable IPO characteristics such as higher IPO and
secondary market valuations.
In the third chapter, co-authored with Thomas Chemmanur, Lei Kong, and Karthik
Krishnan, using panel data on top management characteristics and a management quality
factor constructed using common factor analysis on individual management quality proxies,
we analyze the relation between the human capital or “quality” of ﬁrm management and its
innovation inputs and outputs. We control for the endogenous matching between ﬁrm and
management quality using a plausibly exogenous shock to the supply of new managers as an
instrument, thereby ﬁnding a causal relationship between management quality and innova-
tion activities. We show that higher management quality ﬁrms achieve greater innovation
output by hiring more and higher quality inventors.
1 Do Venture Capital-Driven TopManagement Changes
Enhance Corporate Innovation in Private Firms?
1.1 Introduction
The role of venture capital (VC) in creating value for the entrepreneurial ﬁrms has been
widely debated in the literature. At least since the early work of Gorman and Sahlman
(1989), a number of studies have suggested that venture capitalists take an active role in
the portfolio companies that they ﬁnance beyond providing capital (see, e.g., Lerner (1995)
and Hellmann and Puri (2002)). One channel through which VCs may add value to their
portfolio companies is by improving their management team, either by adding new managers
in areas where the ﬁrm is lacking in managerial expertise or by removing managers who
underperform. Further, VC investments typically focus on high technology and high growth
sectors of the economy, such as information technology, life sciences, and energy technology
(Da Rin, Hellmann, and Puri (2013)), where innovation is a critical driver of their long-term
growth and competitive advantage. This means that one measure by which one can judge the
eﬀectiveness of venture capitalists in recruiting new managers or removing underperforming
managers is by studying the eﬀect of such venture-driven top management changes on the
innovativeness of their portfolio companies. However, to the best of my knowledge, there
is little analysis of the relation between top management changes and corporate innovation
in venture-backed private ﬁrms. In this paper, I use a unique hand-collected dataset to
ﬁll this gap in the literature by providing new evidence on how top management changes
aﬀect corporate innovation in venture-backed private ﬁrms and on the possible mechanisms
through which this occurs.
I explore several interesting research questions regarding the eﬀect of top management
changes on corporate innovation. First, do top management changes lead to more and higher
quality innovation? Second, is the probability of top management changes in venture-backed
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ﬁrms higher in ﬁrms where VCs have greater power (e.g., greater board membership)? Fur-
ther, is the relation between top management changes and corporate innovation stronger in
such ﬁrms? Third, as top management changes may include adding new managers as well
as removing existing managers, how does each of these actions aﬀect corporate innovation?
Fourth, what type of top management background (in terms of educational and employment
experience) is important in spurring innovation? In particular, are managers with general
managerial skills (having worked as a CEO in another company), or those with a prior
technical background (having engaged in the research and development process themselves),
or both, important in spurring innovation?1 Fifth, what are the underlying mechanisms
through which top management changes aﬀect corporate innovation in venture-backed pri-
vate ﬁrms? Finally, how do top management changes and enhanced innovativeness aﬀect the
probability of a successful exit (either through an IPO or an acquisition) of venture-backed
private ﬁrms?
The empirical analysis of the relation between top management changes and corporate
innovation in venture-backed private ﬁrms is hampered by two major challenges. First, the
data (especially management team and board of directors data) on venture-backed private
ﬁrms is very limited. Second, potential endogeneity may confound any empirical analysis
on the relation between top management changes and corporate innovation. On the one
1Anecdotal evidence suggests that venture-backed entrepreneurial ﬁrms may add seasoned CEOs as
well as top managers with a prior technical background to help ﬁrms succeed. For example, Space-
Claim Corporation, a provider of 3D Modeling Software based in Concord, Massachusetts, announced
the addition of Michael McGuinness (a seasoned CEO and President with rich software industry expe-
rience) to its top management team right before it received the third round of VC ﬁnancing. Space-
Claim commented that McGuinness brought to SpaceClaim “broad executive experience across sev-
eral industries” and strategic vision in high technology, management, and business development. See
more details at http://www.spaceclaim.com/fr/company/news/pressreleases/07-03-20/SpaceClaim_
Announces_Addition_of_Michael_McGuinness_as_Chief_Operating_Officer.aspx. An example of a
venture-backed ﬁrm that added a top manager with a prior technical background is Acceleron Pharma,
Inc., a biopharmaceutical company based in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Acceleron announced the appoint-
ment of Matthew L. Sherman, M.D. (who was responsible for clinical research and clinical operations in
another pharmaceutical company prior to joining Acceleron and published a number of research papers)
as Senior Vice President and Chief Medical Oﬃcer when it received VC ﬁnancing in 2006. The company
claimed that the addition of Sherman brought to Acceleron “broad scientiﬁc and clinical research knowledge
along with his experience and proven record of building clinical development organizations.” See more details
at http://investor.acceleronpharma.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=785744.
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hand, one may argue that the relationship between top management changes and corpo-
rate innovation may be largely driven by omitted variables such as the underlying quality
(innovativeness) of the ﬁrm, i.e., both top management changes and corporate innovation
may be positively related to ﬁrm quality, in which case OLS regression estimates linking
top management changes and corporate innovation will be biased upwards. On the other
hand, venture capitalists may be more likely to intervene in ﬁrms (i.e., induce management
changes) when they are performing poorly in order to help them improve their performance,
in which case OLS regression estimates will be biased downwards.
I overcome the ﬁrst challenge by constructing a unique hand-collected dataset of top
management team and board information of venture-backed private ﬁrms, using which I can
identify the top managers as well as board of directors for each ﬁrm across diﬀerent ﬁnancing
rounds. I begin with all the venture-backed deals covered in VentureXpert over the period of
2002-2010 and hand-collect top management team and board information for these venture-
backed private ﬁrms in each ﬁnancing round from their “Form D” ﬁlings on the SEC EDGAR
website. Many venture-backed ﬁrms use exemptions under Regulation D, which allow them
to sell equity to accredited investors (such as venture capitalists) without having to register
with the SEC and become a public company. When relying on Regulation D, ﬁrms are
required to ﬁle a Form D, which is a brief notice that contains important information about
the ﬁrm and the oﬀering, including the names and addresses of the ﬁrm’s executive oﬃcers
(such as CEO, president, Chief Technology Oﬃcer) and directors, the amount of investment
made by investors, and the date of sale.
I overcome the second challenge related to endogeneity using an instrumental variable
analysis. I instrument for top management changes using a plausibly exogenous shock to
the supply of outside managers that are able to move across ﬁrms and are available for
hire by venture-backed private ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, the instrument that I use is the number
of acquisitions made by established ﬁrms in the same industry and in the same state as
the venture-backed private ﬁrm multiplied by an index measuring the enforceability of non-
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compete clauses in that state. This instrument is motivated by the following facts. First,
incoming managers to startups often come from established ﬁrms, and these ﬁrms are domi-
nant players in the acquisition market. In other words, there is a strong correlation between
the movement of executives across ﬁrms and the number of acquisitions made by established
ﬁrms in the industry. Second, the enforceability of non-compete clauses, which are commonly
used in employment contracts for top management to prohibit them from joining or founding
a rival company, aﬀects the mobility of managers across ﬁrms. In each stage of my IV regres-
sions, I include industry-by-year and state-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects to absorb any industry-wide
technology shock and any local economic shock that may aﬀect innovation. Therefore, my
instrument is unlikely to aﬀect innovation through channels other than through its eﬀect on
the the ease of recruiting top management, thus satisfying the exclusion restriction.
My empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, I ﬁnd that top management
changes are associated with signiﬁcantly more and higher quality corporate innovation sub-
sequent to top management changes (as measured by patent counts and patent citations) in
venture-backed private ﬁrms. For example, two-year patent counts and two-year patent cita-
tions increase by 14% and 11.7%, respectively, following top management changes. Second,
I show that the probability of management changes is increasing with the power of venture
capitalists in the ﬁrm (as measured by the number of outside board members), suggesting
that management changes in my venture-backed sample are primarily driven by venture
capitalists.2 Further, I ﬁnd that the eﬀect of management changes on corporate innova-
tion is stronger for ﬁrms where venture capitalists have greater power, consistent with the
conjecture that venture capitalists add value to their portfolio companies through inducing
management changes. My instrumental variable analysis (making use of a plausibly exoge-
2I follow the existing literature (see, e.g., Ewens and Marx (2014)) in making use of the number of
outside board members as a measure for the power of VCs in the ﬁrm. Typically, outside board members in
venture-backed private ﬁrms are composed of investors (e.g., VCs) and independent observers (see Kaplan
and Stro¨mberg (2003) and Ewens and Marx (2014) for details). The existing literature has documented that
other outside board members are likely to vote along with VCs (especially when the venture-backed ﬁrm
performs poorly), thus justifying the use of the number of outside board members as a proxy for the power
of VCs in the ﬁrm.
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nous shock to the supply of outside managers as described above) shows that the positive
relationship that I documented earlier between management changes and corporate innova-
tion is causal. Third, I ﬁnd that adding new managers has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the quantity and quality of future innovation, while removing existing managers does not.
Fourth, I ﬁnd that adding seasoned CEOs has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on innovation,
while adding senior managers with a prior technical background does not.
I then investigate the possible underlying mechanisms through which top management
changes may foster greater innovation activities. I hypothesize that the new management
teams may select and allocate resources to higher quality innovation projects, manage inno-
vative assets more eﬃciently, and provide a better environment for inventors (i.e., scientists
and engineers) to succeed in the ﬁrm (for example, by creating a more failure-tolerant envi-
ronment for inventors, in the sense of Manso (2011)). Thus, one way that top management
changes may enhance corporate innovation is by the new management team being able to
hire more inventors to work for the ﬁrm (for a given amount of resources available). My
result is consistent with this conjecture: I ﬁnd that top management changes are associated
with a signiﬁcantly greater net inﬂow (inﬂow minus outﬂow) of inventors in the two or three
years following top management changes. Further, the positive relation between top man-
agement changes and the net inﬂow of inventors is stronger for ﬁrms where VCs have greater
power.
Finally, I explore the relation between top management changes, corporate innovation,
and successful exit outcomes (as measured by an IPO or an acquisition by another company)
in venture-backed private ﬁrms. I ﬁnd that both management changes and innovation output
are signiﬁcantly and positively related to the probability of successful exit outcomes. I also
show that the eﬀect of top management changes on the successful exit is at least partly
mediated through enhanced innovation.
I conduct a number of robustness tests and ﬁnd that the positive relation between top
management changes and corporate innovation that I documented earlier is robust to these
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tests. First, I ﬁnd that the positive relation between management changes and corporate
innovation is robust to controlling for industry-by-state-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects. As my instru-
mental variable analysis makes use of variation at the industry-by-state-by-year level, this
helps to alleviate the concern that that industry-by-state-by-year level omitted variables may
drive both management changes and corporate innovation. Second, to alleviate the concern
that corporate innovation may be driven by a general trend of technological development, I
conduct a placebo test using innovation output generated prior to management changes as
the dependent variable. I ﬁnd that the relation between management changes and prior in-
novation is insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the positive relation between management changes
and future innovation is unlikely to be due to a general trend of technological development.
Third, I show that the positive relation that I documented earlier between top management
changes and corporate innovation is robust to controlling for lead VC ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
The results of this robustness test conﬁrm that the positive relation between top manage-
ment changes and innovation is not driven by any unobservable and time-invariant VC ﬁrm
characteristics that may aﬀect innovation (such as VC ﬁrms’ project selection ability and
preferences).
My paper is related to a number of studies and contributes to several strands in the
literature. First, it improves our understanding on how venture capitalists add value to
the entrepreneurial ﬁrms that they invest in through active intervention in recruiting top
management. Several existing studies show that VCs play a role in recruiting managers
(especially CEOs) and replacing founders. For example, Hellmann and Puri (2002) use
a sample of 170 Silicon Valley startups and show that venture capitalists professionalize
nascent ﬁrms by instituting human resource policies and bringing in professional CEOs to
replace founders. They, however, do not study the eﬀect of such management changes on any
subsequent outcomes (including innovation). Wasserman (2003) shows that raising ﬁnancing
from outside investors (mainly VCs) leads to higher chances of founder-CEO being replaced
by an outside CEO, using a sample of 202 Internet startups. Amornsiripanitch, Gompers,
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and Xuan (2016) show that successful VCs who have a good track record of past investment
and a large network are likely to hire outside managers and outside board members. Ewens
and Marx (2014) ﬁnd that venture capitalists are more likely to replace senior managers
in struggling startups to “correct the ship” and establish a causal relationship between
management replacements and better exit outcomes. In summary, none of the above papers
study the relationship between top management changes and product market innovation in
venture-backed private ﬁrms, which is the focus of this paper.
Second, my paper adds to the literature on how venture-backing improves innovation
or eﬃciency, by establishing the link between a speciﬁc action by venture capitalists (i.e.,
top management changes) and corporate innovation. Several papers study how VC-backing
aﬀects innovation in venture-backed ﬁrms, relative to non-venture-backed ﬁrms, while other
studies attempt to identify the relationship between VC characteristics (such as experience,
industry expertise, syndication, staged capital infusion, and failure tolerance) and innovation
in venture-backed ﬁrms. Recent studies include Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian (2014),
Tian (2011), and Tian and Wang (2014), Bernstein, Giroud, and Townsend (2015), etc.
Another literature is the one studying whether VC-backing improves eﬃciency in private
ﬁrms and the mechanisms through which they do so (see, e.g., Chemmanur, Krishnan, and
Nandy (2011)).3
Third, this study sheds signiﬁcant light on the top management changes/turnover lit-
erature. Existing studies have shown that management changes are important corporate
events. In particular, there is empirical evidence documenting improvements in accounting
and stock performances following CEO turnover mainly for large public companies (Huson,
Malatesta, and Parrino (2004); Denis and Denis (1995); Cornelli, Kominek, and Lungquivst
(2013)). Bereskin and Hsu (2013) study the eﬀect of CEO turnover on corporate innovation
in large public companies. However, with a few exceptions (Gao, Harford, and Li (2015) and
Cornelli and Karakas¸ (2015)), the literature above focuses on the publicly traded ﬁrms and
3See Da Rin, Hellmann, and Puri (2013), who provide an excellent survey of the broader venture capital
literature.
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provides few insights into management changes in private ﬁrms due to data limitations.4 My
paper adds to the literature by examining for the ﬁrst time, the eﬀect of top management
changes on corporate innovation in venture-backed private ﬁrms.
Finally, this study proposes a channel through which top management changes may
aﬀect corporate innovation, suggesting that the new management team may enhance inno-
vation by attracting a greater number of inventors. Thus my study contributes to a small
but growing literature on labor mobility and innovator ﬂows (e.g., Marx, Strumsky, and
Fleming (2009) and Chemmanur, Kong, Krishnan, and Yu (2016)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the underlying theory
and develops testable hypotheses. Section 1.3 outlines the data and the sample selection
procedure. Section 1.4 provides a discussion of my main empirical tests and results. Section
1.5 presents a discussion of my robustness test results. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Theory and Hypothesis Development
In this section, I brieﬂy review the underlying theory and develop testable hypotheses for my
empirical tests. Existing literature oﬀers several explanations for why management changes
can create ﬁrm value. One view is that top management changes are part of an error
correction process. The new management teams may reverse the bad decisions of past man-
agement teams and reallocate resources to more promising projects (e.g., Boot (1992) and
Weisbach (1995)).5 Another view is that new managers may bring additional resources to
the ﬁrm (such as additional human capital) and may establish complementarities between
these new resources and existing human capital, which can create value for the ﬁrm (e.g.,
4Gao, Harford, and Li (2015) ﬁnd that public ﬁrms have higher CEO turnover rates and exhibit greater
CEO turnover-performance sensitivities than large private ﬁrms, using a sample of US public ﬁrms and
large private ﬁrms. Cornelli and Karakas¸ (2015) ﬁnd that CEO turnover decreases and is less contingent on
performance when a ﬁrm is taken private, using a sample of LBO ﬁrms in the UK.
5Boot (1992) theorizes that unskilled managers are reluctant to divest because a divesture is an admission
of a mistake. Therefore, on average, there is too little divesture relative to the shareholders’ optimum. Con-
sistent with Boot’s implications, Weisbach (1995) ﬁnds that the probability of divesting poorly performing
projects increases after CEO turnover.
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Oyer and Schaefer (2011), Pan (2015), and Huang (2014)).6 Based on both theories, if the
new management team can correct bad decisions and reallocate resources to more innovative
projects, or if they can bring additional human capital enabling them to select more innova-
tive projects and manage these projects more ably, I would expect management changes to
be associated with signiﬁcantly more and higher quality corporate innovation output. This
is the ﬁrst hypothesis that I test here (H1).
Existing studies have suggested that VCs provide value-added services to the companies
that they ﬁnance. They are known to take an active role in recruiting senior management,
either by bringing in new (and professional) managers to expand the management team or
by removing existing managers (see, e.g., Gorman and Sahlman (1989), Lerner (1995) and
Hellmann and Puri (2002)). If management changes in venture-backed private ﬁrms are
likely to be driven by venture capitalists, i.e., venture capitalist proactively add or remove
managers in the ﬁrms they back to help them succeed rather than replacing managers who
resign from the ﬁrm voluntarily (possibly due to getting attractive outside opportunities or
losing interest in the current ﬁrm), then I would expect the probability of top management
changes to increase with the power of venture capitalists in the ﬁrm. Further, if management
changes are truly a source of value-addition, I would expect the eﬀect of management changes
on innovation to be stronger for ﬁrms where VCs have greater power. This is the second
hypothesis that I test here (H2).
As top management changes may include adding new managers as well as removing
existing mangers (or both), I then explore how each of these actions may aﬀect corporate
innovation. As suggested in existing studies (e.g., Boot (1992)), removing existing managers
may result in correcting past errors in terms of investment and other decisions, such as
6Oyer and Schaefer (2011) suggest that management attributes (such as talents, skills, or experience) may
complement certain production technologies and improve productivity of the ﬁrm. Pan (2015) uses a model
of executive-ﬁrm matching and shows that complementarity between the ﬁrm and management attributes
may lead to increased productivity of the ﬁrm. Huang (2014) investigates how the complementarity between
managers’ industry experience and the ﬁrm aﬀects ﬁrm value. His empirical ﬁndings show that CEOs in
conglomerates are more likely to refocus on divisions in which they have specialized and divest those in which
they have less experience.
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abandoning poorly performing projects. If so, I would expect removing existing managers to
be positively related with the quantity and quality of innovation. Further, if top management
changes are indeed a source of value-addition by VCs, I would expect the relation between
removing existing managers and innovation to be stronger in ﬁrms where VCs have more
power (H3). Existing studies (e.g., Oyer and Schaefer (2011)) also suggest that adding
new managers may bring in new blood to the ﬁrm’s existing human capital, in addition to
correcting past errors. If so, I would expect adding new managers to be positively related
to the quantity and quality of corporate innovation. Further, I expect such a relation to be
stronger in ﬁrms where VCs have more power (H4). These two relations are not mutually
exclusive and both may exist from a priori theoretical considerations.
Further, I delve deeper into the background of the new management teams and study
how diﬀerent background of the managers may play a role in aﬀecting innovation. One
possibility is that the new managers with general managerial skills (for example, who have
worked as a CEO or president before) are better at allocating resources, managing assets,
and attracting human capital and thus enhance innovation. If so, I would expect adding
seasoned CEOs (or presidents) to the ﬁrm’s top management team (not necessarily as a
CEO or president) to have a positive eﬀect on the quantity and quality of innovation (H5).
Another possibility is that the new managers with a prior technical background (for example,
who either hold a research degree in a ﬁeld related to the ﬁrm’s business or have engaged in
the research and development process in another company) are better at selecting innovative
projects to invest in and participating in the development process due to their technical skills
and research experience. If so, I would expect adding such managers to have a positive eﬀect
on the quantity and quality of innovation (H6). Again, these two eﬀects are not mutually
exclusive to each other and both may exist.
I now turn to an analysis of the possible underlying mechanisms through which man-
agement changes may enhance corporate innovation in venture-backed ﬁrms. One possible
mechanism is through the inventor mobility channel. New management teams may select
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and allocate resources to more innovative projects, manage innovative assets better, and
provide a better environment for inventors to succeed (for example, by creating a more
failure-tolerant environment for inventors, in the sense of Manso (2011)). This, in turn, may
enable the ﬁrm to attract more inventors. Therefore, I would expect management changes
to be associated with a greater net inﬂow of inventors. Further, if VCs have greater power
in the ﬁrm, they may be more eﬀective in using top management changes to create value
for the ﬁrm through the inventor mobility channel. I would therefore expect the eﬀect of
management changes on the net inﬂow of inventors to be stronger in ﬁrms where VCs have
greater power (H7).
Finally, I investigate the eﬀect of venture capital-driven top management changes as
well as enhanced innovation output on the probability of successful exit (either through
an IPO or an acquisition) for venture-backed ﬁrms. First, if one of the ways in which
venture capitalists add value to a ﬁrm that they invest in is by inducing top management
changes when appropriate (either by adding or removing managers), then I would expect
such top management changes to be positively associated with the probability of successful
exit (H8). Second, since successful innovations are likely to be associated with positive net
present value investment opportunities, I would expect ﬁrms with greater innovative success
to be associated with a higher probability of a successful exit (H9).
1.3 Data and Sample Selection
1.3.1 Sample Selection
My sample is derived from multiple data sources. I begin with all the VC-backed deals
(VC investments) with at least two ﬁnancing rounds over the period of 2002-2010 covered
in the VentureXpert database. I require that the ﬁrst round information and the amount
of investment made by VCs for all the rounds must be available. This leaves us with 19201
ﬁrm-ﬁnancing round observations and 1777 distinct venture-backed ﬁrms. Then I randomly
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select 50% of these ﬁrms for hand collection of the information of their management team
and board of directors.7
I hand-collect the management team and board member information for each selected
ﬁrm from the “Form D” ﬁlings on the SEC website. Under the Securities Act of 1933,
any oﬀer to sell securities must either be registered with the SEC (which will make the
company selling securities a public company) or meet an exemption. Regulation D (or Reg
D) contains three rules providing exemptions from the registration requirements, i.e., the Reg
D private placement is an equity-ﬁnancing alternative to a public oﬀering. Many venture-
backed private ﬁrms use exemptions under Reg D to sell equity to the venture capitalists.
Firms relying on a Reg D exemption are required to ﬁle a “Form D,” which is a brief
notice that includes the names and addresses of the company’s top managers (such as CEO,
president, Chief Technology Oﬃcer, and VP Finance), board of directors, size of the oﬀering,
and date of the sale.8,9 Therefore, for each ﬁrm-ﬁnancing round observation in the selected
deals from the VentureXpert database as described above, I search the ﬁrms for their Form
D ﬁlings on the SEC EDGAR website based on the name of the company, the ﬁling date,
and the amount of investment by VCs and hand-collect the names of each member on the
management team as well as board of directors for these venture-backed ﬁrms.
I hand-collect ﬁrm-year patent and citation information from the USPTO website based
on the names and addresses of the venture-backed entrepreneurial ﬁrms in my sample. I
collect the inventor information associated with each patent from the U.S. Patent Inventor
Database (1975-2010) (see Li, Lai, D’Amour, Doolin, Sun, Torvik, Yu, and Fleming (2014)).
Information on the successful exit outcomes of these venture-backed entrepreneurial ﬁrms
(as measured by an IPO or an acquisition by another company) comes from the SDC Global
7In the current stage, I randomly select 50% of the deals for hand collection. I compared the distribution
of the selected deals with the whole sample and conﬁrm that the selected deals are representative of the
whole sample.
8See a detailed description about Form D at http://www.sec.gov/answers/formd.htm.
9Although ﬁrms are not required to disclose each manager’s speciﬁc title in Form D, they have to disclose
the names and titles of the managers who signed the document. From the names and titles of these signers,
I am able to identify the titles of the managers that may be included in Form D.
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New Issues database and the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database, respectively.
The ﬁnal merged sample results in 434 ﬁrms and 977 ﬁrm-ﬁnancing round observations.10
Most of my sample ﬁrms stay private and active under VC investment over 2002-2010, while
about 5% of the these ﬁrms exited through an IPO and 21% of them exited through an
acquisition within ten years after receiving the ﬁrst round of VC ﬁnancing.11 A typical
venture-backed ﬁrm in my sample receives  5.5 million investment from VCs per round. The
median number of investors in a syndicate is 2. Firms headquartered in Massachusetts and
California account for 15% and 41% of the sample ﬁrms, respectively. These statistics of my
sample are comparable to those documented in the existing literature (e.g., Tian (2011) and
Ewens and Marx (2014)).
1.3.2 Measures of Top Management Changes
The main explanatory variable,Mgmt Change, is an indicator variable equal to one for a ﬁrm-
ﬁnancing round if the composition of the ﬁrm’s top management team in the current round
is diﬀerent from that in the previous round and zero otherwise. Speciﬁcally, the indicator
is turned on if either new managers were added to the top management team or existing
managers from the previous ﬁnancing round were removed from the top management team
in the current round. As management changes may include adding new managers to expand
team, removing existing managers from the team, or both, I therefore create three separate
indicators for each of the above three cases. Add Only is a dummy variable equal to one if new
managers were added to the management team for a ﬁrm-round but no existing managers
were removed, and zero otherwise; Remove Only is a dummy variable equal to one if existing
managers were removed from the management team for a ﬁrm-round but no new managers
were added, and zero otherwise; Both is a dummy variable equal to one if new managers
were added to and existing managers were removed from a ﬁrm’s management team as well
10If a ﬁrm receives more than one round of VC ﬁnancing within one year, I aggregate these observations
into one ﬁrm-round year observation.
11In total, 25% of the sample ﬁrms were eventually acquired by another company.
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for a ﬁrm-round observation, and zero otherwise. I also use two sets of continuous variables,
namely, the natural log of one plus the number (or fraction) of new managers added and
the natural log of one plus the number (or fraction) of existing managers, as alternative
measures for adding new managers and removing existing managers.
1.3.3 Measures of Corporate Innovation
Following the existing literature (e.g., Hall, Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg (2001), Chemmanur,
Loutskina, and Tian (2014), and Seru (2014)), I use patent-based metrics to capture ﬁrm in-
novativeness. I hand-collect the patent information associated with each ﬁrm in my venture-
backed sample based on the name and address of the ﬁrm from the USPTO website.12
Patent data is subject to two types of truncation bias. First, patents are recorded on
the USPTO website only after they are granted and the lag between patent applications and
patent grants is signiﬁcant (about two years on average). Therefore, we observe a smaller
number of patent applications that are eventually granted towards the end of my sample
period. Many patent applications ﬁled during these years were still under review and had
not yet been granted. I mitigate this bias by restricting my analyses to patents that are
ﬁled up to 2010. The second type of truncation problem is stemming from citation counts
(i.e., the total number of citations received till now). Patents tend to receive citations over a
long period of time, so the citation counts of more recent patents are signiﬁcantly downward
biased. Following Seru (2014), this bias is accounted for by scaling citations of a given
patent by the mean number of citations received by all patents in that year in the same
3-digit technology class as the patent. Note that the above methodology gives us class-
adjusted measures of patents and citations, which adjust for trends in innovative activity in
particular industries.
Speciﬁcally, I use the following variables to measure the quantity and quality of in-
novation output, respectively: Patents(N) = Ln(1 +
∑N
τ=1 Patentsi,t+τ ), and Cites
(N) =
12I collected the patent data from the USPTO website in March, 2015. Therefore, my patent sample
includes patents that were granted up to March, 2015.
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Ln(1 +
∑N
τ=1Citesi,t+τ ), where N = 2 or 3.
13 These proxies represent the natural log of
one plus patent counts and citation counts over the following two or three years, and the
log-linearization is used to mitigate skewness following Lerner (1995). Patentsi,t is ﬁrm i’s
patent counts in year t, deﬁned as the total number of patent applications ﬁled by ﬁrm i
in year t that were ﬁnally granted. Citesi,t is ﬁrm i’s patent citations in year t, deﬁned as
the number of adjusted number of citations received by all patents ﬁled by ﬁrm i in year t.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for my innovation measures. For example, Patents(2)
has a mean value of 0.50 and a median value of zero; Cites(2) has a mean value of 0.40 and
a median value of zero.
1.3.4 Measures of Inventor Mobility
To identify the inventor mobility, I collect inventor information of each patent from the
U.S Patent Inventor Database (1975-2010) (see Li, Lai, D’Amour, Doolin, Sun, Torvik,
Yu, and Fleming (2014)). The U.S. Patent Inventor Database includes inventor names,
inventor addresses, assignee names, application date, and grant date for each patent. More
importantly, it identiﬁes unique inventors over time so that we could possibly track the
moves of each inventor. Following Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming (2009), I identify mobile
inventors as changing employers if he has ever ﬁled two successive patent applications that
are assigned to diﬀerent ﬁrms (or organizations). As I need at least two patents to detect
a move, inventors that have ﬁled a single patent throughout their career are necessarily
excluded from my analysis.
I assume the inventor’s move to occur in the year when he ﬁled his ﬁrst patent in a
given ﬁrm. For a given ﬁrm, an inventor’s move-in year is the year when he ﬁled his ﬁrst
patent in this ﬁrm; the inventor’s move-out year is the year when he ﬁled his ﬁrst patent in
the subsequent ﬁrm. For the inventor’s very last employer, I assume that the inventor stayed
13In untabulated analyses, I conduct regressions using these dependent variables where N=4 or 5. The
results are qualitatively similar but weaker due to decreased sample size.
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with that ﬁrm and did not move out.14 For example, in the inventor database, an inventor
named Christopher L. Holderness has ﬁled two patent applications till 2010. He ﬁled patent
application with Corning Inc. in 1999 and then with Dell Inc. in 2003. In accordance with my
assumption, for Corning, Mr. Holderness’s move-in year is 1999 and move-out year is 2003;
and for Dell, Mr. Holderness’s move-in year is 2003, and he has stayed with Dell since 2003.
Once I identify each mobile inventor’s move-in and move-out year, I aggregate the number of
mobile inventors that move in and move out at the ﬁrm-year level to obtain the total inﬂow
and outﬂow of mobile inventors for a given ﬁrm in a year. I deﬁne the diﬀerence between the
natural logarithm of one plus the inﬂow and the natural logarithm of one plus the outﬂow
as the net inﬂow of mobile inventors. For ﬁrms without any mobile inventors, I assign zero
values to the inﬂow, outﬂow, and net inﬂow of mobile inventors. I use the following variables
to measure the cumulative inﬂow, outﬂow, and net inﬂow of mobile inventors in the next
N years following management changes, respectively: Inﬂow(N) = Ln(1 +
∑N
τ=1 Inﬂowi,t+τ ),
Outﬂow(N) = Ln(1+
∑N
τ=1Outﬂowi,t+τ ), and Net Inﬂow
(N) = Inﬂow (N)−Outﬂow (N), where
N=2 or 3.
1.3.5 Other Variables
I control for the following characteristics and ﬁxed eﬀects that may aﬀect ﬁrms’ innovation
output following the literature (see, for example, Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian (2014),
Tian (2011), Chemmanur, Krishnan, Kong, and Yu (2016), and Tian and Wang (2014)).
In the baseline regressions, my control variables include the following: Ln(VC Investment),
which is deﬁned as the natural log of the VC investment amount for a ﬁrm-ﬁnancing round;
Ln(Syndicate Size), which is deﬁned as the natural log of one plus the number of investing
VCs; and Ln(Mgmt Team Size), which is deﬁned as the natural log of one plus the number
of managers in a ﬁrm’s top management team. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the
14As a robustness check, I redeﬁne the dates that the inventor moved out of his last employer as one or two
years after he ﬁled his last patent in that ﬁrm. My results remain qualitatively similar with this alternative
deﬁnition.
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control variables described above. For example, Ln(VC Investment) has a mean value of
8.48 and a median value of 8.61. A typical ﬁrm in my sample has a top management team
composed of two senior managers and receives VC funding from three syndicating venture
capitalists. In all regressions, I also include industry ﬁxed eﬀects (deﬁned at the 2-digit SIC
code level), year of ﬁnancing round ﬁxed eﬀects, and development stage ﬁxed eﬀects, unless
otherwise speciﬁed.
1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 The Eﬀect of Top Management Changes on Corporate Innovation
I expect top management changes to be associated with signiﬁcantly more and higher quality
corporate innovation, as measured by patent counts and the total number of citations, re-
spectively. In this section, I empirically test this hypothesis (H1) by estimating the following
model:
Innovation(N) = α + βMgmt Change i,t + γZi,t + Industry + Y ear + Stage+ i,t, (1.1)
where i indexes ﬁrm and t indexes time andN equals two or three. Innovation(N) are the two-
year or three-year patent counts and patent citations described earlier. Since the innovation
process takes time, I examine the cumulative eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s management changes on its
innovation within two or three years following management changes.15 The main explanatory
variable, Mgmt Change, is measured for ﬁrm i over year t, which is the year of the current
ﬁnancing round. Z is a vector of control variables that may aﬀect a ﬁrm’s innovation
output, which includes Ln(VC Investment), Ln(Syndicate Size), and Ln(Mgmt Team Size),
as described in Section 1.3.5. Industry ﬁxed eﬀects (deﬁned at 2-digit SIC code level),
year ﬁxed eﬀects, and development stage ﬁxed eﬀects are also included. In all regressions
15As mentioned in Section 1.3.3, using dependent variables deﬁned over longer horizons (i.e., within the
next four or ﬁve years) gives qualitatively similar but weaker results due to decreased sample size.
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throughout the paper, standard error are clustered at the industry level unless otherwise
speciﬁed.
Table 2 reports the OLS estimation results for regression (1.1). Columns (1) and (2)
report results for the regressions using the cumulative two-year patent counts and patent
citations as dependent variables, respectively; while Columns (3) and (4) report results for
the regressions using the cumulative three-year patent counts and patent citations, respec-
tively. In almost all the speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients on Mgmt Change are positive and
signiﬁcant at least at the 5% level. The coeﬃcient in Column (4) is still positive but be-
comes insigniﬁcant due to increased standard errors. The economic magnitude of the eﬀect of
management changes on innovation is signiﬁcant as well: for example, Column (1) suggests
that two-year patent counts increase by 14% following management changes, and Column
(2) suggests that two-year patent citations increase by 11.4% following management changes.
Collectively, these results suggest that management changes are associated with signiﬁcantly
more and higher quality future innovation, which is consistent with H1.
1.4.2 The Eﬀect of Top Management Changes on Corporate Innovation for
Firms with Diﬀerent VC Power
The results in the above section suggest a positive link between management changes and
corporate innovation. In this section, I ﬁrst show that top management changes in my
venture-backed sample are likely to be driven by venture capitalists. Then I explore whether
the positive relation between venture-driven management changes and corporate innovation
is stronger for ﬁrms where VCs have greater power.
As argued earlier, if venture capitalists proactively add or remove managers in venture-
backed ﬁrms to help them succeed rather than replacing managers who resign from the ﬁrm
voluntarily due to having attractive outside opportunities or losing interest in the ﬁrm, then
I would expect that the probability of management changes increases with the power of
VCs. I use the number of outside board members (i.e., board members that are not on the
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management team) to assess the power of VCs in venture-backed private ﬁrms. The board
of a ﬁrm is known to be responsible for hiring, monitoring, and ﬁring top management
team. The board of directors in venture-backed entrepreneurial ﬁrms are usually composed
of insiders (executive oﬃcers or founders), investors (e.g., VCs), and independent directors
(who are mutually agreed upon both by investors and insiders, see Kaplan and Stro¨mberg
(2003) and Ewens and Marx (2014) for more details). Existing studies document that other
outside board members are likely to vote along with VCs (especially when the ﬁrm performs
poorly), thus justifying the use of outside board members as a proxy for the power of VC in
the ﬁrm.16
To test whether management changes are likely to be driven by VCs, I estimate the
following probit model using the Mgmt Change as the dependent variable:
Prob(Mgmt Change)i,t = α+ θVC Poweri,t + γZi,t + Industry + Y ear + Stage+ i,t, (1.2)
where VC Power is measured by the natural log of one plus the number of outside board
members.17 I use the fraction of outside board members as an alternative measure. As the
existing literature also documents that ﬁrm age may be an important determinant of the
probability of management changes, I include Ln(Firm Age) as a control variable in addition
to the set of controls used earlier.
Table 3 reports the results for the above probit model. Columns (1) uses natural log
of one plus the outside board members as a proxy for the power of VCs in the venture-
backed ﬁrm. The coeﬃcient on Ln(Outside Board Members) is positive and signiﬁcant at
the 1% level, with the predicted sign. The economic magnitude of the eﬀect of VC power
on changes is very signiﬁcant. For example, the estimate in Column (1) implies that a one
16Existing studies show that outside board members are likely to play a role in changing management in
venture-backed private ﬁrms (see, e.g., Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003) and Ewens and Marx (2014)). Studies
on the boards of public ﬁrms such as Weisbach (1988) and Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013) show
that the outside board size or board independence are connected with shareholder power and have a direct
eﬀect on CEO turnover.
17I add one to the the number of outside board members before taking logs to avoid losing observations.
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standard deviation increase in the log of the number of outside board members (0.49) is
associated with a 9.1% increase in the probability of a management change.18 Column (2)
uses the fraction of outside board members as the main explanatory variable. As expected,
the coeﬃcient on Fraction of Outside Board Members is signiﬁcantly positive. A one inter-
quartile increase in the fraction of outside board members (0.3) is associated with 12.7%
increase in the probability of a management change. Overall, the results in Table 3 provide
strong evidence that management changes in my sample of venture-backed private ﬁrms are
likely to be driven by venture capitalists.
Next, I use an interaction test to study whether the eﬀect of management changes on
corporate innovation is stronger for ﬁrms where VCs have greater power. I therefore interact
Mgmt Change with an indicator for greater VC power (High Power) and test the following
model:
Innovation(N) = α + βMgmt Change i,t + δHigh Power i,t + θMgmt Change i,t × High Power i,t
+ γZi,t + Industry + Y ear + Stage+ i,t, (1.3)
where High Power is deﬁned as a dummy variable equal to one if the number of outside board
members is above the sample median and zero otherwise. Table 4 reports the results for these
interaction tests. Consistent with my earlier conjectures, I ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on the
interaction between Mgmt Change and High Power is positive and signiﬁcant at least at the
5% level for all the speciﬁcations. Once the interaction terms are included in the regressions,
the eﬀect of Mgmt Change becomes insigniﬁcant. These ﬁndings suggest that venture-driven
management changes are more eﬀective in enhancing innovation in ﬁrms where VCs have
greater power, consistent with the notion that VCs add value to their portfolio companies
through actively improving ﬁrm management. In sum, the results in this section lend support
18The predicted probability of a management change at the mean of control variables is 20.9%. Fix-
ing means while increasing the outside board size by one standard deviation (0.49) results in a predicted
probability of 30.1%.
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for H2.
1.4.3 The Eﬀect of Top Management Changes on Corporate Innovation: In-
strumental Variable Analysis
In my baseline (OLS regression) analysis, I ﬁnd a positive association between top man-
agement changes and enhanced innovation activities subsequently in venture-backed private
ﬁrms. However, potential endogeneity can confound empirical ﬁndings from the baseline
analysis linking management changes and corporate innovation. On the one hand, one may
argue that the positive relationship between management changes and corporate innovation
may be driven by omitted variables such as ﬁrm quality or innovativeness, as venture cap-
italist may select more innovative ﬁrms to invest in. In this case, the OLS estimates will
be biased upwards. On the other hand, venture capitalists may be more likely to intervene
the ﬁrms when they are oﬀ the track to help them “correct the ship.” In this case, the OLS
estimates will be biased downwards. In order to address the above potential endogeneity
concerns, I conduct an instrumental variable (IV) analysis using a plausibly exogenous shock
to the supply of outside managers available for hire (who might serve as suitable replace-
ments). Speciﬁcally, my instrument is constructed as the number of acquisitions made by
public companies in the same industry and in the same state as the venture-backed private
ﬁrm multiplied by an index measuring the enforceability of the non-compete clauses in that
state.
The instrument in my IV analysis is motivated by the following facts. First, incom-
ing managers to startups often come from established ﬁrms, and these ﬁrms are dominant
players in the acquisition market. In other words, there is a strong correlation between the
movement of managers across ﬁrms and the number of acquisitions in the industry that the
ﬁrm belongs to. Inspired by Ewens and Marx (2014), I count the number of acquisitions
made by established ﬁrms in the same industry and in the same state as the venture-backed
entrepreneurial ﬁrms two years prior as a proxy for the local supply of outside managers
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for the venture-backed ﬁrms.19 The two-year lag stems from the popular retention contracts
employed by the acquirers for target ﬁrms. These contracts often compensate the managers
of target ﬁrms for lost compensation for two to four years and provide strong incentives for
these managers to stay with the target ﬁrms for another few years. The expiration of these
contracts generates a source of variation to the potential supply of managers. Second, the
enforceability of non-compete clauses, which are commonly used in employment contracts for
top management and prohibit them from joining or founding a rival company within one to
two years of leaving, aﬀects the mobility of managers across the ﬁrms.20 Bishara, Martin, and
Thomas (2015) analyze an extensive sample of CEO employment contracts and show that
80% of these contracts contain non-compete clauses, often with a broad geographic scope.
A growing body of work (e.g., Garmaise (2009) and Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming (2009))
shows that higher enforceability of these non-compete clauses reduces employees’ mobility
(including that of managers). The enforceability of such non-compete clauses exhibits both
cross-state and time series variation, which leads to variation in the mobility of managers
that is unlikely to be directly related to innovation. Based on the above facts, I construct an
instrumental variable for Mgmt Change, making use of the the strong correlation between
industry acquisitions and the movement of top managers as well as the exogenous variation
in the mobility of managers.
Speciﬁcally, the instrumental variable for Mgmt Change in a ﬁrm in industry j head-
quartered in state s in year t, is computed as follows:
Instrument j,t = Acquisitionsj,s,t−2 × Enforceability Index s,t, (1.4)
where j, s, and t index industry, state, and year, respectively. Acquisitionsj,s,t−2 is the
number of acquisitions made by established (public) companies in industry j in state s in
19Ewens and Marx (2014) ﬁnd a strong reduced-form correlation between executive replacement and the
number of acquisitions in the same industry two years prior.
20Since these non-compete clauses become operational only when top managers leave their prior ﬁrms, the
enforceability of these non-compete clauses can be thought as a measure of the friction facing top managers
when they attempt to join the venture-backed private ﬁrm.
22
year t− 2. The information on mergers and acquisitions required to construct this variable
is collected from the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions Database. Again, the two-year lag allows
for the expiration of retention contracts that work as “golden handcuﬀs” for managers and
thus Acquisitionsj,s,t−2 proxies for the potential supply of managers from state s in industry
j in year t.
Enforceability Index s,t is the index measuring the enforceability of non-compete agree-
ments across diﬀerent US states based on Garmaise (2009). Garmaise (2009) develops an
index to measure the enforceability of non-compete clauses by considering 12 questions an-
alyzed by Malsberger (2004), which is the central resource describing noncompetition law
in 50 US states and the DC, and assigning 1 point to each jurisdiction for each question
if the jurisdiction’s enforcement of that dimension of noncompetition law exceeds a certain
threshold. Possible totals therefore range from 0 to 12.21 The Enforceability Index used here
is constructed as the diﬀerence between 12 and the value of Garmaise’s (2009) index scaled
by 12 and thus it potentially ranges from 0 to 1. Higher (lower) values of Enforceability
Index indicates weaker (greater) enforceability of the non-compete clauses and thus greater
(weaker) mobility of managers. The instrument therefore proxies for the supply of managers
that are able to move across ﬁrms and available for hire by a venture-backed private ﬁrm
in state s in industry j in year t. I expect my instrument to be positively and signiﬁcantly
related to the probability of top management changes (and empirically show this in my
ﬁrst-stage regression as in below).
To instrument for top managements change of ﬁrm i in industry j in year t, I therefore
21Higher values of Garmaise’s (2009) index indicate higher enforceability of the non-compete agreements
in this state and thus less mobility of the managers from this state. For example, Garmaise’s index (2009)
is equal to 0 for California and is equal to 9 for Florida after 1997.
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run the ﬁrst-stage probit regression of my IV analysis as follows:22’23
Prob(Mgmt Change)i,j,t = α + βInstrument j,t + γZi,t + Industry × Year + State × Year
+ Stage + i,t. (1.5)
In each stage of my IV regressions, I include industry-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects and state-
by-year ﬁxed eﬀects. These ﬁxed eﬀects help to absorb any industry-wide technology shock
(e.g. innovation wave) and any local economic shock that may aﬀect innovation. Therefore,
the instrument is unlikely to aﬀect innovation through channels other than through aﬀecting
the supply of managers and inducing top management changes, thus satisfying the exclusion
restriction.
Table 5 report the ﬁrst and second-stage results of my IV analysis. Column (1) reports
the ﬁrst-stage probit result. I ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on my instrument is positive and
signiﬁcant at the 1% level, even after controlling for industry-wide shock and local economic
shock. Pseudo R-squared is as large as 36.7%. The ﬁrst stage F-statistic (Cragg-Donald
Wald F statistic) for the weak instruments tests is 72.29 and is above the critical value as
suggested in Stock and Yogo (2005). These results indicate that the relevance condition is
likely to be satisﬁed.
Columns (2)-(5) in Panels A of Table 5 report the second-stage results of my IV analysis.
I ﬁnd that management changes continue to have a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the quantity
and quality of subsequent innovation, even after accounting for the potential endogeneity
concerns described earlier. Further, the coeﬃcient estimates on Mgmt Change in my IV
22Since the endogenous variable Mgmt Change is binary, I use a probit model in the ﬁrst stage, following
Wooldrige (2010). I then compute the predicted probability ( ̂Mgmt Change) from the probit estimation in
the ﬁrst stage and use ̂Mgmt Change as the instrumental variable for Mgmt Change to estimate the eﬀect of
top management changes on corporate innovation. I obtain qualitatively similar results using linear models
in each stage.
23As documented in Section 1.4.2, the power of VCs and ﬁrm age may be signiﬁcant determinants of the
probability of top management changes for a venture-backed private ﬁrms. I therefore include Ln(Outside
Board Members) and Ln(Firm Age) as additional control variables in addition to those used in the baseline
analysis, as described in Section 1.3.5.
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regression results become larger compared with the OLS regression estimates, suggesting
that the OLS regression estimates are downward biased. This is like due to the fact that
venture capitalists are more likely to intervene in ﬁrms that do not perform well and therefore
management changes are more likely to occur in such ﬁrms.
In Panel B of Table 5, I report the IV(2SLS) results for the regressions that use the
interaction term between management changes and a dummy variable for greater investor
power as the main explanatory variable.24 I ﬁnd that the interaction terms load signiﬁcantly
and positively in all the speciﬁcations. This is consistent with my earlier ﬁndings in Sec-
tion 1.4.2 and lends support for H2 that the eﬀect of management changes on corporate
innovation is more pronounced in ﬁrms where VCs have greater power.
1.4.4 The Eﬀects of Adding New Managers and Removing Existing Managers
on Corporate Innovation
As top management changes may include adding new managers as well as removing existing
managers (or both), I examine in this section how each of these actions may aﬀect innova-
tion in venture-backed private ﬁrms. To do this, I create three separate dummy variables
to indicate that only new managers were added (Add Only), that only existing managers
were removed (Remove Only), and that both happened (Both), and use them as the main
explanatory variables for innovation. I also use two sets of continuous variables, namely, the
fraction and the number of managers added and removed, as alternative measures for adding
and removing managers.
Panel A of Table 6 report the estimation results using Add Only, Remove Only, and
Both as the main explanatory variables. Columns (1)-(4) show that, the coeﬃcients on Add
Only are positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level for almost all the speciﬁcations, while the
24Following Wooldrige (2010), I run the ﬁrst-stage probit regression as shown in regression (3.8) and
compute the predicted probability of a top management change ( ̂Mgmt Change). Then I use ̂Mgmt Change
and ̂Mgmt Change×High Power as instrumental variables forMgmt Change andMgmt Change×High Power
and conduct an IV (2SLS) analysis. The ﬁrst-stage F-statistic (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) for the weak
instrument test is 24.26, which is signiﬁcantly larger than the critical value suggested in Stock and Yogo
(2005).
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coeﬃcients on Remove Only are all insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcients on Both are positive and
signiﬁcant at the 10% level for the quantity of innovation but insigniﬁcant for the quality of
innovation. The diﬀerences between coeﬃcients on Add Only and those on Remove Only or
Both are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level for the two-year patent counts and patent
citations regressions. These results lend support for H4 but not for H3, suggesting that
adding new managers to the top management team is the major drive that spurs innovation.
Panel B of Table 6 reports regression results using alternative measures for adding
new managers and removing existing managers. Columns (1) and (2) report the eﬀect of
the fraction of new managers added as well as the fraction of existing managers removed
on two-year patent counts and citations. Columns (3)-(4) report regression results using
the log of the number of new managers added and that of existing managers removed as
the main explanatory variables.25 Consistent with the results reported in Panel A, I ﬁnd
that the coeﬃcients on measures for adding managers are signiﬁcantly positive for all the
speciﬁcations, while the coeﬃcients on measures for removing managers are much smaller
and insigniﬁcant. The diﬀerences between coeﬃcients on measures for adding new managers
and those on measures for removing existing managers are statistically signiﬁcant for most
speciﬁcations. The economic magnitude of the eﬀect of adding new managers on corporate
innovation is signiﬁcant as well. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the
fraction of managers added (0.214) is associated with 6.6% increase in two-year patents and
5.4% increase in two-year patent citations following management changes.
I then turn to explore the eﬀect of adding new managers as well as removing existing
managers on innovation for ﬁrms with diﬀerent VC power. To do this, I interact the three
indicator variables for adding new managers, removing existing managers, and both with
the dummy variable for greater VC power. I report the results for these interaction tests
in Table 7. I ﬁnd that the interaction term Add Only × High Power loads positively and
25Here I use the cumulative two-year patent counts and citations as the only set of dependent variables
in order to save space. The regressions using the cumulative three-year patent counts and patent citations
yield qualitatively similar results. These results are available from the author upon request.
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signiﬁcantly for Columns (1)-(3), which is consistent with the conjecture that bringing in
new managers is a source of value addition by VCs and venture-driven management changes
are more eﬀective in enhancing corporate innovation if VCs have more power in the ﬁrm.
The coeﬃcients on the other two interaction terms are almost all insigniﬁcant, consistent
with my earlier results reported in Table 6 that adding new blood to the management team
plays a major role in enhancing innovation. Collectively, my results in this section provide
support for my hypothesis H4.
1.4.5 The Background of New Managers and Corporate Innovation
I show in the previous section that adding new managers is the major drive that enhances
corporate innovation. In this section, I dig deeper into the proﬁle of each new manager added
to the management team and explore how diﬀerent background of these new managers (in
terms of educational and employment experience) may play a role in enhancing corporate
innovation. To do this, I search for and read the bios of each new manager in my sample on
their personal website, their company’s website, LinkedIn, or Bloomberg, etc., and collect
information on their educational background and employment history. I then classify all
the new managers that were added to the management team into two broad categories:
seasoned CEOs or presidents (who have prior experience working as a CEO or president in
another company) and managers with a prior technical background (who hold a doctoral
degree in a ﬁeld related to the ﬁrm’s business, or who were previously engaged in research
and development process in another company working as a Chief Technology Oﬃcer (CTO)
or Chief Innovation Oﬃcer (CIO), or who were previously granted patents in a ﬁeld related
to the ﬁrm’s business). If the new management teams are better at managing and attracting
human capital (scientists and engineers) and thus foster innovation activities, I would expect
that adding seasoned CEOs to have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on corporate innovation.
If the new management teams are better at generating innovation themselves, I would expect
adding people with a prior technical background to have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
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corporate innovation. These two eﬀects are not mutually exclusive and may coexist. To test
these implications of the background of new managers on innovation, I estimate the following
model:
Innovation(N) = α + β1Ln(Seasoned CEOs Added)i,t + β2Ln(Tech Mgrs Added)i,t
+ δAdd(Dummy)i,t + γZi,t + Industry + Y ear + Stage+ i,t. (1.6)
In the above regression, Ln(Seasoned CEOs Added) is the natural log of one plus the
number of managers added to the management team who have prior working experience
as a CEO or president in another company. Ln(Tech Mgrs Added) is the natural log of
one plus of the number of managers with a prior technical background that have been
added to the management team. I include the indicator variable for adding new managers
(Add(Dummy)) so that the coeﬃcients on Ln(Seasoned CEOs Added) and on Ln(Tech Mgrs
Added) capture the incremental eﬀects of adding seasoned CEOs and adding managers with a
prior technical background compared to the case of adding managers with other backgrounds.
The results for the above regressions are reported in Table 8. I ﬁnd that adding seasoned
CEOs or presidents has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s innovation, especially
on the quality of innovation. However, adding managers with a prior technical background
does not have a signiﬁcant impact on innovation. The diﬀerences between the coeﬃcients on
Ln(Seasoned CEOs Added) and those on Ln(Tech Mgrs Added) are statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10% level for the regressions using the quality of innovation as the dependent variables.
Collectively, these ﬁndings suggest that the new management teams enhance innovation in
venture-backed entrepreneurial ﬁrms as they are better at managing resources and human
capital, which support my hypothesis H5 but not H6.
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1.4.6 The Eﬀect of Top Management Changes on Corporate Innovation in Dif-
ferent Development Stages
The level of risks faced by venture-backed ﬁrms in generating innovation as well as in run-
ning their business as a whole varies in diﬀerent stages. In general, these venture-backed
entrepreneurial ﬁrms face larger risks in their early stages than in their late stages when
they mature. If top management changes do play a signiﬁcant role in spurring innovation
in venture-backed ﬁrms as documented earlier, I would expect the positive eﬀect of top
management changes on innovation to be stronger in a ﬁrm’s early stages than in its late
stages.
I estimate regression (1.1) for venture-backed companies in their early stages and in
their late stages separately, where Early Stage includes “early stage” and “start-up/seed”
stages and Late Stage includes the “later stage,” “acquisition,” “expansion,” and “acquisition
for expansion” stages. I report these results in Panel A of 9 use patent counts and patent
citations as the dependent variables, respectively. I ﬁnd that the eﬀects of management
changes on future innovation for ventures in their early stages are all positive and signiﬁcant
(mostly at the 1% level), while the marginal eﬀects in their late stages are all insigniﬁcant.
The diﬀerences of the coeﬃcients on Mgmt Change in the early stage group and in the late
stage group are signiﬁcant mostly at the 10% level. To summarize, my ﬁndings support
the conjecture that the marginal eﬀect of management changes on innovation is stronger for
venture-backed ﬁrms in their early stages when they face greater level of risks and diﬃculties
running their businesses than in their late stages when they mature into development.
In Panel B, I investigate the eﬀects of adding new managers as well as removing existing
managers on innovation for ventures in the early stages and in the late stages by separately
estimating the regressions using Add Only, Remove Dummy, and Both as the main explana-
tory variables across the above two groups. I ﬁnd that the eﬀects of adding new managers
on future innovation are signiﬁcantly positive and signiﬁcantly larger (all at the 5% level)
for ventures in their early stages than for ventures in their late stages, while the eﬀects of
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removing existing managers on innovation for ventures in the early stages are not signiﬁcant
and not statistically diﬀerent from those for ventures in the late stages. These results are
also consistent with my earlier ﬁndings that adding new blood to the top management team
is the major drive that enhances innovation.
1.4.7 Mechanism: Inventor Mobility Channel
My evidence so far is consistent with the notion that top management changes in venture-
backed ﬁrms are likely to be driven by VCs and have positive impacts on future corporate
innovation. In this section, I investigate the possible underlying mechanism through which
this occurs. As argued earlier, the new management teams may select and allocate resources
to higher quality innovation projects, manage innovative assets better, and provide a better
environment for inventors (scientists and engineers) to succeed (for example, in the sense of
Manso (2011), by creating a more failure-tolerant environment for inventors), all of which
may make the ﬁrm more attractive to inventors. Thus, one way that management changes
may enhance innovation is by being able to hire more inventors to work for the ﬁrm (after
controlling for the size of investment). To assess the relationship between management
changes and the movement of mobile inventors, I test the the following models:
Dep Var = α+ βMgmt Change i,t + γZi,t + Industry × Y ear + Stage+Round+ i,t, (1.7)
where i indexes ﬁrm and t indexes time and N equals two or three. The dependent vari-
ables for regression (1.7) are the two-year (or three-year) net inﬂow, outﬂow, and inﬂow of
mobile inventors that have worked for diﬀerent ﬁrms over my sample period of 2002-2010,
respectively, which are deﬁned as in Section 1.3.4. Z is vector of control variables used in
prior tests. I include industry-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects to absorb the industry-wide technology
shock that may aﬀect the labor markets. I further include ﬁnancing round ﬁxed eﬀects to
account for the possibility that inventors may likely to move to a ﬁrm after it obtained VC
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ﬁnancing.
Table 10 reports the results for the above regressions. Columns (1)-(3) correspond to
regressions using the net inﬂow, inﬂow, and outﬂow of mobile inventors within two years fol-
lowing management changes as the dependent variables, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) use
dependent variables that are measured within three years following management changes.
Columns (1) and (2) as well as Columns (4) and (5) in Table 10 suggest that management
changes are associated with a signiﬁcantly greater net inﬂow and inﬂow of inventors fol-
lowing top management changes; while the association between management changes and
the outﬂow of inventors is much smaller and insigniﬁcant. The economic magnitude of the
eﬀects of management changes on the net inﬂow and inﬂow of inventors is signiﬁcant as well:
for example, Column (1) suggests that top management changes are associated with a 5.7%
increase in the net inﬂow of inventors over the next two years; and Column (4) suggests
that top management changes are associated with associated with a 6.2% increase in the
net inﬂow of inventor over the next three years. These ﬁndings support my hypothesis H7,
and suggest that one mechanism through which top management changes enhance corporate
innovation is by the new management team attracting more inventors to work for the ﬁrms
(after controlling for the size of VC investment).
As argued in prior sections, if VCs have more power in the ﬁrm, they may be more
eﬀective in using top management changes to create value for the ﬁrm through the inventor
mobility channel. Therefore, I would expect management changes to have a stronger eﬀect on
the net inﬂows of inventors for ﬁrms where VCs have greater power. To test this implication,
I include the interaction term of management changes and an indicator variable for greater
VC power in the above regressions and report the results for these tests in Panel B of
Table 10. As shown in Columns (1) and (4), the coeﬃcients on the interaction of Mgmt
Change and High Power are signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting that the eﬀect of management
changes on the net inﬂow of inventors is especially stronger for ﬁrms where VCs have greater
power. Further, the eﬀect of management changes on the future inﬂow of inventors is more
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pronounced in such ﬁrms, while the eﬀect of management changes on the outﬂow of inventors
is insigniﬁcant. Overall, my results are consistent with the conjecture that VCs are more
eﬀective in using top management changes to enhance innovation through attracting more
inventors when they have more power in the ﬁrm.
1.4.8 The Eﬀect of Top Management Changes and Corporate Innovation on
Successful Exits
My results thus far have documented a positive relation between top management changes
and subsequent corporate innovation. In this section, I investigate the implication of top
management changes and corporate innovation on the successful exit of venture-backed ﬁrms.
Both IPOs and acquisitions are considered as successful exit outcomes in the existing liter-
ature (e.g., Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007), So¨rensen (2007), and Nahata (2008)). I
therefore use the following variables to measure the successful exit of venture-backed ﬁrms:
(i) IPO, a dummy variable equal to one if the venture-backed ﬁrm went public within ten
years after receiving the ﬁrst round of VC ﬁnancing and zero otherwise; (ii) MA, a dummy
variable equal to one if the venture-backed ﬁrm was acquired by another company within
ten years after receiving the ﬁrst round of VC ﬁnancing and zero otherwise; (iii) Exit, a
dummy variable equal to one if the venture-backed ﬁrm either went public or was acquired
by another company within ten years after receiving the ﬁrst round of VC ﬁnancing.26 In
my sample, 5% of the venture-backed ﬁrms exited through an IPO and 21% of them exited
through an acquisition. These statistics are comparable to those documented in the existing
literature (e.g., Tian (2011) and Ewens and Marx (2014)). Using the above three measures
as the dependent variables, I conduct the following ﬁrm-level probit regressions:
Prob(Successful Exit) = α + β1Ln(Total Added) + β2Ln(Total Removed)
+ θLn(Innovation) + γZ + Industry + i. (1.8)
26I require an IPO or acquisition to occur within ten years after the ﬁrst VC ﬁnancing, as most VC funds
typically have a limited life of ten years (although with the possibility of a few years’ extension).
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In the above regression, Ln(Total Added) and Ln(Total Removed) are two diﬀerent
measures for top management changes at the ﬁrm level, which are deﬁned as the natural log
of one plus the total number of managers that have been added to the management team and
the natural log of one plus the total number of managers that have been removed from the
management team up to the last ﬁnancing round, respectively. Ln(Innovation) is Ln(Total
Patents) or Ln(Total Citations), which are deﬁned as the natural log of one plus the total
number of patents ﬁled by a ﬁrm and the natural log of one plus the total adjusted number of
citations received by the patents ﬁled by the ﬁrm up to the last ﬁnancing round, respectively.
Z is a set of control variables that may aﬀect the exit outcome of venture-backed ﬁrms as
suggested in the literature, which includes Ln(VC Investment) (the natural log of the total
investment made by VCs), Ln(Age) (the natural log of a ﬁrm’s age in the last VC ﬁnancing
round), and VC Syndication (a dummy variable equal to one if a ﬁrm receives VC funding
from more than one VC ﬁrm at least for one ﬁnancing round and zero otherwise). I also
include industry ﬁxed eﬀects in the above regressions and use robust standard errors.
Table 11 reports the results for the above regressions. Columns (1)-(3) reports the eﬀect
of management changes and corporate innovation output on the probability of a venture-
backed private ﬁrm going public within ten years of receiving the ﬁrst VC ﬁnancing round.
The regression in Column (1) uses management change measures only as the main explana-
tory variables. I ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on Ln(Total Added) is positive and signiﬁcant, while
the coeﬃcient on Ln(Total Removed) is insigniﬁcant, suggesting that adding new managers
has an important impact on the probability of a venture-backed private ﬁrm going public.
In terms of economic magnitude, Column (1) suggests that a one standard deviation in-
crease in Ln(Total Added) is associated with 2.4% increase in the probability of IPO. In the
regressions in Columns (2) and (3), I include the patent counts and patent citations as addi-
tional explanatory variables, respectively. I ﬁnd that the both coeﬃcients on patent counts
and patent citations are positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Further, the coeﬃcient
on Ln(Total Added) becomes less signiﬁcant and smaller once the innovation variables are
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included. These results suggest the positive eﬀect of management changes on IPO is likely
to be at least partly mediated through enhanced innovation output. In terms of economic
magnitude, Columns (2) suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the number of
managers added is associated with 2.1% increase in the probability of a venture-backed ﬁrm’s
IPO and a one standard deviation increase in patent counts is associated with 1.6% increase
in the probability of IPO. These results also suggest that management changes and corporate
innovation have equally important impacts on the probability of an IPO, which is considered
as a “gold standard” of venture success.
As reported in Columns (4)-(6), I ﬁnd that patent counts and patent citations remain
signiﬁcant determinants of the probability of venture-backed ﬁrms getting acquired, while
neither adding managers nor removing existing managers has a signiﬁcant eﬀect. In Columns
(7)-(9), I ﬁnd that adding new managers is positively and signiﬁcantly associated with the
probability of a venture-backed ﬁrm’s exit either through a IPO or an acquisitions. Again,
when innovation variables are included, the coeﬃcients on the Ln(Total Added) become
insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the eﬀect of adding new managers on a ﬁrm’s successful exit is at
least partly mediated through innovation. These results suggest that both top management
changes (especially adding new blood to the management team) and corporate innovation
have a positive impact on the successful exit of venture-backed private ﬁrms. Collectively,
these results support my hypotheses H8 and H9.
1.5 Robustness Tests
1.5.1 Robustness to Controlling for Industry-by-State-by-Year Fixed Eﬀects
Since my instrumental variable analysis makes use of variation at the industry-by-state-by-
year level, one concern may be that that industry-by-state-by-year level omitted variables
(e.g, a technology shock speciﬁc to some states) may aﬀect both management changes and
corporate innovation. To alleviate such concerns, I replace the industry and year ﬁxed eﬀects
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in the baseline models by industry-by-state-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects and re-run these regressions.
I report the results for theses regressions in Table 12. For almost all the speciﬁcations, I ﬁnd
that the positive eﬀect of management changes on future innovation remains positive and
signiﬁcant, even after controlling for the industry-by-state-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects. The eco-
nomic magnitude remains signiﬁcant as well: for example, three-year patent counts increase
by 13.3% following management changes, and three-year patent citations increase by 15.2%
following top management changes.
1.5.2 Placebo Test: The Eﬀect of Top Management Changes on Corporate
Innovation Generated Prior to Management Changes
To further alleviate the concern that the positive relationship between top management
changes and enhanced innovation may be driven by some omitted variables such as a trend
of technological development, I therefore conduct a placebo test using a ﬁrm’s corporate
innovation output generated prior to management changes as the dependent variables in this
section. If enhanced innovation is indeed caused by management changes rather than drivers
such as a trend of technological development, I would expect that management changes to
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect only on innovation generated after management changes, but not
on that generated prior to management changes. To test these implications, I estimate the
following model:
Innovation(−N) = α + βMgmt Change i,t + γZi,t + Industry + Y ear + Stage+ i,t, (1.9)
where Innovation(−N) includes Patents(−N) and Cites(−N), which are deﬁned as the natural
log of one plus the number of patents ﬁled in the past N years prior to management changes
and the natural log of one plus the total number of citations received by these patents, and
N equals 2 and 3. The same set of control variables and ﬁxed eﬀects as in my baseline model
(regression (1.1)) are included in the above models.
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I present the results for the above placebo test in Table 13. For all the speciﬁcations,
top management changes do not have a signiﬁcant impact on innovation generated prior to
top management changes. To summarize, the above results for the placebo test suggest that
the positive relation between management changes and enhanced innovation is unlikely to
be driven by omitted variables such as a trend of technological development.
1.5.3 Robustness to Controlling for Lead VC Firm Fixed Eﬀects
Prior literature (e.g., Tian and Wang (2014)) has suggested that VC ﬁrm characteristics may
aﬀect its project selection ability or preferences and thus the characteristics and quality of
the projects that it funded. To alleviate the concern that the relation between management
changes and corporate innovation may be driven by VC ﬁrm characteristics, I include lead VC
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in my baseline models in this section.27 This helps to control for the eﬀect
of any unobservable and time-invariant VC characteristics. If the VC ﬁrm’s project selection
ability or preference (as reﬂected in the project quality) has a time-invariant component,
then including lead VC ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects will mitigate this impact.
The results of this test are reported in Table 14. Consistent with my earlier results, the
coeﬃcients on management changes are signiﬁcantly positive for almost all the speciﬁcations,
even after controlling for the lead VC ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. This suggests that the positive
relation between management changes and enhanced future innovation is not likely to be
driven by the unobservable characteristics of VC ﬁrms such as project selection ability or
preferences.
1.6 Conclusion
Using a unique hand-collected dataset, I analyze the eﬀect of top management changes on
corporate innovation in venture-backed private ﬁrms. This is the ﬁrst paper to establish the
causal link between top management changes as a speciﬁc action by venture capitalists and
27Following the existing literature (e.g., Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007)), I deﬁne the lead VC as
the one that makes the largest total investment across all rounds of funding in a venture-backed ﬁrm.
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product market innovations of their portfolio companies. I ﬁnd that top management changes
are associated with signiﬁcantly more and higher quality corporate innovation output. Fur-
ther, my evidence suggests that top management changes in venture-backed private ﬁrms
are likely to be driven by venture capitalists and that the eﬀect of management changes on
innovation is stronger for ﬁrms where venture capitalists have more power. These results are
consistent with the existing studies suggesting that venture capitalists provide value-addition
services beyond providing capital for their portfolio companies through active intervention
in recruiting management (see, e.g., Gorman and Sahlman (1989) and Hellmann and Puri
(2002)). An instrumental variable analysis making use of a plausibly exogenous shock to the
supply of outside managers shows that the above documented relation is causal.
My evidence also suggests that adding new managers has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
on enhancing innovation, while removing existing managers does not. Having established
that, I use hand-collected information on educational background and employment history
of each new manager and ﬁnd that adding seasoned CEOs or presidents to the ﬁrm’s top
management team (not necessarily as a CEO or president) has a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on innovation, while adding senior managers with a prior technical background does
not. Further, I analyze the possible underlying mechanisms through which top management
changes may aﬀect corporate innovation in venture-backed private ﬁrms and establish that
one such mechanism is through new management teams hiring a greater number of inventors
and scientists for a given investment size. Finally, I ﬁnd that top management changes have
a positive eﬀect on the probability of a ﬁrm’s successful exit (especially exit via an IPO) and
such an eﬀect is at least partly through enhanced innovation.
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Table 2: The Eﬀect of Top Management Changes on Corporate Innovation
(Baseline Results)
This table reports the OLS regression results of corporate innovation on top management changes.
Patents(2) is the natural log of one plus the number of patents ﬁled over the next two years;
Patents(3) is the natural log of one plus the number of patents ﬁled over the next three years;
Cites(2) is the natural log of one plus the adjusted number of citations received by patents ﬁled
over the next two years; Cites(3) is the natural log of one plus the adjusted number of citations
received by patents ﬁled over the next three years. Mgmt Change is a dummy variable equal to one
for a ﬁrm-ﬁnancing round if there was a change in the composition of the top management team
and zero otherwise. Ln(VC Investment) is the natural log of VC investment amount. Ln(Syndicate
Size) is the natural log of one plus the number of investing VCs. Ln(Mgmt Team Size) is the natural
log of one plus the total number of managers on the top management team. Intercept, industry ﬁxed
eﬀects (deﬁned at the 2-digit SIC code level), ﬁnancing year ﬁxed eﬀects, and startup development
stage ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at
the industry level and are reported in parentheses below the coeﬃcient estimates. ***, **, and *
represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Patents(2) Patents(3) Cites(2) Cites(3)
Mgmt Change 0.140*** 0.116** 0.117** 0.080
(0.048) (0.056) (0.047) (0.062)
Ln(VC Investment) 0.169*** 0.197*** 0.160*** 0.179***
(0.035) (0.044) (0.034) (0.042)
Ln(Syndicate Size) 0.074 0.074 0.058 0.023
(0.070) (0.072) (0.076) (0.085)
Ln(Mgmt Team Size) -0.052 0.054 -0.049 0.037
(0.074) (0.110) (0.084) (0.127)
Observations 743 577 743 577
Adjusted R-squared 0.195 0.177 0.165 0.132
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3: The Eﬀect of VC Power on the Probability of Top Management
Changes
This table reports the probit regression results of the probability of top management changes on
measures for VC power. Mgmt Change is a dummy variable equal to one for a ﬁrm-ﬁnancing round if
there was a change in the composition of the top management team and zero otherwise. Ln(Outside
Board Members) is the natural log of one plus the number of outside board members. Fraction of
Outside Board Members is the number of outside board members divided by the total number of
board members. Ln(VC Investment) is the natural log of VC investment amount. Ln(Syndicate
Size) is the natural log of one plus the number of investing VCs. Ln(Mgmt Team Size) is the natural
log of one plus the total number of managers on the top management team. Ln(Firm Age) is the
natural log of one plus the ﬁrm’s age in the ﬁnancing year since it was founded. Intercept, 2-digit
SIC industry ﬁxed eﬀects, ﬁnancing year ﬁxed eﬀects, and startup development stage ﬁxed eﬀects
are included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level
and are reported in parentheses below the coeﬃcient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Mgmt Change Mgmt Change
Ln(Outside Board Members) 0.645***
(0.185)
Fraction of Outside Board Members 1.472***
(0.361)
Ln(VC Investment) -0.018 -0.021
(0.037) (0.034)
Ln(Syndicate Size) 0.241*** 0.298***
(0.093) (0.092)
Ln(Mgmt Team Size) 0.945*** 1.088***
(0.105) (0.110)
Ln(Firm Age) -0.234*** -0.235***
(0.077) (0.071)
Observations 955 955
Pseudo R-squared 0.264 0.256
Industry FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Stage FE Yes Yes
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Table 4: The Eﬀect of Top Management Changes on Corporate Innovation for
Firms with Diﬀerent VC Power
This table reports the OLS regression results of corporate innovation on the interaction between
top management changes and a dummy variable for greater VC power. Patents(2) is the natural
log of one plus the number of patents ﬁled over the next two years; Patents(3) is the natural log
of one plus the number of patents ﬁled over the next three years; Cites(2) is the natural log of one
plus the adjusted number of citations received by patents ﬁled over the next two years; Cites(3) is
the natural log of one plus the adjusted number of citations received by patents ﬁled over the next
three years. Mgmt Change is a dummy variable equal to one for a ﬁrm-ﬁnancing round if there
was a change in the composition of the top management team and zero otherwise. High Power is a
dummy variable equal to one if the number of outside board members is above the sample median
and zero otherwise. Ln(VC Investment) is the natural log of VC investment amount. Ln(Syndicate
Size) is the natural log of one plus the number of investing VCs. Ln(Mgmt Team Size) is the
natural log of one plus the total number of managers on the top management team. Intercept,
industry ﬁxed eﬀects, ﬁnancing year ﬁxed eﬀects, and startup development stage ﬁxed eﬀects are
included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level
and are reported in parentheses below the coeﬃcient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Patents(2) Patents(3) Cites(2) Cites(3)
Mgmt Change × High Power 0.179*** 0.357*** 0.158** 0.333***
(0.052) (0.084) (0.075) (0.100)
Mgmt Change 0.055 -0.076 0.041 -0.096
(0.057) (0.093) (0.071) (0.088)
High Power -0.114 -0.151 -0.097 -0.158
(0.084) (0.134) (0.087) (0.128)
Ln(VC Investment) 0.171*** 0.193*** 0.161*** 0.176***
(0.037) (0.047) (0.035) (0.044)
Ln(Syndicate Size) 0.083 0.086 0.066 0.036
(0.072) (0.072) (0.079) (0.086)
Ln(Mgmt Team Size) -0.047 0.078 -0.044 0.059
(0.074) (0.110) (0.087) (0.130)
Observations 743 577 743 577
Adjusted R-squared 0.196 0.180 0.165 0.134
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: The Eﬀect of Top Management Changes on Corporate Innovation:
Instrumental Variable Analysis
Panel A of this table reports the Instrumental Variable (IV/2SLS) regression results of corporate
innovation on top management changes. The instrumental variable used is the number of acquisi-
tions made by public ﬁrms in the same industry and in the same state as the venture-backed ﬁrm
multiplied by an index measuring the enforceability of non-compete clauses in that state. Column
(1) reports the ﬁrst-stage probit regression result, i.e., regressing the probability of top management
changes on the instrumental variable and other controls. Columns (2)-(5) reports the second-stage
results of the IV regressions using the number of patents and total number of citations in the next
two and three years as dependent variables, respectively. Panel B reports the second-stage results
of the IV regressions for the relation between top management changes, VC power, and corporate
innovation. Patents(2) is the natural log of one plus the number of patents ﬁled over the next two
years; Patents(3) is the natural log of one plus the number of patents ﬁled over the next three years;
Cites(2) is the natural log of one plus the adjusted number of citations received by patents ﬁled over
the next two years; Cites(3) is the natural log of one plus the adjusted number of citations received
by patents ﬁled over the next three years. Ln(VC Investment) is the natural log of VC investment
amount. Ln(Syndicate Size) is the natural log of one plus the number of investing VCs. Ln(Mgmt
Team Size) is the natural log of one plus the total number of managers on the top management
team. Ln(Outside Board Members) is the natural log of one plus the number of outside board
members. Ln(Firm Age) is the natural log of one plus the ﬁrm’s age in the ﬁnancing round since
it was founded. Intercept, industry by year ﬁxed eﬀects, state by year ﬁxed eﬀects, and startup
development stage ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for
clustering at the industry level and are reported in parentheses below the coeﬃcient estimates. ***,
**, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Panel A: The Eﬀect of Top Management Changes on Corporate Innovation (2SLS Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1st-Stage 2SLS
VARIABLES Mgmt Change Patents(2) Patents(3) Cites(2) Cites(3)
Instrument 0.005***
(0.001)
Mgmt Change 0.392*** 0.579*** 0.487** 0.689***
(0.127) (0.159) (0.203) (0.238)
Ln(VC Investment) -0.081 0.177*** 0.205*** 0.181*** 0.204***
(0.129) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.042)
Ln(Syndicate Size) 0.410* 0.147 0.082 0.093 -0.044
(0.248) (0.103) (0.132) (0.129) (0.156)
Ln(Mgmt Team Size) 1.062*** -0.001 0.039 -0.033 -0.014
(0.146) (0.068) (0.077) (0.081) (0.109)
Ln(Outside Board Members) 1.308** -0.028 0.033 -0.123 -0.037
(0.539) (0.077) (0.097) (0.075) (0.090)
Ln(Firm Age) -0.648*** 0.014 -0.009 -0.044 -0.086
(0.170) (0.066) (0.097) (0.050) (0.090)
Observations 743 743 577 743 477
Pseudo R-squared 0.367
Industry-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B: The Eﬀect of Top Management Changes on Corporate Innovation for Firms with
Diﬀerent VC Power (2SLS Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Patents(2) Patents(3) Cites(2) Cites(3)
Mgmt Change × High Power 0.407*** 0.476*** 0.515*** 0.564***
(0.118) (0.110) (0.133) (0.180)
Mgmt Change 0.086 0.252 0.119 0.314
(0.159) (0.176) (0.219) (0.290)
High Power -0.030 -0.143 -0.096 -0.199
(0.060) (0.113) (0.100) (0.175)
Ln(VC Investment) 0.169*** 0.199*** 0.173*** 0.197***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.040)
Ln(Syndicate Size) 0.135 0.071 0.078 -0.057
(0.097) (0.129) (0.124) (0.158)
Ln(Mgmt Team Size) 0.072 0.083 0.034 0.027
(0.082) (0.089) (0.085) (0.132)
Ln(Outside Board Members) -0.048 0.064 -0.120 0.012
(0.093) (0.112) (0.112) (0.124)
Ln(Firm Age) 0.007 -0.006 -0.051 -0.082
(0.067) (0.104) (0.053) (0.100)
Observations 743 577 743 577
Industry-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: The Eﬀect of Adding and Removing Managers on Corporate
Innovation
This table reports the OLS regression results of corporate innovation on adding new managers to
and removing existing managers from the top management team. Panel A uses three separate
dummy variables for adding new managers only, removing managers only, and both adding and
removing managers, as the main explanatory variables. Panel B uses the fraction and number of
managers added and removed as the main explanatory variables. Patents(2) is the natural log of
one plus the number of patents ﬁled over the next two years; Patents(3) is the natural log of one
plus the number of patents ﬁled over the next three years; Cites(2) is the natural log of one plus
the adjusted number of citations received by patents ﬁled over the next two years; Cites(3) is the
natural log of one plus the adjusted number of citations received by patents ﬁled over the next three
years. Add Only is a dummy variable equal to one if new managers were added to the management
team for a ﬁrm-round and no existing managers were removed, and zero otherwise; Remove Only is
a dummy variable equal to one if existing managers were removed from the management team for a
ﬁrm-round but no new managers were added, and zero otherwise; Both is a dummy variable equal to
one if new managers were added to and existing managers were removed from a ﬁrm’s management
team as well for a ﬁrm-round observation, and zero otherwise. Add (Fraction) is the number of
new managers added to the top management team divided by the total number of managers on
the top management team for a ﬁrm-ﬁnancing round; Remove (Fraction) is the number of existing
managers removed from the top management team divided by the total number of managers on
the top management team. Add (Log Number) is the natural log of one plus the number of new
managers added to the top management team for a ﬁrm-ﬁnancing round; Remove (Log Number)
is the natural log of one plus the number of existing managers removed from the top management
team. Ln(VC Investment) is the natural log of VC investment amount. Ln(Syndicate Size) is the
natural log of one plus the number of investing VCs. Ln(Mgmt Team Size) is the natural log of
one plus the total number of managers on the top management team. Intercept, industry ﬁxed
eﬀects, ﬁnancing year ﬁxed eﬀects, and startup development stage ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all
regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level and are reported
in parentheses below the coeﬃcient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Panel A: The Eﬀect of Adding and Removing Managers on Innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Patents(2) Patents(3) Cites(2) Cites(3)
Add Only 0.225** 0.175** 0.200** 0.140
(0.086) (0.080) (0.097) (0.098)
Both 0.117* 0.105* 0.029 0.028
(0.061) (0.060) (0.098) (0.095)
Remove Only 0.127 0.107 0.123 0.103
(0.107) (0.106) (0.129) (0.159)
Ln(VC Investment) 0.158*** 0.197*** 0.144*** 0.170***
(0.031) (0.038) (0.027) (0.035)
Ln(Syndicate Size) 0.029 0.013 0.016 -0.049
(0.084) (0.089) (0.089) (0.101)
Ln(Mgmt Team Size) -0.086 -0.004 -0.076 -0.024
(0.056) (0.084) (0.067) (0.079)
Observations 743 577 743 577
Adjusted R-squared 0.298 0.308 0.259 0.259
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B: Using Alternative Measures for Adding and Removing Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Patents(2) Cites(2) Patents(2) Cites(2)
Add (Fraction) 0.313*** 0.253*
(0.112) (0.147)
Remove(Fraction) 0.066 0.049
(0.062) (0.079)
Add(Log Number) 0.169** 0.129*
(0.063) (0.078)
Remove(Log Number) 0.064 0.036
(0.113) (0.129)
Ln(VC Investment) 0.159*** 0.146*** 0.160*** 0.147***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029)
Ln(Syndicate Size) 0.030 0.015 0.028 0.014
(0.082) (0.088) (0.083) (0.091)
Ln(Mgmt Team Size) -0.070 -0.069 -0.105* -0.092
(0.052) (0.062) (0.057) (0.061)
Observations 743 743 743 743
Adjusted R-squared 0.297 0.258 0.298 0.258
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: The Eﬀect of Adding and Removing Managers on Corporate
Innovation for Firms with Diﬀerent VC Power
This table reports the OLS regression results of corporate innovation on the interaction between
measures for adding and removing managers and a dummy variable for greater VC power. Patents(2)
is the natural log of one plus the number of patents ﬁled over the next two years; Patents(3) is the
natural log of one plus the number of patents ﬁled over the next three years; Cites(2) is the natural
log of one plus the adjusted number of citations received by patents ﬁled over the next two years;
Cites(3) is the natural log of one plus the adjusted number of citations received by patents ﬁled
over the next three years. High Power is a dummy variable equal to one if the number of outside
board members is above the sample median and zero otherwise. Ln(VC Investment) is the natural
log of VC investment amount. Add Only is a dummy variable equal to one if new managers were
added to the management team for a ﬁrm-round and no existing managers were removed, and
zero otherwise; Remove Only is a dummy variable equal to one if existing managers were removed
from the management team for a ﬁrm-round but no new managers were added, and zero otherwise;
Both is a dummy variable equal to one if new managers were added to and existing managers were
removed from a ﬁrm’s management team as well for a ﬁrm-round observation, and zero otherwise.
Ln(VC Investment) is the natural log of VC investment amount. Ln(Syndicate Size) is the natural
log of one plus the number of investing VCs. Ln(Mgmt Team Size) is the natural log of one plus
the total number of managers on the top management team. All standard errors are adjusted for
clustering at the industry level and are reported in parentheses below the coeﬃcient estimates. ***,
**, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Patents(2) Patents(3) Cites(2) Cites(3)
Add Only × High Power 0.345** 0.393** 0.278* 0.306
(0.159) (0.189) (0.169) (0.204)
Both × High Power 0.136 0.285 0.183 0.402*
(0.219) (0.271) (0.221) (0.228)
Remove Only × High Power -0.130 0.371 -0.163 0.189
(0.193) (0.351) (0.244) (0.362)
Add Only 0.011 -0.063 0.043 -0.032
(0.097) (0.127) (0.094) (0.128)
Both -0.007 -0.109 -0.100 -0.261
(0.144) (0.201) (0.151) (0.189)
Remove Only 0.283 -0.066 0.288 0.076
(0.190) (0.333) (0.225) (0.336)
High Power -0.116 -0.151 -0.100 -0.157
(0.084) (0.134) (0.086) (0.128)
Ln(VC Investment) 0.171*** 0.191*** 0.160*** 0.173***
(0.037) (0.046) (0.035) (0.042)
Ln(Syndicate Size) 0.086 0.088 0.070 0.039
(0.072) (0.071) (0.078) (0.086)
Ln(Mgmt Team Size) -0.052 0.080 -0.045 0.064
(0.085) (0.124) (0.100) (0.138)
Observations 743 577 743 577
Adjusted R-squared 0.195 0.175 0.165 0.129
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8: The Eﬀect of Management Team Background on Corporate Innovation
This table reports the eﬀects of adding seasoned CEOs and adding managers with a prior technical
background on corporate innovation. Patents(2) is the natural log of one plus the number of patents
ﬁled over the next two years; Patents(3) is the natural log of one plus the number of patents ﬁled over
the next three years; Cites(2) is the natural log of one plus the adjusted number of citations received
by patents ﬁled over the next two years; Cites(3) is the natural log of one plus the adjusted number
of citations received by patents ﬁled over the next three years. Ln(Seasoned CEOs Added) is the
natural log of one plus the number of managers who have previously worked as CEOs or presidents
in other companies added to the ﬁrm’s management team. Ln(Tech Mgrs Added) is the natural
log of one plus the number of managers with a prior technical background added to the ﬁrm’s
management team. Add (Dummy) is a dummy variable equal to one for a ﬁrm-ﬁnancing round if
new managers were added to the top management team and zero otherwise. Ln(VC Investment)
is the natural log of VC investment amount. Ln(Syndicate Size) is the natural log of one plus the
number of investing VCs. Ln(Mgmt Team Size) is the natural log of one plus the total number
of managers on the top management team. Intercept, industry ﬁxed eﬀects, ﬁnancing year ﬁxed
eﬀects, and startup development stage ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. All standard
errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level and are reported in parentheses below the
coeﬃcient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Patents(2) Patents(3) Cites(2) Cites(3)
Ln(Seasoned CEOs Added) 0.244* 0.303* 0.398** 0.497**
(0.128) (0.157) (0.173) (0.237)
Ln(Tech Mgrs Added) -0.034 -0.089 -0.080 -0.128
(0.139) (0.201) (0.128) (0.178)
Add(Dummy) 0.122 0.087 0.050 -0.000
(0.078) (0.085) (0.086) (0.079)
Ln(VC Investment) 0.163*** 0.200*** 0.150*** 0.174***
(0.032) (0.039) (0.030) (0.038)
Ln(Syndicate Size) 0.030 0.016 0.016 -0.047
(0.086) (0.095) (0.091) (0.104)
Ln(Mgmt Team Size) -0.097* -0.008 -0.082 -0.027
(0.051) (0.091) (0.050) (0.060)
Observations 743 577 743 577
Adjusted R-squared 0.298 0.310 0.263 0.266
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
53
T
a
b
le
9
:
T
h
e
E
ﬀ
e
ct
o
f
T
o
p
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
o
n
C
o
rp
o
ra
te
In
n
o
v
a
ti
o
n
in
D
iﬀ
e
re
n
t
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
S
ta
g
e
s
P
a
n
el
A
o
f
th
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
O
L
S
re
g
re
ss
io
n
re
su
lt
s
of
co
rp
or
a
te
in
n
ov
at
io
n
o
n
to
p
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
ch
a
n
g
es
in
th
e
ea
rl
y
st
a
g
es
ve
rs
u
s
in
th
e
la
te
st
a
g
es
.
P
an
el
B
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
a
d
d
in
g
n
ew
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
re
m
ov
in
g
ex
is
ti
n
g
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
o
n
co
rp
o
ra
te
in
n
ov
a
ti
o
n
in
th
e
ea
rl
y
st
a
g
es
ve
rs
u
s
in
th
e
la
te
st
a
g
es
.
T
h
e
te
st
s
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
th
e
d
iﬀ
er
en
ce
s
b
et
w
ee
n
co
eﬃ
ci
en
ts
o
n
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
ch
a
n
g
es
in
th
e
ea
rl
y
st
a
g
es
ve
rs
u
s
in
th
e
la
te
st
a
g
es
ar
e
re
p
o
rt
ed
a
t
th
e
b
o
tt
o
m
of
ea
ch
p
a
n
el
.
E
a
rl
y
S
ta
ge
in
cl
u
d
es
“
ea
rl
y
st
a
g
e”
a
n
d
“
st
a
rt
-u
p
/
se
ed
”
st
a
g
es
.
L
a
te
S
ta
ge
in
cl
u
d
es
th
e
“
la
te
r
st
a
g
e,
”
“
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
,”
“e
x
p
a
n
si
o
n
,”
an
d
“
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
fo
r
ex
p
a
n
si
o
n
”
st
a
g
es
.
P
a
te
n
ts
(2
)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
o
n
e
p
lu
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
a
te
n
ts
ﬁ
le
d
ov
er
th
e
n
ex
t
tw
o
ye
a
rs
;
P
a
te
n
ts
(3
)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
of
o
n
e
p
lu
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
a
te
n
ts
ﬁ
le
d
ov
er
th
e
n
ex
t
th
re
e
y
ea
rs
;
C
it
es
(2
)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
of
on
e
p
lu
s
th
e
ad
ju
st
ed
n
u
m
b
er
of
ci
ta
ti
o
n
s
re
ce
iv
ed
b
y
p
a
te
n
ts
ﬁ
le
d
ov
er
th
e
n
ex
t
tw
o
ye
a
rs
;
C
it
es
(3
)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
of
o
n
e
p
lu
s
th
e
a
d
ju
st
ed
n
u
m
b
er
of
ci
ta
ti
o
n
s
re
ce
iv
ed
b
y
p
a
te
n
ts
ﬁ
le
d
ov
er
th
e
n
ex
t
th
re
e
ye
a
rs
.
M
gm
t
C
h
a
n
ge
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
eq
u
a
l
to
on
e
fo
r
a
ﬁ
rm
-ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ro
u
n
d
if
th
er
e
w
a
s
a
ch
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
to
p
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
te
a
m
a
n
d
ze
ro
ot
h
er
w
is
e.
A
d
d
O
n
ly
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
eq
u
a
l
to
on
e
if
n
ew
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
w
er
e
a
d
d
ed
to
th
e
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
te
a
m
fo
r
a
ﬁ
rm
-r
o
u
n
d
a
n
d
n
o
ex
is
ti
n
g
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
w
er
e
re
m
ov
ed
,
a
n
d
ze
ro
ot
h
er
w
is
e;
R
em
o
ve
O
n
ly
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
if
ex
is
ti
n
g
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
w
er
e
re
m
ov
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
te
a
m
fo
r
a
ﬁ
rm
-r
o
u
n
d
b
u
t
n
o
n
ew
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
w
er
e
a
d
d
ed
,
a
n
d
ze
ro
o
th
er
w
is
e;
B
o
th
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
eq
u
a
l
to
on
e
if
n
ew
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
w
er
e
a
d
d
ed
to
an
d
ex
is
ti
n
g
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
w
er
e
re
m
ov
ed
fr
o
m
a
ﬁ
rm
’s
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
te
a
m
a
s
w
el
l
fo
r
a
ﬁ
rm
-r
o
u
n
d
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
,
an
d
ze
ro
ot
h
er
w
is
e.
L
n
(V
C
In
ve
st
m
en
t)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
of
V
C
in
ve
st
m
en
t
a
m
o
u
n
t.
L
n
(S
yn
d
ic
a
te
S
iz
e)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
o
n
e
p
lu
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
v
es
ti
n
g
V
C
s.
L
n
(M
gm
t
T
ea
m
S
iz
e)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
of
on
e
p
lu
s
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
o
n
th
e
to
p
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
te
a
m
.
In
te
rc
ep
t,
in
d
u
st
ry
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
,
a
n
d
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ye
a
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
ar
e
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
a
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s.
A
ll
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
ad
ju
st
ed
fo
r
cl
u
st
er
in
g
a
t
th
e
in
d
u
st
ry
le
v
el
a
n
d
ar
e
re
p
or
te
d
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
b
el
ow
th
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
a
te
s.
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
re
p
re
se
n
t
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
,
5
a
n
d
10
p
er
ce
n
t
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
P
an
el
A
:
T
h
e
E
ﬀ
ec
t
of
T
op
M
an
ag
em
en
t
C
h
an
ge
s
on
In
n
ov
at
io
n
in
D
iﬀ
er
en
t
S
ta
ge
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
E
ar
ly
L
at
e
E
ar
ly
L
at
e
E
ar
ly
L
at
e
E
ar
ly
L
at
e
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
P
at
en
ts
(2
)
P
at
en
ts
(2
)
P
at
en
ts
(3
)
P
at
en
ts
(3
)
C
it
es
(2
)
C
it
es
(2
)
C
it
es
(3
)
C
it
es
(3
)
M
gm
t
C
h
an
ge
(β
)
0.
21
2*
**
-0
.0
61
0.
23
3*
**
-0
.0
97
0.
19
7*
**
-0
.0
38
0.
17
9*
*
-0
.0
15
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.1
32
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.2
10
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.1
60
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.1
94
)
L
n
(V
C
In
ve
st
m
en
t)
0.
16
8*
**
0.
22
4*
**
0.
18
3*
**
0.
26
2*
**
0.
17
5*
**
0.
21
2*
**
0.
18
4*
**
0.
24
1*
**
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
56
)
(0
.0
71
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
82
)
L
n
(S
y
n
d
ic
at
e
S
iz
e)
-0
.0
32
0.
17
5*
-0
.0
67
0.
23
0
-0
.0
68
0.
15
1*
-0
.1
38
0.
16
9
(0
.0
83
)
(0
.0
91
)
(0
.0
84
)
(0
.1
56
)
(0
.0
88
)
(0
.0
83
)
(0
.1
08
)
(0
.1
43
)
L
n
(M
gm
t
T
ea
m
S
iz
e)
-0
.0
87
-0
.0
44
0.
03
6
0.
01
8
-0
.1
17
0.
00
3
0.
01
8
-0
.0
10
(0
.1
15
)
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.1
55
)
(0
.1
87
)
(0
.1
51
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.1
98
)
(0
.2
03
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
38
7
34
3
30
2
26
6
38
7
34
3
30
2
26
6
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
16
9
0.
21
6
0.
12
5
0.
21
1
0.
13
0
0.
19
9
0.
07
2
0.
16
4
In
d
u
st
ry
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
S
ta
ge
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
D
if
b
et
w
ee
n
β
0.
27
3*
0.
33
0*
0.
23
5*
0.
19
3
54
P
an
el
B
:
T
h
e
E
ﬀ
ec
t
of
A
d
d
in
g
an
d
R
em
ov
in
g
M
an
ag
er
s
on
In
n
ov
at
io
n
in
D
iﬀ
er
en
t
S
ta
ge
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
E
ar
ly
L
at
e
E
ar
ly
L
at
e
E
ar
ly
L
at
e
E
ar
ly
L
at
e
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
P
at
en
ts
(2
)
P
at
en
ts
(2
)
P
at
en
ts
(3
)
P
at
en
ts
(3
)
C
it
es
(2
)
C
it
es
(2
)
C
it
es
(3
)
C
it
es
(3
)
A
d
d
O
n
ly
(β
a
d
d
)
0.
31
7*
**
-0
.2
01
0.
31
7*
**
-0
.2
92
0.
35
5*
**
-0
.2
16
0.
31
2*
**
-0
.3
32
(0
.0
92
)
(0
.1
96
)
(0
.0
91
)
(0
.2
38
)
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.2
14
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.2
51
)
B
ot
h
0.
09
2
0.
16
4
0.
13
4
0.
12
5
0.
04
0
0.
26
5
0.
05
5
0.
26
8
(0
.0
92
)
(0
.4
37
)
(0
.1
21
)
(0
.6
23
)
(0
.1
23
)
(0
.4
79
)
(0
.1
56
)
(0
.6
92
)
R
em
ov
e
O
n
ly
0.
19
0
0.
08
7
0.
20
7
0.
22
6
0.
13
8
0.
14
4
0.
09
6
0.
54
1
(0
.1
60
)
(0
.1
72
)
(0
.1
94
)
(0
.3
60
)
(0
.1
87
)
(0
.2
21
)
(0
.2
44
)
(0
.3
64
)
L
n
(V
C
In
ve
st
m
en
t)
0.
16
8*
**
0.
22
8*
**
0.
18
2*
**
0.
26
9*
**
0.
17
6*
**
0.
21
7*
**
0.
18
5*
**
0.
25
2*
**
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
83
)
L
n
(S
y
n
d
ic
at
e
S
iz
e)
-0
.0
27
0.
17
0*
-0
.0
61
0.
21
4
-0
.0
62
0.
14
5*
-0
.1
30
0.
14
3
(0
.0
83
)
(0
.0
88
)
(0
.0
90
)
(0
.1
47
)
(0
.0
90
)
(0
.0
77
)
(0
.1
17
)
(0
.1
33
)
L
n
(M
gm
t
T
ea
m
S
iz
e)
-0
.1
00
-0
.0
40
0.
02
2
0.
02
4
-0
.1
44
0.
00
8
-0
.0
17
0.
00
5
(0
.1
46
)
(0
.1
00
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.1
87
)
(0
.1
85
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.2
33
)
(0
.1
98
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
38
7
34
3
30
2
26
6
38
7
34
3
30
2
26
6
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
17
0
0.
21
4
0.
12
1
0.
20
9
0.
13
5
0.
20
0
0.
07
1
0.
17
1
In
d
u
st
ry
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
S
ta
ge
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
D
if
b
et
w
ee
n
β
a
d
d
0.
51
8*
*
0.
61
0*
*
0.
57
0*
*
0.
64
4*
*
55
T
a
b
le
1
0
:
T
h
e
E
ﬀ
e
ct
o
f
T
o
p
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
o
n
In
v
e
n
to
r
M
o
b
il
it
y
P
a
n
el
A
o
f
th
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
to
p
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
ch
a
n
g
es
on
th
e
n
et
in
ﬂ
ow
,
in
ﬂ
ow
,
a
n
d
o
u
tﬂ
ow
o
f
m
o
b
il
e
in
ve
n
to
rs
.
P
a
n
el
B
re
p
or
ts
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
to
p
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
ch
a
n
g
es
an
d
V
C
p
ow
er
on
th
e
n
et
in
ﬂ
ow
,
in
ﬂ
ow
,
an
d
o
u
tﬂ
ow
o
f
m
o
b
il
e
in
ve
n
to
rs
.
In
ﬂ
o
w
(N
)
a
n
d
O
u
tﬂ
o
w
(N
)
a
re
d
eﬁ
n
ed
a
s
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
o
n
e
p
lu
s
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
of
in
ve
n
to
rs
th
a
t
m
ov
e
in
a
n
d
th
a
t
m
ov
e
o
u
t
in
th
e
n
ex
t
N
ye
a
rs
fo
ll
ow
in
g
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
ch
a
n
g
e,
w
h
er
e
N
eq
u
a
ls
2
an
d
3
.
N
et
In
ﬂ
o
w
(N
)
is
d
eﬁ
n
ed
as
th
e
d
iﬀ
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
in
ﬂ
ow
a
n
d
o
u
tﬂ
ow
o
f
in
ve
n
to
rs
a
s
d
es
cr
ib
ed
a
b
ov
e.
H
ig
h
P
o
w
er
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
eq
u
a
l
to
on
e
if
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
of
o
u
ts
id
e
b
o
a
rd
m
em
b
er
s
is
a
b
ov
e
th
e
sa
m
p
le
m
ed
ia
n
a
n
d
ze
ro
o
th
er
w
is
e.
L
n
(V
C
In
ve
st
m
en
t)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
of
V
C
in
v
es
tm
en
t
a
m
o
u
n
t.
L
n
(S
yn
d
ic
a
te
S
iz
e)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
o
n
e
p
lu
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
v
es
ti
n
g
V
C
s.
L
n
(M
gm
t
T
ea
m
S
iz
e)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
of
on
e
p
lu
s
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
o
n
th
e
to
p
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
te
a
m
.
In
te
rc
ep
t,
in
d
u
st
ry
b
y
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
,
st
a
rt
u
p
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
st
a
g
e
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
,
a
n
d
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ro
u
n
d
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
a
re
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
al
l
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s.
A
ll
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
ad
ju
st
ed
fo
r
cl
u
st
er
in
g
a
t
th
e
in
d
u
st
ry
le
ve
l
a
n
d
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
b
el
ow
th
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
a
te
s.
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
re
p
re
se
n
t
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1
,
5
an
d
1
0
p
er
ce
n
t
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
P
an
el
A
:
T
h
e
E
ﬀ
ec
t
of
T
op
M
an
ag
em
en
t
C
h
an
ge
s
on
th
e
N
et
In
ﬂ
ow
,
In
ﬂ
ow
,
an
d
O
u
tﬂ
ow
of
In
ve
n
to
rs
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
N
et
In
ﬂ
ow
(2
)
In
ﬂ
ow
(2
)
O
u
tﬂ
ow
(2
)
N
et
In
ﬂ
ow
(3
)
In
ﬂ
ow
(3
)
O
u
tﬂ
ow
(3
)
M
gm
t
C
h
an
ge
0.
05
7*
**
0.
05
6*
**
-0
.0
01
0.
06
2*
0.
06
2*
-0
.0
00
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
02
)
L
n
(V
C
In
ve
st
m
en
t)
0.
05
2*
*
0.
05
5*
*
0.
00
4
0.
07
4*
**
0.
07
9*
**
0.
00
5
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
03
)
L
n
(S
y
n
d
ic
at
e
S
iz
e)
0.
03
3
0.
03
4
0.
00
1
0.
04
9
0.
05
0
0.
00
1
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
05
)
L
n
(M
gm
t
T
ea
m
S
iz
e)
-0
.0
24
-0
.0
22
0.
00
2
0.
00
3
0.
00
5
0.
00
2
(0
.0
61
)
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
95
)
(0
.0
94
)
(0
.0
07
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
74
3
74
3
74
3
57
7
57
7
57
7
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
11
2
0.
13
9
0.
20
1
0.
12
9
0.
15
2
0.
19
5
In
d
u
st
ry
-b
y
-Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
S
ta
ge
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
ou
n
d
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
56
P
an
el
B
:
T
h
e
E
ﬀ
ec
t
of
T
op
M
an
ag
em
en
t
C
h
an
ge
s
an
d
V
C
P
ow
er
on
th
e
N
et
In
ﬂ
ow
,
In
ﬂ
ow
,
an
d
O
u
tﬂ
ow
of
M
ob
il
e
In
ve
n
to
rs
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
N
et
In
ﬂ
ow
(2
)
In
ﬂ
ow
(2
)
O
u
tﬂ
ow
(2
)
N
et
In
ﬂ
ow
(3
)
In
ﬂ
ow
(3
)
O
u
tﬂ
ow
(3
)
M
gm
t
C
h
an
ge
×
H
ig
h
P
ow
er
0.
13
5*
**
0.
11
3*
*
-0
.0
22
0.
12
4*
*
0.
09
5
-0
.0
29
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
31
)
M
gm
t
C
h
an
ge
-0
.0
27
-0
.0
18
0.
00
9
-0
.0
27
-0
.0
13
0.
01
3
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
17
)
H
ig
h
P
ow
er
-0
.0
52
-0
.0
52
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
38
-0
.0
39
-0
.0
01
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
05
)
L
n
(V
C
In
ve
st
m
en
t)
0.
05
1*
**
0.
05
5*
**
0.
00
4
0.
07
2*
**
0.
07
8*
**
0.
00
6*
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
03
)
L
n
(S
y
n
d
ic
at
e
S
iz
e)
0.
02
9
0.
03
0
0.
00
1
0.
03
7
0.
03
8
0.
00
0
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
05
)
L
n
(M
gm
t
T
ea
m
S
iz
e)
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
00
0.
01
3
0.
01
2
-0
.0
00
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
90
)
(0
.0
90
)
(0
.0
05
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
74
3
74
3
74
3
57
7
57
7
57
7
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
11
9
0.
14
3
0.
20
9
0.
13
3
0.
15
3
0.
20
4
In
d
u
st
ry
-b
y
-Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
S
ta
ge
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
ou
n
d
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
57
T
a
b
le
1
1
:
T
h
e
E
ﬀ
e
ct
o
f
T
o
p
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
a
n
d
C
o
rp
o
ra
te
In
n
o
v
a
ti
o
n
o
n
th
e
S
u
cc
e
ss
fu
l
E
x
it
o
f
V
e
n
tu
re
-B
a
ck
e
d
P
ri
v
a
te
F
ir
m
s
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
ﬁ
rm
-l
ev
el
p
ro
b
it
re
g
re
ss
io
n
re
su
lt
s
of
th
e
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
of
th
e
su
cc
es
sf
u
l
ex
it
o
f
ve
n
tu
re
-b
a
ck
ed
ﬁ
rm
s
o
n
to
p
m
a
n
-
a
g
em
en
t
ch
a
n
g
es
an
d
co
rp
o
ra
te
in
n
ov
a
ti
o
n
ou
tp
u
t
g
en
er
a
te
d
u
p
to
th
e
la
st
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ro
u
n
d
.
IP
O
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
if
th
e
ﬁ
rm
ex
it
ed
v
ia
a
n
in
it
ia
l
p
u
b
li
c
o
ﬀ
er
in
g
w
it
h
in
te
n
ye
a
rs
of
th
e
ﬁ
rs
t
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ro
u
n
d
a
n
d
ze
ro
o
th
er
w
is
e.
M
A
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
if
th
e
ve
n
tu
re
-b
a
ck
ed
ﬁ
rm
ex
it
ed
v
ia
a
n
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
w
it
h
in
te
n
ye
a
rs
of
th
e
ﬁ
rs
t
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ro
u
n
d
a
n
d
ze
ro
o
th
er
w
is
e.
E
xi
t
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
eq
u
a
l
to
on
e
if
th
e
ve
n
tu
re
-b
a
ck
ed
ﬁ
rm
ex
it
ed
v
ia
ei
th
er
a
n
in
it
ia
l
p
u
b
li
c
o
ﬀ
er
in
g
o
r
a
n
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
w
it
h
in
te
n
y
ea
rs
o
f
th
e
ﬁ
rs
t
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ro
u
n
d
a
n
d
ze
ro
ot
h
er
w
is
e.
L
n
(T
o
ta
l
A
d
d
ed
)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
of
on
e
p
lu
s
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
th
a
t
h
av
e
b
ee
n
a
d
d
ed
to
th
e
ﬁ
rm
’s
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
te
a
m
u
p
to
th
e
la
st
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ro
u
n
d
.
L
n
(T
o
ta
l
R
em
o
ve
d
)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
o
n
e
p
lu
s
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
th
a
t
h
av
e
b
ee
n
re
m
ov
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
ﬁ
rm
’s
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
te
a
m
u
p
to
th
e
la
st
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ro
u
n
d
.
L
n
(T
o
ta
l
P
a
te
n
ts
)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
o
n
e
p
lu
s
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
of
p
a
te
n
ts
ﬁ
le
d
b
y
th
e
ve
n
tu
re
-b
a
ck
ed
ﬁ
rm
u
p
to
th
e
la
st
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ro
u
n
d
.
L
n
(T
o
ta
l
C
it
a
ti
o
n
s)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
of
on
e
p
lu
s
th
e
a
d
ju
st
ed
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
ci
ta
ti
o
n
s
re
ce
iv
ed
b
y
al
l
th
e
p
a
te
n
ts
ﬁ
le
d
b
y
th
e
ve
n
tu
re
-b
a
ck
ed
ﬁ
rm
s
u
p
to
th
e
la
st
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ro
u
n
d
.
L
n
(V
C
In
ve
st
m
en
t)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
of
th
e
V
C
in
v
es
tm
en
t
a
m
o
u
n
t.
L
n
(A
ge
)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
th
e
a
g
e
o
f
th
e
ﬁ
rm
in
th
e
la
st
V
C
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ro
u
n
d
.
V
C
S
yn
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
eq
u
a
l
to
on
e
if
a
ﬁ
rm
is
b
a
ck
ed
b
y
m
o
re
th
a
n
o
n
e
V
C
ﬁ
rm
in
a
n
y
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ro
u
n
d
a
n
d
ze
ro
o
th
er
w
is
e.
In
te
rc
ep
t
an
d
in
d
u
st
ry
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
ar
e
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
a
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
b
el
ow
th
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
a
te
s.
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
re
p
re
se
n
t
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
,
5
a
n
d
1
0
p
er
ce
n
t
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
IP
O
IP
O
IP
O
M
A
M
A
M
A
E
x
it
E
x
it
E
x
it
L
n
(T
ot
al
A
d
d
ed
)
0.
47
0*
*
0.
44
2*
0.
44
3*
0.
11
3
0.
08
8
0.
08
7
0.
25
2*
0.
22
3
0.
22
2
(0
.2
37
)
(0
.2
36
)
(0
.2
36
)
(0
.1
44
)
(0
.1
44
)
(0
.1
45
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.1
39
)
(0
.1
39
)
L
n
(T
ot
al
R
em
ov
ed
)
-0
.1
42
-0
.1
46
-0
.1
28
-0
.1
12
-0
.1
24
-0
.1
19
-0
.1
40
-0
.1
54
-0
.1
49
(0
.2
75
)
(0
.2
80
)
(0
.2
76
)
(0
.1
58
)
(0
.1
61
)
(0
.1
61
)
(0
.1
55
)
(0
.1
58
)
(0
.1
58
)
L
n
(T
ot
al
P
at
en
ts
)
0.
22
6*
*
0.
15
6*
0.
19
0*
*
(0
.1
14
)
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.0
86
)
L
n
(T
ot
al
C
it
at
io
n
s)
0.
20
8*
*
0.
14
2*
*
0.
17
8*
*
(0
.0
94
)
(0
.0
71
)
(0
.0
70
)
L
n
(V
C
In
ve
st
m
en
t)
0.
59
5*
**
0.
56
9*
**
0.
57
2*
**
0.
19
4*
**
0.
17
0*
*
0.
17
4*
*
0.
31
6*
**
0.
28
6*
**
0.
29
1*
**
(0
.1
77
)
(0
.1
82
)
(0
.1
82
)
(0
.0
68
)
(0
.0
70
)
(0
.0
70
)
(0
.0
71
)
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.0
72
)
L
n
(A
ge
)
0.
09
7
0.
11
5
0.
11
6
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
22
-0
.0
19
0.
02
5
0.
01
8
0.
02
1
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.1
05
)
(0
.0
97
)
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.0
89
)
(0
.0
89
)
(0
.0
88
)
V
C
S
y
n
d
ic
at
io
n
-0
.6
49
-0
.6
33
-0
.6
86
0.
29
2
0.
31
2
0.
28
0
0.
14
0
0.
16
3
0.
12
4
(0
.5
67
)
(0
.5
84
)
(0
.5
97
)
(0
.2
83
)
(0
.2
77
)
(0
.2
80
)
(0
.2
79
)
(0
.2
72
)
(0
.2
77
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
42
2
42
2
42
2
42
2
42
2
42
2
42
2
42
2
42
2
In
d
u
st
ry
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
P
se
u
d
o
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
25
6
0.
27
9
0.
28
4
0.
05
4
0.
06
1
0.
06
3
0.
07
8
0.
08
6
0.
09
1
58
Table 12: Robustness Test: Controlling for Industry-by-State-by-Year Fixed
Eﬀects
This table reports the OLS regression results of corporate innovation on top management changes
controlling for industry-by-state-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Patents(2) is the natural log of one plus
the number of patents ﬁled over the next two years; Patents(3) is the natural log of one plus the
number of patents ﬁled over the next three years; Cites(2) is the natural log of one plus the adjusted
number of citations received by patents ﬁled over the next two years; Cites(3) is the natural log of
one plus the adjusted number of citations received by patents ﬁled over the next three years. Mgmt
Change is a dummy variable equal to one for a ﬁrm-ﬁnancing round if there was a change in the
composition of the top management team and zero otherwise. Ln(VC Investment) is the natural log
of VC investment amount. Ln(Syndicate Size) is the natural log of one plus the number of investing
VCs. Ln(Mgmt Team Size) is the natural log of one plus the total number of managers on the
top management team. Intercept, industry-by-state-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects, and startup development
stage ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at
the industry level and are reported in parentheses below the coeﬃcient estimates. ***, **, and *
represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Patents(2) Patents(3) Cites(2) Cites(3)
Mgmt Change 0.137* 0.133** 0.119 0.152**
(0.076) (0.060) (0.098) (0.052)
Ln(VC Investment) 0.129*** 0.191*** 0.132*** 0.172***
(0.025) (0.033) (0.029) (0.043)
Ln(Syndicate Size) 0.157 0.145 0.103 0.025
(0.114) (0.145) (0.148) (0.187)
Ln(Mgmt Team Size) 0.111 0.263** 0.098 0.209*
(0.107) (0.118) (0.087) (0.104)
Observations 743 577 743 577
Adjusted R-squared 0.154 0.186 0.124 0.137
Industry-by-Year-by-State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 13: Placebo Test: The Eﬀect of Top Management Changes on Corporate
Innovation Generated Prior to Top Management Changes
This table reports the OLS regression results of corporate innovation generated over the past two
or three years on top management changes. Patents(−2) is the natural log of one plus the number
of patents ﬁled in the past two years prior to management change; Patents(−3) is the natural log of
one plus the number of patents ﬁled in the past three years prior to management change; Cites(−2)
is the natural log of one plus the adjusted number of citations received by patents ﬁled in the past
two years prior to management change; Cites(−3) is the natural log of one plus the adjusted number
of citations received by patents ﬁled in the past three years prior to management change. Mgmt
Change is a dummy variable equal to one for a ﬁrm-ﬁnancing round if there was a change in the
composition of the top management team and zero otherwise. Ln(VC Investment) is the natural log
of VC investment amount. Ln(Syndicate Size) is the natural log of one plus the number of investing
VCs. Ln(Mgmt Team Size) is the natural log of one plus the total number of managers on the
top management team. Intercept, industry ﬁxed eﬀects, ﬁnancing year ﬁxed eﬀects, and startup
development stage ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for
clustering at the industry level and are reported in parentheses below the coeﬃcient estimates. ***,
**, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Patents(−2) Patents(−3) Cites(−2) Cites(−3)
Mgmt Change 0.029 0.059 0.025 0.055
(0.046) (0.057) (0.038) (0.042)
Ln(VC Investment) 0.116*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.129***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Ln(Syndicate Size) 0.086 0.087 0.075 0.075
(0.054) (0.061) (0.051) (0.058)
Ln(Mgmt Team Size) 0.052 0.055 0.040 0.035
(0.058) (0.065) (0.066) (0.076)
Observations 976 976 976 976
Adjusted R-squared 0.165 0.173 0.125 0.138
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 14: Robustness Test: Controlling for Lead VC Firm Fixed Eﬀects
This table reports the OLS regression results of corporate innovation on top management changes
controlling for the lead VC ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Patents(2) is the natural log of one plus the number
of patents ﬁled over the next two years; Patents(3) is the natural log of one plus the number of
patents ﬁled over the next three years; Cites(2) is the natural log of one plus the adjusted number
of citations received by patents ﬁled over the next two years; Cites(3) is the natural log of one
plus the adjusted number of citations received by patents ﬁled over the next three years. Mgmt
Change is a dummy variable equal to one for a ﬁrm-ﬁnancing round if there was a change in the
composition of the top management team and zero otherwise. Ln(VC Investment) is the natural
log of VC investment amount. Ln(Syndicate Size) is the natural log of one plus the number of
investing VCs. Ln(Mgmt Team Size) is the natural log of one plus the total number of managers
on the top management team. Intercept, lead VC ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, industry ﬁxed eﬀects, ﬁnancing
year ﬁxed eﬀects, and startup development stage ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. All
standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level and are reported in parentheses
below the coeﬃcient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Patents(2) Patents(3) Cites(2) Cites(3)
Mgmt Change 0.219*** 0.267** 0.180** 0.222
(0.064) (0.111) (0.075) (0.155)
Ln(VC Investment) 0.119** 0.209** 0.113** 0.198*
(0.056) (0.087) (0.053) (0.103)
Ln(Syndicate Size) 0.118 0.072 0.079 -0.006
(0.142) (0.233) (0.141) (0.278)
Ln(Mgmt Team Size) -0.068 0.008 -0.067 -0.011
(0.187) (0.194) (0.155) (0.161)
Observations 722 557 722 557
Adjusted R-squared 0.400 0.371 0.328 0.265
Lead VC Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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2 Venture Capital Backing, Investor Attention, and
Initial Public Oﬀerings
2.1 Introduction
It is by now well established that venture capitalists add product market value to the private
ﬁrms that they invest in, either by helping them to improve ﬁrm eﬃciency (Chemmanur,
Krishnan, and Nandy (2011)) or through monitoring (see, e.g., Gompers (1995) or Lerner
(1995)). However, practitioners also talk about venture capitalists helping to create value for
the ﬁrm in the ﬁnancial market at the time the ﬁrm goes public. The channels through which
such value is created, however, are less well-understood. The objective of this paper is to
explore a new channel through which VCs may create value in the IPO market for the private
ﬁrms that they invest in over and above any value they have created for these ﬁrms in the
product market. We propose a new channel through which VCs may create value at the time
of IPO for a ﬁrm that they have invested in, namely, by attracting greater investor attention
to the ﬁrm’s IPO. Using proxies for investor attention, we ﬁrst test whether VC-backed
ﬁrm IPOs are indeed associated with greater investor attention relative to non-VC-backed
ﬁrm IPOs. We then develop testable predictions regarding the implications of this ability of
VC-backing to attract greater investor attention to a ﬁrm going public for various speciﬁc
characteristics (e.g., ﬁrm valuation at IPO) of VC-backed versus non-VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs
and empirically test these predictions.
An important hypothesis that has signiﬁcant currency in the existing literature regarding
ﬁnancial market value-creation by VCs for their portfolio ﬁrms is the venture capital (VC)
“certiﬁcation hypothesis”: see, e.g., Megginson and Weiss (1991). This hypothesis postulates
that venture capitalists are able to “certify” the value of a ﬁrm backed by them to the
ﬁnancial market, thus reducing the information asymmetry faced by the ﬁrm in the IPO
market. The argument here is that this reduces information asymmetry, and in turn, leads
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to a lower extent of underpricing for the IPOs of VC-backed ﬁrms relative to that for the
IPOs of non-VC-backed ﬁrms. The certiﬁcation hypothesis, however, has been called into
question by the evidence from the 1990s and later, which shows that VC-backed IPOs were,
in fact, more (not less) underpriced than non-VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs (see, e.g., Lee and
Wahal (2004)). However, while the notion that VC-backing reduces underpricing has been
contradicted by the empirical evidence, it is nevertheless possible that, given the empirical
evidence that VCs select higher quality ﬁrms to invest in and add product market value to
them (see, e.g., Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy (2011)), investors may infer that a ﬁrm
going public is of higher quality (intrinsic value) from the fact that it is VC-backed. The
investor attention channel that we propose in this paper and the above “weak form” of the
certiﬁcation hypothesis are not mutually exclusive: we control for this certiﬁcation eﬀect in
our empirical analysis.28
Precisely how may VC-backing aﬀect the IPO characteristics of a ﬁrm when it goes
public through the investor attention channel? To address this question, we start by as-
suming that for institutional investors to participate in a ﬁrm’s IPO, they not only need to
receive information about various aspects of that ﬁrm from an investment bank, but also
to pay attention to or “recognize” this information. This last assumption is in the spirit of
Merton’s (1987) investor recognition or attention model, which assumes that an investor will
incorporate a security into his portfolio only if he pays attention to (or acquires information
about) that security. While Merton (1987) posits several possible sources of his “attention”
or “recognition” cost, he views this cost mainly as arising from the cost of investors becom-
ing aware of (or familiar with) a ﬁrm: in his setting, investors consider investing only in the
28We use the term “weak form” of the certiﬁcation hypothesis to capture the notion that IPO market
investors may infer that the ﬁrm is of higher quality from the fact that it is VC-backed (with implications
for ﬁrm valuation and other IPO characteristics). This is in contrast to the stronger implications of the
original certiﬁcation hypothesis such as the reduction in information asymmetry facing a VC-backed ﬁrm
or lower underpricing for VC-backed ﬁrms (compared to non-VC-backed ﬁrms), which can be thought of as
arising from a “strong form” of the certiﬁcation hypothesis. In order to establish that the investor attention
channel of VC value creation in the ﬁnancial market that we propose in this paper has eﬀects on the IPO
characteristics of VC-backed ﬁrms over and above any certiﬁcation eﬀects of VC-backing, we control for
potential diﬀerences in intrinsic quality between VC-backed and non-VC-backed ﬁrms in a variety of ways
(discussed in the main text).
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stock of ﬁrms with which they have a certain level of familiarity. In a similar vein, we can
think of institutional and other investors considering for investment only the stock of IPO
ﬁrms that they have become familiar with by incurring a cost.29
We now make the additional assumption that the above attention cost for investors is
lower for VC-backed IPOs compared to that for non-VC-backed IPOs. This may be because
VCs are repeat players in the IPO market, so that institutional investors may have had
repeated prior interactions with the VCs backing a given IPO ﬁrm. For example, some
institutional investors may have previously invested in IPOs backed by one or more of the
VCs backing the current IPO ﬁrm, and had a good experience from the point of view of
their investment paying oﬀ a high return. Alternatively, they may have heard about other
institutions having made such successful prior investments in IPOs backed by one or more of
the VCs backing the current IPO ﬁrm. In the context of the Merton (1987) model, the above
assumption implies that investors’ cost of paying attention to VC-backed IPO ﬁrms will, on
average, be lower compared to that for paying attention to non-VC-backed IPO ﬁrms. This,
in turn, implies that more institutions are likely to pay attention to a particular IPO if that
IPO is VC-backed relative to the situation where it is not VC-backed.30
The notion that VC-backed IPO ﬁrms may attract greater attention from institutional
investors has important implications for the IPO pricing process, and in particular, for the
book-building and road-show process in IPOs. The practitioner literature points to the two-
way information ﬂow occurring during the IPO road-show and book-building process between
IPO underwriters and institutions: while underwriters collect information from institutions
about their demand schedules for the IPO ﬁrm’s shares during this process (information
extraction), they also address institutions’ questions and concerns about the future strategy
and performance of the IPO ﬁrm (information dissemination). We can therefore think of two
29The Merton (1987) model has been extended by Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009), who assume
that such attention/information acquisition has a cost. See also the theoretical IPO model of Liu, Lu,
Sherman, and Zhang (2016) who also make such an assumption.
30By a similar argument, we expect institutions’ attention cost to be lower for high-reputation VC-backed
IPOs relative to that for low-reputation VC-backed IPOs. This, in turn, implies that institutions are more
likely to pay attention to an IPO if it is high-reputation VC-backed rather than low-reputation VC-backed.
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ways in which the greater investor attention that may be generated by the VC-backing of IPO
ﬁrms may aﬀect the characteristics of VC-backed versus non-VC-backed IPOs. First, such
greater investor attention may aﬀect the ability of a lead IPO underwriter to disseminate
information about the IPO ﬁrm to institutional investors. Second, such greater investor
attention may aﬀect a lead IPO underwriter’s ability to extract information from institutions
about their demand for the IPO ﬁrm’s equity.
We ﬁrst discuss how VC-backing and the greater investor attention it draws to a ﬁrm’s
IPO aﬀects information dissemination. An important strand in the theoretical literature on
IPOs has argued that the role of an underwriter in an IPO is that of a producer of noisy
information about the ﬁrm it takes public and a transmitter of that information to potential
investors in its IPO: see, e.g., Booth and Smith (1986) or Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994).
However, unlike this literature, which has argued that a lead IPO underwriter transmits
information to investors about the IPO using its reputation as a certiﬁcation mechanism,
we postulate here that the lead underwriter transmits noisy information about the IPO ﬁrm
to potential IPO investors either directly, or through the other investment banks in the
IPO syndicate.31 As we discussed earlier, we have assumed that, for institutional investors
to participate in a ﬁrm’s IPO, they not only need to receive information about various
aspects of that ﬁrm from the IPO underwriter, but also to pay attention to or “recognize”
this information in the spirit of Merton’s (1987) investor recognition model. This has an
important implication for information dissemination. The implication is that, since, on
average, a greater number of institutions will pay attention to an IPO if it is VC-backed, the
dissemination of information about the IPO ﬁrm from the underwriter to institutions will be
more eﬃcient if the IPO is VC-backed. We will refer to this hypothesis as the “information
dissemination through investor attention” hypothesis.
31Unlike their role in the certiﬁcation literature, the role of lead IPO underwriters that we postulate here
is essentially that of “marketing” IPOs to institutional investors making use of their investment banking
syndicate and the ongoing relationships individual investment banks in the IPO syndicate may have with
various institutional investors. See also a related paper by Gao and Ritter (2010), who analyze the eﬀects
of marketing eﬀorts by underwriters in seasoned equity oﬀerings.
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We now turn to the eﬀect of VC-backing on information extraction. The theoretical
book-building literature that originated with Benveniste and Spindt (1989) has modeled
an IPO underwriter as concerned with extracting truthful information from institutional
investors who have private information about their own valuation of the IPO ﬁrm (and
therefore their demand schedule for the ﬁrm’s shares), and using the IPO share allocation
process to design an incentive compatible mechanism to extract this information. In the
above setting, we again introduce our assumption that institutions’ cost of paying attention to
an IPO is lower for VC-backed than for non-VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs, in which case institutional
investors are more likely to pay attention to the IPO of a VC-backed ﬁrm rather than that
of a non-VC-backed ﬁrm. Since a lead IPO underwriter has to ﬁrst attract the attention of
institutional investors to the ﬁrm whose IPO they are underwriting before they can extract
information from them about their valuation of the ﬁrm’s equity, this also implies that a
lead IPO underwriter will be able to extract information from institutions more eﬃciently
in the case of VC-backed IPOs relative to the case of non-VC-backed IPOs. We will refer to
this hypothesis as the “information extraction through investor attention” hypothesis.32
In summary, we have argued above that an important eﬀect of the VC-backing of IPOs
is to induce a larger number of institutions to pay attention to IPO ﬁrms, thus making it
easier for the lead underwriter to disseminate information about the ﬁrm to institutions and
to extract information from them about their demand for the IPO ﬁrm’s equity. As we
discuss in detail in Section 2.3, this has implications for various IPO characteristics such
as the absolute value of IPO oﬀer price revisions; IPO and immediate secondary market
valuations of the ﬁrm; IPO initial returns; and participation by institutional investors and
ﬁnancial analysts in IPOs or its immediate secondary market (the former by holding IPO
32Some of our discussion above of the eﬀect of VC-backing on information dissemination and information
extraction by IPO underwriters is parallel to the arguments made by Bajo, Chemmanur, Simonyan, and
Tehranian (2016). Similar to our paper, they also focus on the ability of a lead underwriter to disseminate
information to institutions and to extract information from them. Unlike our paper, however, the focus of
that paper is on the eﬀect of the centrality of lead IPO underwriters in their investment banking networks on
their ability to eﬃciently disseminate information about IPO ﬁrms they take public to institutional investors
and to extract information from them.
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ﬁrms’ equity and the latter by providing analyst coverage). We test these implications in
our empirical analysis.
Before empirically analyzing the relation between VC-backing, investor attention, and
various speciﬁc IPO characteristics, we ﬁrst analyze whether VC-backed IPOs are indeed able
to garner greater investor attention than non-VC-backed IPOs. In conducting this analysis,
we make use of a proxy for investor attention developed by Liu, Sherman, and Zhang (2014),
namely, pre-IPO media coverage received by the ﬁrm going public. Liu, Sherman, and
Zhang (2014) argue that, since media sources compete to attract readers and advertising
revenues, editors expect their reporters to cover those ﬁrms which have already received
investor attention or are expected to receive such attention in the future. Consequently,
the pre-IPO media coverage of ﬁrms going public serves as a good proxy for the degree of
attention investors pay to such ﬁrms. We therefore make use of this proxy to test the notion
that VC-backed IPOs are associated with greater investor attention.
We then move on to test the relation between VC-backing, investor attention, and
various speciﬁc IPO characteristics. One diﬃculty with conducting such an analysis is that
diﬀerences in various IPO characteristics between VC-backed and non-VC-backed ﬁrms may
be driven by considerations other than diﬀerences in investor attention. For example, VC-
backed and non-VC-backed ﬁrms may diﬀer in terms of their intrinsic value (quality) pre-
IPO. Such diﬀerences in intrinsic value may arise, for example, from VCs investing in higher
quality ﬁrms to begin with (screening) or by VCs adding greater product market value to
these ﬁrms pre-IPO (value addition or monitoring). Consequently, in our empirical analysis,
we explicitly allow for the fact that diﬀerences in the IPO characteristics of VC-backed and
non-VC-backed ﬁrms may be due to diﬀerences in their intrinsic quality (and the resulting
valuation diﬀerences as inferred by investors: i.e., the certiﬁcation eﬀect) as well as their
diﬀerences in investor attention (as proxied by media coverage) across the two kinds of
IPOs. As we discuss below, we accomplish this in three diﬀerent ways.
First, in our OLS analysis, we choose not to rely purely on comparisons of IPO charac-
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teristics between VC-backed versus non-VC-backed ﬁrms to test our hypotheses. Instead, we
use interaction tests to split up the eﬀect of VC-backing on various IPO characteristics (e.g.,
IPO valuation) into three components. The ﬁrst component we identify is the direct eﬀect
of VC-backing, as captured by the coeﬃcient of a VC-backing dummy, on IPO valuation.
This component can be interpreted as coming partly from the higher intrinsic value of VC-
backed ﬁrms (as inferred by the ﬁnancial market).33 The second component, whose eﬀect
is captured by the coeﬃcient of our high (above median) investor attention dummy, can be
interpreted as a “pure” investor attention eﬀect: i.e., the direct eﬀect of receiving higher
investor attention on the IPO valuation of any ﬁrm (though, under our theory, we expect
VC-backed ﬁrms to be more likely to receive higher investor attention than non-VC backed
ﬁrms). The third component, whose eﬀect is captured by the coeﬃcient of the interaction
term between VC-backing and the high investor attention dummy, can be interpreted as the
incremental eﬀect of higher investor attention on the valuation of VC-backed ﬁrms relative
to that of non-VC-backed ﬁrms. Thus, we use our interaction tests to analyze whether there
is an incremental eﬀect of higher investor attention on various IPO characteristics of VC-
backed ﬁrms even after controlling for the eﬀect of possible diﬀerences in quality (intrinsic
value) between VC- and non-VC-backed ﬁrms going public.
Second, we conduct a dynamic analysis of the diﬀerence in valuation between VC- and
non-VC-backed ﬁrms, analyzing how ﬁrm valuation changes over the period of one, two,
and three years after IPO for the two types of ﬁrms. Since we expect investor attention to
dissipate (fade) to some extent after the IPO over time, we expect the diﬀerences in market
valuation between VC and non-VC-backed ﬁrms (generated by the higher investor attention
received by VC-backed ﬁrms) to become correspondingly smaller as time passes after the
IPO. Further, if we assume that investor attention will decline to a greater extent (with
33Thus, a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the VC-backing dummy in the regression of IPO valuation
would indicate that VC-backed ﬁrms are valued higher on average than non-VC-backed ﬁrms at IPO: this
could be partially due to VC-backed ﬁrms having higher intrinsic value than non-VC-backed ﬁrms, and
partially due to VC-backed ﬁrms receiving greater investor attention than non-VC-backed ﬁrms. A similar
interpretation of the VC-backing dummy holds in our regressions of other IPO characteristics as well.
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the passage of time) for ﬁrms that received a higher level of such attention at the time of
IPO (and assuming that the eﬀect of investor attention is stronger on the valuation of VC-
backed than that of non-VC-backed ﬁrms), we expect to ﬁnd in our interaction test that the
valuation of VC-backed ﬁrms that received higher (above median) investor attention at IPO
declines to a greater extent post-IPO with the passage of time.34
Third, we control for the fact that VC-backing and investor attention (as well as favor-
able IPO characteristics) may be endogenous. In other words, it is possible that ﬁrms with
certain intrinsic characteristics are more likely to receive VC backing as well as to receive
greater investor attention, so that the greater investor attention and favorable IPO char-
acteristics that we document for VC-backed ﬁrms may be due to these underlying intrinsic
ﬁrm characteristics rather than due to VC-backing itself. We control for this endogeneity by
instrumenting for VC-backing. Similar to the methodology of Samila and Sorenson (2011),
the instrument we use for VC-backing is the product of the number of limited partners (who
invest in VC funds) in the state where the IPO ﬁrm is headquartered and the average in-
vestment returns of college endowment funds for the ten years preceding the ﬁrm’s IPO. Our
instrument is motivated by the following three well-documented facts: First, the LPs of VC
funds generally adopt an investing strategy that has a ﬁxed optimal allocation ratio to dis-
tribute their investment over diﬀerent asset classes, which includes equity, ﬁxed income, and
alternative assets (such as venture capital, private equity, and hedge funds). When univer-
sity endowments earn higher returns, they are likely to shift more of their assets into venture
capital to maintain the above optimal ratio. Second, these LPs exhibit a “home bias” when
investing in venture capital, i.e., they are likely to invest in VC funds headquartered close
to them. Third, VC funds also have a “home bias”: i.e., they have a strong tendency to
invest in entrepreneurial (private) ﬁrms close to them so that it is easier for them to monitor
34Using similar arguments, and under similar assumptions about the eﬀect of investor attention fading
over time (and assuming that the eﬀect of investor attention is stronger on valuation of high-reputation
VC-backed ﬁrms than that of low-reputation VC-backed ﬁrms), we expect the valuation of high-reputation
VC-backed ﬁrms receiving higher (above median) investor attention to decline to a greater extent as time
passes post-IPO.
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and advise these ﬁrms (see, e.g., Tian (2011)). The above three facts collectively imply that
higher endowment returns earned by LPs likely lead to more venture capital investments in
ﬁrms in the same state as the LPs in the next few years, so that we expect our instrument to
be positively related to the probability of VC-backing of a sample ﬁrm. We conﬁrm that this
is indeed the case empirically in the ﬁrst stage of our IV analysis. The exclusion restriction
for this instrument for VC-backing is also likely to be satisﬁed, since this instrument is likely
to be unrelated to the underlying ﬁrm characteristics of the IPO ﬁrms in our sample.
The results of our analysis of the relation between VC-backing and investor attention
can be summarized as follows. First, we ﬁnd from our baseline regression analysis that
VC-backed IPOs are associated with a greater amount of investor attention as proxied by
pre-IPO media coverage. Second, high-reputation VC-backed IPOs receive greater investor
attention than low-reputation VC-backed IPOs. Third, the second-stage regressions of our
IV analysis with investor attention as the dependent variable show that VC-backed IPOs
are associated with a greater amount of investor attention (as proxied by pre-IPO media
coverage), and that this relation is causal.
We now discuss the results of our analysis of the relation between VC-backing, investor
attention, and IPO characteristics. First, VC-backed IPOs are associated with larger ab-
solute values of IPO oﬀer price revisions. Further, our interaction tests reveal that, even
after controlling for the direct eﬀect of VC-backing, there is an incremental positive eﬀect of
higher (above median) investor attention received by VC-backed ﬁrms on the absolute value
of IPO oﬀer price revisions. Second, VC-backed IPOs are associated with greater IPO and
secondary market valuations, and greater IPO initial returns. Further, our interaction tests
reveal that, even after controlling for the direct eﬀect of VC-backing, there is an incremental
positive eﬀect of higher (above median) investor attention received by VC-backed ﬁrms on
IPO and secondary market valuations as well as on IPO initial returns.
The above results show two things. First, VC-backed ﬁrms have more favorable IPO
characteristics, namely IPO and secondary market valuations and IPO initial returns, than
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non-VC-backed ﬁrms. Second, the fact that the coeﬃcient of the interaction terms between
higher investor attention and VC-backing is positive and signiﬁcant in each of our OLS
regression analyses of the above three IPO variables is consistent with the notion that the
productivity of investor attention (in generating IPO and secondary market valuations and
IPO initial returns) is greater for VC-backed than for non-VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs. This
indicates that, even if part of the higher valuations (and higher IPO initial returns) of VC-
backed over non-VC-backed IPO ﬁrms is due to diﬀerences in intrinsic ﬁrm quality, investor
attention plays a signiﬁcant role in generating higher values of these variables in VC-backed
over non-VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs.
The results of our analysis of comparing the IPO characteristics of high- versus low-
reputation VC-backed ﬁrms are broadly consistent with the above results. First, while we
ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of the VC-reputation dummy is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across
high- versus low-reputation VC-backed IPOs in our regressions of IPO and secondary mar-
ket valuations, it is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in our initial return regression. Second, in our
interaction tests comparing the IPO and secondary market valuations as well as the ini-
tial returns of high- versus low-reputation VC-backed IPOs, we ﬁnd that high-reputation
VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs receiving higher (above median) investor attention have higher IPO
and secondary market valuations as well as IPO initial returns, compared to low-reputation
VC-backed IPOs receiving higher (above median) investor attention, even after controlling
for the direct eﬀect of high- and low-reputation VC-backing. The fact that the coeﬃcient
of the interaction term between high-reputation VC-backing and higher investor attention
is signiﬁcantly greater than that of the interaction term between low-reputation VC-backing
and higher investor attention in our analysis of the above IPO variables suggests that the
productivity of investor attention in generating higher values of these IPO variables is greater
for high-reputation VC-backed IPO ﬁrms.
The results of our analysis of the relation between VC-backing and participation by
important ﬁnancial market players in a ﬁrm’s IPOs are also broadly supportive of the in-
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vestor attention channel. First, VC-backed IPOs have a greater number of institutional
investors holding the ﬁrms’ equity and have greater analyst coverage post-IPO. Further,
our interaction tests reveal that, even after controlling for the direct eﬀect of VC-backing,
there is an incremental positive eﬀect of higher (above median) investor attention received
by VC-backed ﬁrms on institutional investor participation and analyst coverage.
The results of our analysis of the dynamics of IPO ﬁrm valuation over time are also
supportive of the investor attention channel. We ﬁnd that the secondary market valuation
of VC-backed IPO ﬁrms fall to a greater extent from the ﬁrst trading day post-IPO through
the three years following the IPO date. Further, our interaction tests reveal that, even after
controlling for the direct eﬀect of VC-backing, VC-backed ﬁrms that received higher (above
median) investor attention have a greater fall in valuation as time passes after IPO.35 These
two results, taken together, suggest that the higher market valuation of VC-backed ﬁrms
that we document at IPO is at least partially due to the greater investor attention received
at IPO by such ﬁrms, as evidenced by their valuation falling to a greater extent as investor
attention dissipates with the passage of time after IPO.
We now discuss the results of our IV analysis of the relation between VC-backing and
various IPO characteristics. As mentioned earlier, we use our IV analysis to control for the
possible diﬀerences in intrinsic quality between VC-backed and non-VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs,
using the instrument for VC-backing discussed earlier. Our second-stage regressions with
various IPO characteristics as dependent variables show that the positive relations between
VC-backing and various IPO characteristics (the absolute value of oﬀer price revisions, IPO
and secondary market valuations, IPO initial returns, participation by institutional investors,
and ﬁnancial analyst coverage) that we document in our OLS analysis are causal.
35Similarly, our interaction test comparing high- and low-reputation VC-backed IPOs reveal that, even
after controlling for the direct eﬀect of venture capital reputation, high-reputation VC-backed IPO ﬁrms
receiving higher (above median) investor attention have a greater fall in valuation over the three years after
IPO compared to low-reputation VC-backed IPO ﬁrms receiving similar levels of (above median) investor
attention. This is consistent with our earlier results showing that the productivity of high-reputation VC-
backing in generating immediate post-IPO secondary market ﬁrm valuations is higher than that of low-
reputation VC-backing. Clearly, given the earlier result, one would expect the fall in valuation as investor
attention fades over time to be greater for high-reputation VC-backed IPOs as well.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses how our paper is
related to the existing literature and describes its contribution relative to this literature.
Section 2.3 discusses the underlying theory and develops testable hypotheses. Section 2.4
describes our data and variables. Section 2.5 presents our analysis of the relation between
VC-backing and investor attention. Section 2.6 presents our analysis of the relation between
VC-backing, investor attention, and various IPO characteristics. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Relation to the Existing Literature and Contribution
Our paper is most closely related to two diﬀerent strands in the IPO literature. The ﬁrst
strand is the literature on the eﬀects of VC-backing on IPO characteristics and its impli-
cations for the intermediation role played by VCs in the ﬁnancial market. As we discussed
earlier, an important early paper in this literature is Megginson and Weiss (1991), who doc-
ument that VC-backing is associated with lower IPO underpricing (initial returns), which
they attribute to the ability of VCs to certify ﬁrm value to the ﬁnancial market. Another
early paper is Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990), who also document lower
IPO underpricing for VC-backed IPOs, though this paper attributes this lower extent of
underpricing to the intensive monitoring services provided by VCs and ﬁnd that VC equity
ownership, the length of board service, and the number of VCs invested in the pre-IPO ﬁrm
are negatively related to IPO underpricing.36 However, Lee and Wahal (2004) document
that, controlling for the endogeneity in the receipt of VC funding, IPOs of VC-backed ﬁrms
were, in fact, more underpriced on average than those of non-VC-backed ﬁrms between 1980
and 2000.37 They cite their evidence as providing partial support for the grandstanding
hypothesis of Gompers (1996), whereby younger VCs take the ﬁrms they have invested in
public at an earlier age even at the expense of incurring a greater extent of underpricing,
since this enables such VCs to establish a reputation for successful exits, thereby enhancing
36See also Li and Masulis (2007), and Krishnan Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh (2011) for similar arguments
based on VC certiﬁcation.
37Megginson and Weiss (1991) analyze VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs between 1983 and 1987, while Barry,
Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990) analyze such IPOs between 1978 and 1987.
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their future fund-raising abilities.38
An important recent paper that gives a new rationale for why some IPOs are more
underpriced than others is Liu and Ritter (2011). They argue that, while the underwriting
industry is in general competitive, a small number of underwriters have market power and
are able to provide greater coverage by “star analysts.” This, in turn, generates the predic-
tion that issuers who are less focused on maximizing IPO proceeds and more desirous of
coverage by star analysts will have IPOs characterized by greater underpricing. They also
attribute the greater underpricing of VC-backed IPOs to the “analyst lust” of VCs. Unlike
Liu and Ritter (2011), in our setting, VC-backed IPOs receive greater analyst coverage en-
dogenously as a consequence of the greater investor attention garnered by VC-backed ﬁrm
IPOs. Further, while our empirical results documenting a positive relation between VC-
backing and underpricing (IPO initial returns) are consistent with that of Liu and Ritter
(2011), underpricing is only one among the many IPO characteristics we study in our empir-
ical analysis: the focus of our paper is on establishing the ability of VC-backing to generate
greater investor attention as a channel for value creation by venture capitalists in IPOs.
In summary, while related to the above literature analyzing the eﬀect of VC-backing on
various IPO characteristics, this paper contributes uniquely to this literature by establishing
a new channel through which VC-backing creates value at IPO for the entrepreneurial ﬁrms
they that invest in. It is also worth pointing out that the investor attention channel of value
creation by VCs in the ﬁnancial market that we propose and analyze in this paper may
coexist with other channels that have been proposed in the existing literature, such as VC
certiﬁcation of ﬁrms and intensive monitoring of ﬁrm management by VCs pre- and post-
IPO. In fact, by controlling for the direct eﬀect of VC-backing, we are able to account for
38A number of other papers document somewhat similar results. Bradley and Jordan (2002) show that,
once they control for industry eﬀects and underwriter quality, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in underpricing
between VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs during the period 1990-1999. Brav and Gompers (2003) ﬁnd that
underpricing is more severe among VC-backed ﬁrms during the 1990s. Hamao, Packer, and Ritter (2000)
do a similar comparison for Japanese VC-backed and non-VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs during the 1990s and ﬁnd
that underpricing is more severe for VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs. See also Chemmanur and Loutskina (2004), who
note that IPO underpricing may not be the most appropriate measure to evaluate the role of VC-backing in
IPOs.
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the diﬀerences in intrinsic value between VC- and non-VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs (and therefore
the VC certiﬁcation and monitoring eﬀects documented in the existing literature) even in
our baseline analysis of various IPO characteristics.
The second strand in the IPO literature to which our paper is related is the broader
theoretical and empirical literature on IPOs: see Ritter and Welch (2002) for a review.39,40
Apart from the IPO papers discussed earlier, our paper is related to several other papers
in this literature. In an important paper, Liu, Sherman, and Zhang (2014) show that pre-
IPO media coverage is positively related to the long-term equity value, liquidity, analyst
coverage, and institutional investor ownership of the equity of ﬁrms going public. Another
related paper is by Bajo, Chemmanur, Simonyan, and Tehranian (2016) who show that lead
underwriters located more centrally in the networks of investment banks induced by their
prior underwriting activity are able to generate more favorable IPO characteristics for the
ﬁrms they take public, by attracting greater investor attention, and thereby disseminating
information more eﬃciently to institutions and by better extracting information from them.41
While our result that the extent of investor attention received by a ﬁrm is positively related
to its IPO characteristics such as IPO valuation and initial returns is consistent with those
in the above two papers, ours is the ﬁrst paper in the literature that analyzes the relation
between VC-backing and investor attention. Ours is also the ﬁrst paper in the literature to
39In particular, the broader empirical literature studying the information ﬂows in IPOs (e.g., Hanley
(1993)) and the more recent studies on the eﬃciency of the IPO process in general (e.g., Lowry and Schwert
(2004)) are also related to our paper.
40Some examples of information-driven theoretical models of IPO underpricing are Chemmanur (1993);
Allen and Faulhaber (1989); Sherman (1992); Welch (1989); and Welch (1992). To the extent that our study
is related to information ﬂows around a ﬁrm’s IPO, it is also indirectly related to models of going public versus
remaining private decision driven by the desire of ﬁrm insiders to avoid revealing private information (e.g.,
Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983)) or by considerations of minimizing duplication in information production
by outsiders (e.g., Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999)).
41Our paper is also distantly related to the literature relating media coverage, equity trading volume, and
stock returns in an asset pricing context. Fang and Peress (2009) show that stocks with no media coverage
earn higher returns than stocks with high media coverage, even after controlling for well-known risk factors.
Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009) ﬁnd supportive evidence of the Merton (1987) investor recognition eﬀect using
Swedish data. Tetlock (2007) analyzes daily content from a popular Wall Street Journal column and ﬁnd that
high media pessimism predicts downward pressure on market prices followed by a reversion to fundamentals,
and that high or low pessimism predicts high market trading volume. Engelberg and Parsons (2011) analyze
the relation between media coverage and stock market trading volume and make use of diﬀerences in local
media coverage to identify the causal eﬀect of media coverage on investor trading.
75
propose investor attention as a channel through which VCs create value in the IPO market
for the ﬁrms that they invest in, and the ﬁrst to empirically analyze how VC-backing aﬀects
IPO characteristics through the investor attention channel.
Our paper is also distantly related to the literature on the selection of private ﬁrms to
invest in by venture capitalists as well as that on value addition by VCs (in the product
market) subsequent to their investment in these ﬁrms (but pre-IPO). Some papers have
documented that venture capitalists may invest in higher quality private ﬁrms to begin
with: see, e.g., Sørenson (2007), who makes use of an “assortive” matching model to show
that more experienced VCs invest in better ﬁrms. A number of other papers have shown
that VCs add value to the private ﬁrms in which they invest in a variety of ways: for
example, by playing a role in the monitoring and management of these companies (Gorman
and Sahlman (1989), Sahlman (1990), and Gompers and Lerner (1999)), by professionalizing
ﬁrm management (Hellman and Puri (2002)), and improving ﬁrm eﬃciency (Chemmanur,
Krishnan, and Nandy (2011)). Given this value addition, it is possible that, on average, VC-
backed ﬁrms diﬀer from non-VC-backed ﬁrms in a variety of ways including having a higher
intrinsic value. However, our analysis goes through even if this is the case, since, in our
empirical analysis, we explicitly take into account the fact that VC-backed ﬁrms may diﬀer
in intrinsic value (quality) from non-VC-backed ﬁrms. In contrast to the above literature,
the focus of this paper is to show that, for a ﬁrm with a given intrinsic value at the time of
IPO, VC-backing creates additional value in the IPO market by garnering enhanced investor
attention to the ﬁrm’s IPO, yielding higher IPO and secondary market valuations and other
favorable IPO characteristics.
2.3 Theory and Hypothesis Development
In the introductory section of this paper, we introduced the notion that VC-backing may
attract greater investor attention to an IPO ﬁrm, and discussed two ways in which this may
aﬀect the IPO characteristics of VC-backed versus non-VC-backed ﬁrms. First, the greater
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investor attention brought about by VC-backing may make information dissemination about
the IPO ﬁrm by the IPO underwriter to institutional investors more eﬀective. Second, such
enhanced investor attention may allow the IPO underwriter to credibly extract information
from institutional investors more eﬃciently about their valuation of the IPO ﬁrm. We refer
to these two ways in which VC-backing may aﬀect IPO characteristics as the “informa-
tion dissemination through investor attention hypothesis” and the “information extraction
through investor attention hypothesis,” respectively.42 In this section, we develop testable
implications for the relationship between the VC-backing of ﬁrms going public and various
characteristics of the IPOs of these ﬁrms based on these two broad hypotheses.
2.3.1 Relation between VC-Backing and Investor Attention
We argued earlier that VC-backed IPOs may receive greater investor attention and are
thereby able to obtain more favorable IPO characteristics (such as higher IPO and imme-
diate secondary market valuations, greater institutional investor participation, and ﬁnancial
analyst coverage). If indeed an important mechanism through which the IPOs of VC-backed
ﬁrms obtain more favorable IPO characteristics is by attracting a larger number of institu-
tions to pay attention to these ﬁrms, then we would expect proxies for investor attention
to be greater for VC-backed relative to non-VC-backed IPOs. We follow Liu, Sherman, and
Zhang (2014) and use the pre-IPO media coverage received by a ﬁrm going public as a proxy
for investor attention paid to that ﬁrm (see Section 2.4.1 for a detailed discussion of our
two proxies and why they are appropriate proxies). Thus, we expect greater pre-IPO media
coverage for the IPOs of VC-backed ﬁrms compared to those of non-VC-backed ﬁrms (H1).
42We would like to emphasize that the two roles of the lead IPO underwriter during IPO road-shows
and the book-building process that we discussed in the introduction are not mutually exclusive, though,
in some contexts, one or the other role may dominate. Indeed, the practitioner literature on IPOs points
to the two-way information ﬂow occurring during IPO road-shows and the book-building process between
IPO underwriters and institutions: while, on the one hand, underwriters collect information about the
demand schedule of institutional investors for the IPO ﬁrm’s shares, they also address institutional investors’
questions and concerns about the future strategy and performance of the ﬁrm going public, thus disseminating
information about the IPO ﬁrm to them. It is therefore not our objective to empirically distinguish between
the information dissemination and information extraction roles of the lead IPO underwriter during IPO
road-shows and the book-building process.
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Further, if indeed VC-backed IPOs receive greater investor attention relative to non-VC-
backed IPOs, due to VCs being repeat players in the IPO market, we would expect this
eﬀect to be stronger in the case of high-reputation VCs than in the case of low-reputation
VCs. This is because high-reputation VCs may have taken more higher intrinsic value ﬁrms
public in the past and therefore may have had even more favorable prior interactions with
institutional investors than low-reputation VCs (as well as having a better track record
in terms of the post-IPO performance of ﬁrms they have taken public). This is the next
hypothesis (H2) that we test here.
In the following subsections, we develop testable hypotheses regarding the eﬀect of the
higher investor attention that will be garnered by a VC-backed ﬁrm (as we postulated) on
various IPO characteristics of such ﬁrms.
2.3.2 VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and the IPO Pricing Process: Initial
Oﬀer Price Range, the IPO Oﬀer Price, and the Secondary Market Price
We now discuss the speciﬁc relation that we have in mind between the VC-backing of an
IPO ﬁrm, the greater investor attention that VC-backing generates, and its eﬀect on the
IPO pricing process. In particular, we characterize the setting of the initial IPO oﬀer price
range by the lead IPO underwriter and the ﬁrm, oﬀer price revision during the book-building
process leading to the determination of the ﬁnal IPO oﬀer price, and the subsequent deter-
mination of the post-IPO share price in the immediate post-IPO secondary market. The
timing of various events that we postulate (as depicted in Figure 1) is the following. First,
the ﬁrm and its lead underwriter agree on the initial range of oﬀer prices (sometimes referred
to as the “preliminary oﬀer price range” or “initial ﬁling range”) within which they expect
to set the ﬁnal oﬀer price. Second, the lead underwriter attempts to attract the attention of
various institutions to the ﬁrm whose IPO it is underwriting. We assume here, as discussed
earlier, that institutions’ cost of paying attention to an IPO ﬁrm is lower for VC-backed ﬁrms
than for non-VC-backed ﬁrms. Third, the lead underwriter disseminates information about
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Figure 1: Timeline of the IPO Pricing Process
the characteristics of the IPO ﬁrm to the institutions whose attention it has been able to
attract to the ﬁrm’s IPO. Finally, the lead underwriter extracts information from the above
institutions about their demand schedule for the IPO ﬁrm’s equity.43 The ﬁnal oﬀer price
is set by the lead IPO underwriter as a result of the above information dissemination and
extraction process; this may also aﬀect the immediate post-IPO share price of the ﬁrm as
well.
Consider ﬁrst the determination of the initial IPO oﬀer price range by the lead under-
writer. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no formal theoretical model in the
existing literature regarding the process by which an underwriter and issuer choose this ini-
tial oﬀer price range; our objective here is not to develop such a model. Rather, the process
we describe below is meant only to capture the trade-oﬀs facing a lead underwriter when
setting this initial oﬀer price range. We make two important assumptions here about the
process of setting the initial oﬀer price range. First, while the lead underwriter is aware of
its expected ability to attract investor attention to a particular IPO and the noisy infor-
mation about the IPO ﬁrm that it wishes to convey to these investors, it will have residual
uncertainty about the precise amount of attention it will be able to attract from institutions
to the IPO and therefore about the amount of information it will be able to convey to these
institutions about the ﬁrm going public.44 This means that the lead underwriter will choose
43While, for concreteness, we have speciﬁed the timing of information extraction as occurring after infor-
mation dissemination, our testable predictions remain qualitatively unchanged even if there is some overlap
between the timing of information dissemination and information extraction by the lead underwriter.
44This uncertainty may arise for various reasons. For example, there may be other important (and un-
foreseen) events occurring at the time of a given IPO that may aﬀect the stock market and the economy as
a whole, which can aﬀect the attention that institutions pay to the IPO: see, e.g., Liu, Sherman, and Zhang
(2014) who discuss the possibility of other contemporaneous news events aﬀecting the investor attention
(and media coverage) achieved by a particular ﬁrm’s IPO.
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the initial IPO oﬀer price range based on the expected value of the investor attention that
it will be able to attract to the IPO and the expected value of the eﬀect of its information
dissemination on the ﬁrm’s ﬁnal IPO oﬀer price, with the precise value of these variables
being realized only subsequently (during the book-building process). Second, we assume
that, while the lead underwriter is free to set the ﬁnal oﬀer price anywhere within the initial
oﬀer price range (and if necessary above or below this range), it is costly for the lead un-
derwriter to set the oﬀer price signiﬁcantly above or below the midpoint of this range: for
simplicity, we assume that this cost is increasing in the distance of the ﬁnal oﬀer price from
the midpoint of the initial IPO oﬀer price range.45
The above two assumptions imply that the cost-beneﬁt trade-oﬀ driving a lead under-
writer’s choice of the initial IPO oﬀer price range is as follows. If a lead underwriter sets the
midpoint of the initial IPO oﬀer price range signiﬁcantly below the expected ﬁnal IPO oﬀer
price, it will have to incur the cost of revising the price upward in the event the demand
from institutions for the IPO ﬁrm’s shares is strong (in order to maximize IPO proceeds).
If, however, the lead underwriter sets the midpoint of the initial IPO oﬀer price range sig-
niﬁcantly above the expected ﬁnal IPO oﬀer price, it will have to incur the cost of revising
the price downward in the event the demand from institutions for the IPO ﬁrm’s shares is
weak (to ensure that all the shares oﬀered in the IPO are sold out, and the ﬁrm is able to
raise the amount of ﬁnancing it needs). The above trade-oﬀ implies that a lead underwriter
will set the midpoint of the initial IPO oﬀer price range equal to its expectation of the ﬁnal
IPO oﬀer price.46
45Such a cost may arise, for example, from underwriters losing reputation with institutions: the latter
may have devoted considerable resources to evaluating the IPO ﬁrm based on the initial oﬀer price range
set by the underwriter, and some of these resources may be wasted if the ﬁnal oﬀer price is set signiﬁcantly
away from the initial oﬀer price. See, e.g., Bajo, Chemmanur, Simonyan, and Tehranian (2016) for a more
detailed discussion.
46The empirical and anecdotal evidence is somewhat consistent with the process of setting the initial IPO
oﬀer price (ﬁling) range that we postulate here. While there is no consensus in the literature on this point,
some of the empirical studies on IPOs have used the midpoint of the initial IPO oﬀer price range as an
unbiased predictor of the ultimate IPO oﬀer price: see, e.g., Hanley (1993), Loughran and Ritter (2002), and
Bradley and Jordan (2002). However, Lowry and Schwert (2004) document that the midpoint of the initial
IPO oﬀer price range is not always an unbiased predictor of the ﬁnal IPO oﬀer price: in their sample, the
ﬁnal IPO oﬀer price is set about 1.4% below the midpoint of the initial IPO oﬀer price range, on average.
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After the initial oﬀer price range is chosen and the information about the IPO ﬁrm
is disseminated to the institutions who pay attention to it, the lead underwriter extracts
information from these institutions about their demand for the IPO ﬁrm’s shares. The oﬀer
price will be revised upward or downward from the midpoint of the initial oﬀer price range
depending on the above information extracted by the lead underwriter from institutions.
Since the lead IPO underwriter of a VC-backed ﬁrm will be able to attract attention from a
larger number of institutions for the ﬁrm it is taking public (relative to the situation in the
case of a non-VC-backed ﬁrm), it will be able to more eﬃciently extract information useful
for valuing a VC-backed IPO ﬁrm’s shares from institutions. If this is the case, we would
expect a positive relationship between VC-backing and the absolute value of the IPO oﬀer
price revision under the information extraction hypothesis (H3A), since a greater amount
of information will be extracted from institutions in this case.47 Further, assuming that the
eﬀect of investor attention is stronger in the case of VC-backed IPOs than in the case of
non-VC-backed IPOs, the information extraction hypothesis implies that, VC-backed ﬁrms
receiving higher (above median) investor attention will be associated with a larger absolute
value of IPO oﬀer price revision, even after controlling for the direct eﬀect of VC-backing.48
A lead IPO underwriter of a VC-backed ﬁrm may also be in a position to disseminate
information more eﬃciently about the ﬁrm to institutions, given institutions’ lower cost of
paying attention to VC-backed ﬁrms. Since the lead underwriter knows the expected value
of the eﬀect of its information dissemination on the ﬁnal IPO oﬀer price, the expected eﬀect
of this more eﬃcient information dissemination will already be incorporated into the mid-
point of the initial IPO ﬁling range (recall that, as we discussed above, the underwriter sets
47The above implication assumes that the information that a lead underwriter uses in setting the initial
IPO oﬀer price range is obtained from the process of writing the initial IPO prospectus, and the process
of gathering more information from institutional investors begins only after that (during the book-building
process).
48For all IPO characteristics, we empirically analyze whether the incremental eﬀect of higher investor
attention received by VC-backed compared to non-VC-backed ﬁrms (after controlling for the direct eﬀect
of VC-backing) making use of interaction tests. Thus, we expect the coeﬃcient of the interaction between
VC-backing and higher investor attention to be positive or negative according as this incremental eﬀect of
investor attention is greater or smaller in VC-backed ﬁrms.
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the midpoint of the initial IPO oﬀer price range equal to its expectation of the ﬁnal IPO
oﬀer price). However, since lead underwriters will be able to disseminate information more
eﬃciently (and accurately) to institutions in the case of VC-backed ﬁrms, the realization of
information dissemination during the book-building process will be closer to the midpoint
of the initial IPO oﬀer price range for VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs compared to non-VC-backed
ﬁrm IPOs. This implies that we would expect a negative relationship between VC-backing
and the absolute value of the IPO oﬀer price revision under the information dissemination
hypothesis (H3B). Further, assuming that the eﬀect of investor attention is stronger in the
case of VC-backed IPOs than in the case of non-VC-backed IPOs, the information dissem-
ination hypothesis implies that, VC-backed ﬁrms receiving higher (above median) investor
attention will be associated with a smaller absolute value of IPO oﬀer price revision, even
after controlling for the direct eﬀect of VC-backing.
We now turn to the relationship between VC-backing and immediate post-IPO sec-
ondary market valuation (we discuss the various valuation measures we use in Section 2.4.3).
As we discussed earlier, underwriters may be able to induce more institutions to pay attention
to the information they are disseminating about VC-backed IPO ﬁrms that they take public,
since institutions will have a smaller cost of paying attention to the IPOs of VC-backed
ﬁrms compared to the situation where they take a non-VC-backed ﬁrm public. Assuming
that a given fraction of institutions paying attention to an IPO ﬁrm choose to invest in its
equity, this means that the market clearing price for the shares of a VC-backed IPO ﬁrm
will be greater than the market clearing price of a non-VC-backed ﬁrm (of the same intrinsic
value). Further, since the expected secondary market IPO ﬁrm value will equal this the
market-clearing price, this implies that VC-backed IPO ﬁrms will be associated with higher
immediate post-IPO secondary market valuations than similar non-VC-backed ﬁrms (H4).49
49The immediate secondary market as well as IPO valuations of VC-backed ﬁrms may be greater compared
to those of non-VC-backed ﬁrms driven by considerations other than diﬀerences in investor attention. For
example, VC-backed and non-VC-backed ﬁrms may diﬀer in terms of their intrinsic value pre-IPO. Such
diﬀerences in intrinsic value may arise, for example, from VCs investing to higher quality ﬁrms to begin with
(screening) or by VCs creating greater product market value for these ﬁrms pre-IPO (monitoring). Given
this possibility, we chose not to focus on simple comparisons between VC-backed versus non-VC-backed ﬁrms
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Further, assuming that the eﬀect of investor attention is stronger in the case of VC-backed
IPOs than in the case of non-VC-backed IPOs, we would expect VC-backed ﬁrms receiving
higher (above median) investor attention to be associated with higher immediate post-IPO
secondary market valuations even after controlling for the direct eﬀect of VC-backing.50
Next, we discuss the relationship between VC-backing and ﬁrm valuation at the IPO
oﬀer price. This relationship depends on the process of setting the oﬀer price in IPOs. While
there is no consensus in the theoretical and empirical literature on precisely how the IPO
oﬀer price is set, this price-setting process can be broadly thought of as the following. During
the book-building and road-show, the lead underwriter may convey information about the
IPO ﬁrm to institutions (this, in turn, may aﬀect their valuation of the ﬁrm). The lead
underwriter may then extract information from institutional investors about their valuation
of the IPO ﬁrm. Toward the end of the book-building and road-show process, once the lead
underwriter establishes the highest uniform price at which it can sell all the shares oﬀered
in the IPO (i.e., the market-clearing price, which is also the underwriter’s expectation of
the ﬁrst day secondary market closing price), the underwriter may apply a “discount” to
this price, thus establishing the actual IPO oﬀer price (typically on the evening before the
IPO). The theoretical literature has made various arguments regarding the main driving
force behind this discount. A prominent reason for this discount that has been advanced
by Benveniste and Spindt (1989) is that this discount ensures that institutional investors
have the incentive to reveal their true demand for the ﬁrm’s equity (i.e., it ensures that
their incentive compatibility or truth-telling conditions will hold). Since VC-backing may
induce a larger number of institutions to pay attention to the IPO of a given ﬁrm (so that
a larger number of institutions may participate in the book-building process of that IPO),
the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argument predicts that only a smaller discount to the
to test our hypotheses. Rather, we also focus on the interaction tests between VC-backing and proxies for
investor attention in our empirical analyses of IPO and secondary market valuations.
50A higher after-market price may also arise from considerations of information extraction, since more
complete knowledge and more accurate valuation of an IPO ﬁrm’s shares means less risk for investors, and
hence a smaller risk premium (assuming that investors are risk-averse on average).
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market-clearing price will be required for the IPOs of VC-backed ﬁrms to ensure truth-
telling by institutions. This, in turn, implies that the relationship between VC-backing
and ﬁrm valuation at the IPO oﬀer price will be unambiguously positive (H5A). Further,
assuming that the eﬀect of investor attention is stronger in the case of VC-backed IPOs
than in the case of non-VC-backed IPOs, we would expect VC-backed ﬁrms receiving higher
(above median) investor attention to be associated with higher valuations at the oﬀer price
even after controlling for the direct eﬀect of VC-backing.
On the other hand, if the discount from the expected after-market price is used to com-
pensate institutional investors for their opportunity cost of paying attention to a particular
IPO (as argued by Liu, Lu, Sherman, and Zhang (2016)) in addition to ensuring truthful
revelation of information by these investors (as in Benveniste and Spindt (1989)), then lead
underwriter may apply a higher discount to the expected ﬁrst day secondary market closing
price for VC-backed IPOs.51 If this is indeed the case, the predicted relationship between
VC-backing and the IPO oﬀer price becomes ambiguous (H5B). This is because the greater
after-market price associated with the IPO of a VC-backed ﬁrm (that we postulated earlier)
may be overcome by a larger discount, so that the relationship between VC-backing and ﬁrm
valuation at the IPO oﬀer price may even turn negative.
Finally, we turn to the relationship between VC-backing and IPO initial returns (un-
derpricing). Given our discussion above regarding the potentially ambiguous relationship
between VC-backing and the discount applied by the underwriter to the market-clearing
(expected after-market) price to arrive at the IPO oﬀer price, we are agnostic about the re-
lationship between VC-backing and IPO initial returns.52 Following our discussion above, if
51To better understand why lead underwriters may apply a larger discount to the expected secondary
market price to arrive at the IPO oﬀer price, note, as we argued earlier, that such IPOs will attract greater
investor attention. In equilibrium, such underwriters need to compensate these institutional investors for
their opportunity cost of paying attention to these IPOs (as argued by Liu, Lu, Sherman, and Zhang (2016)).
In the above setting, if institutions’ aggregate cost of paying attention to VC-backed IPOs is greater (taking
into account the smaller cost per investor for paying attention to a VC-backed IPO but the greater attention
paid to these IPOs by institutions collectively), then the “money left on the table” (the dollar amount of
the IPO discount multiplied by the number of shares sold) has to be greater for VC-backed IPO ﬁrms.
52Clearly, the greater the discount applied by the lead underwriter to the ﬁrst day expected secondary
market closing price of an IPO (assumed here to be the same as the market-clearing price) to arrive at the
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the above discount is driven primarily by the need to extract truthful information from insti-
tutions (as argued by Benveniste and Spindt (1989)), then we would expect this relationship
between VC-backing and the discount to be negative (H6A), since lead underwriters will
apply a smaller discount to the expected after-market price to arrive at the IPO oﬀer price
in the case of VC-backed ﬁrms. If, however, this relationship is driven also by considerations
of compensating institutions for their opportunity cost of paying attention to the IPO ﬁrm
(as argued by Liu, Lu, Sherman, and Zhang (2016)), then we would expect the relationship
between VC-backing and IPO initial returns to be positive (H6B). We are agnostic of about
the sign of coeﬃcient on the interaction between VC-backing and investor attention, since
it may be positive or negative depending on whether it is H6A or H6B that holds.
2.3.3 The Eﬀect of VC Reputation on the Relation between Investor Attention
and IPO Characteristics
Analogous to our analysis of the relation between VC-backing, investor attention, and IPO
characteristics, we also conduct an analysis of the relation between VC reputation, investor
attention, and three IPO variables: immediate secondary market valuation, IPO valuation,
and IPO initial returns. As we argued earlier, we expect institutions’ cost of paying attention
to information disseminated by lead IPO underwriters about ﬁrms backed by higher reputa-
tion VCs to be lower than those backed by lower reputation VCs. Therefore, by arguments
similar to that we have made above in the context of VC-backing (when developing our
hypothesis H4), high-reputation VC-backed IPOs will be associated with higher immediate
secondary market valuations compared to those backed by low-reputation VCs. Further, as-
suming that the eﬀect of investor attention on secondary market valuation is stronger in the
case of high-reputation VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs compared to that of low-reputation VC-backed
ﬁrm IPOs, we would expect such IPOs receiving high (above median) investor attention to
have higher secondary market valuations compared to low-reputation VC-backed IPOs re-
IPO oﬀer price, the greater the initial return will be.
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ceiving high (above median) investor attention, even after controlling for the direct eﬀect of
high- and low-reputation VC-backing.53
We also conduct an analysis comparing IPO valuations of high- and low-reputation VC-
backed IPOs. By arguments similar to that we have made earlier (when developing hypothe-
ses H5A and H5B), high-reputation VC-backed IPOs may have greater or lesser valuations
compared to those of low-reputation VC-backed IPOs (depending on whether higher sec-
ondary market valuations for the former IPOs are overcome by the larger discounts applied
by underwriters in setting the IPO oﬀer price). Further, if considerations of information
extraction dominate and assuming that the eﬀect of investor attention is stronger in the case
of high-reputation VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs compared to that of low-reputation VC-backed ﬁrm
IPOs, we would expect that high-reputation VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs receiving higher (above
median) investor attention will have higher valuations at the IPO oﬀer price compared to
low-reputation VC-backed IPOs receiving higher (above median) investor attention, even
after controlling for the direct eﬀect of high- and low-reputation VC-backing.
Finally, we conduct an analysis comparing the initial returns of high- and low-reputation
VC-backed IPOs. By an argument similar to that we made in developing hypotheses H6A
and H6B, we would expect high-reputation VC-backed IPOs to have a greater or smaller
intial returns than that for low-reputation VC-backed IPOs, depending upon whether or not
information extraction considerations dominate that of compensating institutions for paying
greater investor attention to the former category of IPOs. Further, assuming that the eﬀect of
investor attention is stronger in the case of high-reputation VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs compared
to that of low-reputation VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs, and depending on whether it is H6A or
H6B that holds, we would expect high-reputation VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs receiving higher
53There is signiﬁcant empirical evidence that high-reputation venture capitalists take higher quality ﬁrms
public compared to low-reputation venture capitalists. This means that the nature of information dissem-
inated to institutional investors by lead underwriters of high-reputation VC-backed IPO ﬁrms about the
ﬁrms going public (or that of the information extracted by lead IPO underwriters from institutions about
these ﬁrms) may be fundamentally diﬀerent from the information disseminated (or extracted) by lead un-
derwriters of low-reputation VC-backed IPO ﬁrms. This in turn, may lead to diﬀerential eﬀects of investor
attention on the immediate post-IPO secondary market as well as IPO valuations of ﬁrms backed by high-
and low-reputation VCs.
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(above median) investor attention to have lower or higher IPO initial returns compared to
low-reputation VC-backed IPOs receiving higher (above median) investor attention, even
after controlling for the direct eﬀect of high- and low-reputation VC-backing.
2.3.4 VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and the Participation of Financial Mar-
ket Players in IPOs
We have argued so far that the lead IPO underwriters may be able to induce a larger number
of institutions to pay attention to the IPOs of VC-backed ﬁrms. This implies that participa-
tion by institutional investors (i.e., institutional investor investments in the equity of the IPO
ﬁrm) will be greater for such IPOs (H7). Further, the grater amount of investor attention
(as proxied by pre-IPO media coverage) received by a VC-backed ﬁrm IPO, the greater the
institutional investor investment in the equity of that IPO ﬁrm even after controlling for the
direct eﬀect of VC-backing.
Given that ﬁnancial analysts are either engaged in conveying information about the
IPO ﬁrm to institutions (sell-side analysts aﬃliated with investment banks in the IPO un-
derwriting syndicate) or in acquiring information on behalf of institutions (buy-side analysts
aﬃliated with various institutions) we would also expect greater analyst coverage to be re-
ceived by VC-backed ﬁrm IPOs (H8). Further, the greater the amount of investor attention
(as proxied by pre-IPO media coverage) received by a VC-backed ﬁrm IPO, the greater
analyst coverage received by that IPO ﬁrm even after controlling for the direct eﬀect of
VC-backing.
2.3.5 The Dynamics of the Secondary Market Valuation of IPO Firm Equity
We argued in Section 2.3.2 that VC-backed IPO ﬁrms may receive greater valuations in the
immediate post-IPO secondary market due to, among other reasons, the greater amount of
investor attention they receive around their IPO. We now explore the dynamic changes in
the valuations of VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPO ﬁrms over time. To develop testable
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hypotheses for our dynamic analysis of VC valuation, we make two assumptions. First, we
assume that investor attention fades signiﬁcantly as time passes after the IPO. Second, we
assume that investor attention will decline to the greatest extent (with the passage of time)
for ﬁrms that received the highest level of such attention at the time of IPO. Under these two
assumptions, we get two testable implications. First, the valuation of VC-backed IPO ﬁrms
will fall to a greater extent than that of non-VC-backed ﬁrms, assuming that a signiﬁcant
portion of their immediate secondary market value is due to the greater investor attention
they received around the IPO (H9).54 Second, we expect the valuation of VC-backed ﬁrms
receiving the greatest investor attention at IPO to decline to the greatest extent post-IPO
(corresponding to the greater decline in investor attention received by these ﬁrms over time)
(H10). By a similar argument, in our analysis comparing the dynamics the secondary market
valuations of high- and low-VC-backed IPOs, we expect that the valuation of high-reputation
VC-backed ﬁrms receiving high investor (above median) attention at the IPO to decline to a
greater extent than that of low-reputation VC-backed ﬁrms receiving high investor attention.
2.4 Data and Sample Selection
The data used in this study came from multiple sources. We obtain the list of initial public
oﬀerings in the US from 1980 to 2009 from the SDC/Platinum Global New Issues database.
In line with the IPO literature, we exclude equity oﬀerings of ﬁnancial institutions (SIC
codes between 6000 and 6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999),
unit oﬀerings, closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs), rights issues, spin-oﬀs, equity carve-outs, leverage buyouts, tracking stocks,
issues with oﬀer price less than  5, issues with incomplete information on oﬀer price and
the number of shares ﬁled in an IPO, and duplicates. The IPO ﬁrm should issue common
shares (with share code headers of 10 and 11 in CRSP). We further require that the issuing
54As we discussed earlier, VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPO ﬁrms may also diﬀer in intrinsic value,
driven by product market considerations associated with VC-backing. The implications we are deriving
in this subsection assumes that the drivers of higher valuation in VC-backed ﬁrms other than the greater
investor attention received by a VC-backed ﬁrm IPO, remain constant as time passes after IPO.
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ﬁrm must be present on the Compustat annual industrial database for the ﬁscal year prior
to the oﬀering and at least for one year after the oﬀering, as well as on the CRSP database
within sixty days of the issue date. Though the SDC/Platinum Global New Issues database
provides the venture ﬂag which can be used to identify venture-backed IPOs, we cross check
this by merging our list of IPOs with the VentureXpert database. We drop IPO ﬁrms
that are classiﬁed as VC-backed in the SDC/Platinum Global New Issues database but as
non-VC-backed in VentureXpert or vice versa from our sample.
We end up with 4105 IPOs that satisfy these criteria, out of which 1876 are VC-backed
IPOs and 2229 are non-VC-backed IPOs. The median oﬀer price of the IPO ﬁrms in our
sample is  12.00, median sales are  43.0 million, median EBITDA is  4.65 million, and me-
dian net income is  1.58 million. These characteristics of our IPO sample are comparable
to those in other studies (see, e.g., Loughran and Ritter (2004)). Information on IPO un-
derwriters as well as various IPO characteristics is taken from the SDC/Platinum Global
New Issues database. The data for constructing the VC reputation measure came from
VentureXpert. Information on institutional investors was obtained from Thomson Reuters
Institutional Holdings (13F) Database. Analyst coverage data came from Institutional Bro-
kers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Accounting data came from Compustat and stock price
data came from CRSP. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of our sample.
2.4.1 Proxies for Investor Attention
In order to assess the degree of attention that investors pay to IPO ﬁrms, we make use of
two measures of pre-IPO media coverage of ﬁrms going public following Liu, Sherman, and
Zhang (2014), who use media coverage as a proxy for investor attention. Liu, Sherman,
and Zhang (2014) argue that media sources compete to attract readers and advertising
revenues and, consequently, editors expect their reporters to cover the ﬁrms which have
already received investor attention or are expected to receive such attention in the future.
Even though media coverage does not contain any new “hard” information about the IPO
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ﬁrm (such “hard” information must be disclosed in the IPO prospectus), the fact that the
ﬁrm receives coverage indicates that reporters and/or their sources expect the ﬁrm to attract
investor attention. According to Liu, Sherman, and Zhang (2014), when choosing a ﬁrm to
cover, reporters use not only their own judgment but also talk to Wall Street professionals,
so that media coverage of IPO ﬁrms will be more than mere noise. While media coverage
may include some ﬁrms due to short-term demand from retail investors who are driven by
sentiment, it will also include ﬁrms that sophisticated investors care about. Given the above,
the pre-IPO media coverage of ﬁrms going public is a good proxy for the degree of attention
investors pay to such ﬁrms.
We construct two measures of pre-IPO media coverage of ﬁrms going public by searching
all U.S. English language media sources in Factiva for news articles as well as the headlines
of articles covering IPO ﬁrms in our sample. Our ﬁrst measure is Headlines, which is the
number of article headlines that have mentioned the IPO ﬁrm in the two months prior to
the IPO date: this measure has been used by Bajo, Chemmanur, Simonyan, and Tehranian
(2016). Our second measure is Articles, which is the number of articles that have mentioned
the IPO ﬁrm in the two months prior to the IPO date (used by both Liu, Sherman, and
Zhang (2014) and Bajo, Chemmanur, Simonyan, and Tehranian (2016)). As shown in Table
1, a typical ﬁrm in our sample is covered by 2 headlines and 10 articles in the two months
prior to its IPO. Since the distribution of Headlines and Articles are right skewed, we use the
natural log of one plus the actual number of headlines and that of articles (Ln(Headlines) and
Ln(Articles)) in our regressions. We also construct two dummy variables, High Headlines
and High Articles, to indicate that the number of headlines and that of articles covering the
IPO ﬁrm are above the sample median, respectively.
2.4.2 Measures for VC Reputation
In this section, we describe how we construct our reputation measure for the lead VC investors
that invested in VC-backed IPO ﬁrms. To determine lead VC investors, we merge our list of
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VC-backed IPOs with the VC investment level data from VentureXpert. Following Nahata
(2008), we deﬁne the lead VC as the VC ﬁrm that participated in the ﬁrst round and made
the largest total investment in the company across all rounds. If the identities of investors
in the ﬁrst round are not available, we use the same logic to identify the lead VC ﬁrm based
on investors’ information in the second round. We require the lead VCs to have participated
in the ﬁrst or second rounds since the lead VCs usually originate the deal and are among
the ﬁrst venture investors in startups.
In each year, we deﬁne VC reputation using the market share of the amount of funds
raised by the VC up to the current year since 1975, following the methodology of Megginson
and Weiss (1991) and Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy (2011).55 This measure eﬀectively
captures reputation since reputation is primarily built on past success: VCs are usually able
to raise greater follow-on funds from their limited partners only if the performance of their
funds has been successful in the past. For each VC-backed IPO in our sample, we then
calculate the average reputation of their lead VC investor(s). High-Rep-VC-Backing is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the average market share of funds raised by their lead VC
investors is above the 75th percentile of the sample and 0 otherwise; while Low-Rep-VC-
Backing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the average market share of funds raised is equal
to or below the 75th percentile of the sample and 0 otherwise.
2.4.3 Measures for Valuation
We measure the valuation of ﬁrms at IPO and in the secondary market using a compara-
ble ﬁrm approach based on a non-IPO industry peer with comparable Sales and EBITDA
proﬁt margin (EBITDA/Sales): see, e.g., Kim and Ritter (1999) and Purnanandam and
Swaminathan (2004). To pick an industry peer ﬁrm for an IPO ﬁrm in our sample, we
ﬁrst consider all ﬁrms in the Compustat that were active and present on CRSP for at least
55In untabulated tests, we use an alternative measure for VC reputation. We deﬁne VC reputation using
the market share of the amount of investment made by a VC up to the current year since 1975 and obtain
qualitatively similar results.
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three years at the end of the ﬁscal year preceding the IPO. We then eliminate ﬁrms that are
REITs, closed-end funds, ADRs, not ordinary common shares, and ﬁrms with stock prices
less than  5 at the report date. We separate the remaining population of Compustat ﬁrms
into 48 industry groups based on the industry classiﬁcation introduced by Fama and French
(1997). For each year, we divide each industry portfolio into three portfolios based on sales,
and then separate each sales portfolio into three portfolios based on EBITDA proﬁt margin
(EBITDA/Sales). This procedure gives us nine portfolios for each industry-year.56 Each
IPO ﬁrm is then placed into an appropriate year-industry-Sales-EBITDA margin portfolio
based on an IPO ﬁrm’s sales and EBITDA in the year prior to IPO. Within the portfolio,
we ﬁnd a matching ﬁrm that is closest in sales to the IPO ﬁrm being valued. We are able
to ﬁnd matching ﬁrms for 3100 IPO ﬁrms (1442 VC-backed and 1658 non-VC-backed IPO
ﬁrms) in our baseline sample. We then estimate the relative valuation of the IPO ﬁrms to
their matching ﬁrm based on their price multiples.
We measure the relative valuation of an IPO ﬁrm at oﬀer (RVO) using the following
formula:
RV O =
Oﬀer Price× IPO ﬁrm shares outstanding
IPO ﬁrm prior ﬁscal year sales
Matching ﬁrm market price×Matching ﬁrm shares outstanding
Matching ﬁrm prior ﬁscal year sales
, (2.1)
In the above, the Oﬀer Price of the IPO ﬁrm is collected from the SDC database. IPO ﬁrm
shares outstanding refers to the shares outstanding of the IPO ﬁrm at the ﬁrst secondary
market trading day as recorded in CRSP. Matching ﬁrm market price is the stock price and
matching ﬁrm shares outstanding is the number of shares outstanding of the matching ﬁrm
at the close of the day closest to the IPO oﬀer date.
We measure the relative valuation of an IPO ﬁrm in the secondary market using the
following formula:
56We insist, however, that at least three ﬁrms should be in each portfolio. If the number of ﬁrms in the
industry does not allow us to form 9 portfolios, we limit the separation to two portfolios based on Sales with
further separation into two portfolios based on EBITDA proﬁt margin.
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RV St =
Secondary Market Price× IPO ﬁrm shares outstanding
IPO ﬁrm prior ﬁscal year sales
Matching ﬁrm market price×Matching ﬁrm shares outstanding
Matching ﬁrm prior ﬁscal year sales
, (2.2)
In the above, the relative valuation in the secondary market in the t-th year after IPO as
shown in formula (2), RVS t, is computed in a similar way: we substitute the IPO oﬀer
price and the number of shares outstanding of the IPO ﬁrm in formula (1) by the secondary
market price in the t-year after IPO and the number of shares outstanding observed on that
date in CRSP. Here t equals 0, 1, 2, and 3, and year 0 means at the close of the ﬁrst trading
day in the secondary market. Due to their right skewed distribution, we use the natural
log of the above two measures (Ln(RVO) and Ln(RVSt)) as the dependent variables in our
regressions.57
In addition to the above relative valuation measures, we use industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q
as alternative measures for IPO and secondary market valuations. Tobin’s Q is deﬁned as the
ratio of a ﬁrm’s market value of assets over its book value of assets, where the market value
of assets is equal to the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the product
of the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the relevant share price. We measure
Tobin’s Q at IPO using the IPO oﬀer price as the share price in the above deﬁnition, while
we measure Tobin’s Q in the secondary market using the closing price on the ﬁrst trading
day. The number of shares outstanding for IPO ﬁrms is measured as of the ﬁrst trading day
in the secondary market. In untabulated analyses, we obtain quantitatively and qualitatively
similar results using these alternative ﬁrm valuation measures.
57Although our main measures of IPO and secondary market valuations are computed based on Price-
to-Sales multiple, we also compute valuation measures based on price-to-EBITDA and price-to-earnings
multiples.
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2.4.4 The Participation of Financial Market Players
We obtain the institutional investor data from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings
(13F) Database, as reported on Form 13F ﬁled with the SEC. All investment companies and
professional money managers with assets over  100 million under management are required
to report the 13F ﬁlings on a quarterly basis. The number of institutional investors (N Inst)
is deﬁned as the number of institutions that hold the stocks of the IPO ﬁrm at the end of
the ﬁrst ﬁscal year after IPO. We obtain analyst coverage data from Institutional Brokers
Estimate System (I/B/E/S). The analyst coverage measure we use, N An, is deﬁned as the
number of analysts providing earnings forecasts at the end of the ﬁrst ﬁscal year after IPO. As
reported in Table 1, the medians of N Inst and N An are 20 and 3, respectively, suggesting
that 20 institutional investors invested in the equity of a typical IPO ﬁrm in our sample and
three ﬁnancial analysts provided earnings forecast for a typical IPO ﬁrm.
Since the distribution N Inst and N An are right skewed, we use take logs of these two
values and use the logged number of institutional investors and that of ﬁnancial analysts
(Ln(N Inst) and Ln(N An)) in our regressions in later sections.
2.4.5 Control Variables
In our regressions in the later sections, our dependent variables include various IPO char-
acteristics as well as investor attention (as proxied by pre-IPO media coverage). Following
the existing literature, our control variables include the Carter-Manaster rank of the lead
underwriter (CM Rank), the natural log of the ﬁrm’s pre-IPO assets (Ln(Asset)), and the
fraction of ﬁrm equity sold in the IPO (Fraction Sold). We obtain the values of pre-IPO
assets and the fraction of equity sold in an IPO from the SDC database, or Compustat if the
SDC data item is not available. The Carter-Manaster rank of lead underwriter reputation
is collected from Jay Ritter’s website (http://site.warrington.uﬂ.edu/ritter/ipo-data/). In
addition to the above control variables, we also include industry ﬁxed eﬀects based on Fama
French 48 industry classiﬁcations, IPO year ﬁxed eﬀects, and stock exchange (in which the
94
IPO ﬁrm is listed) ﬁxed eﬀects to control for diﬀerences among IPO characteristics across
diﬀerent industries, time periods, and listing exchanges in all regressions unless otherwise
speciﬁed.
2.5 Analysis of the Relation between VC-Backing and Investor
Attention
2.5.1 Baseline Analysis of the Relation between VC-Backing and Investor At-
tention
In this section, we directly test whether VC-backed ﬁrms receive greater investor atten-
tion (as proxied by pre-IPO media coverage) compared to non-VC-backed ﬁrms (H1), and
whether this eﬀect is stronger for IPO ﬁrms backed by high-reputation VCs (H2). To test
the former hypothesis, we thereby regress our media coverage variables as described in Sec-
tion 2.4.1, on VC-Backing, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO is VC-backed and 0
otherwise. To test the latter hypothesis, we regress our media coverage variables on High-
Rep-VC-Backing and Low-Rep-VC-Backing, dummy variables indicating IPO ﬁrms backed
by high-and low-reputation VCs, respectively, and test whether the diﬀerences between the
coeﬃcients on these two variables are statistically diﬀerent from zero. Our control variables
include underwriter reputation (CM Rank), pre-IPO assets (Ln(Asset)), and the fraction
of ﬁrm equity sold in the IPO (Fraction Sold). We include IPO year dummies, industry
dummies based on Fama French 48 industry classiﬁcations, and dummies for stock exchange
in which the IPO ﬁrm is listed to control for the time-invariant, industry-speciﬁc, and stock
exchange-speciﬁc characteristics that might aﬀect the media coverage received by an IPO
ﬁrm, in all regressions (unless otherwise speciﬁed). Standard errors are clustered at the
industry level for all regressions in this paper.
We report the eﬀect of VC-backing on investor attention as measured by pre-IPO me-
dia coverage in Panel A of Table 2 and the diﬀerential eﬀects of high-reputation and low-
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reputation VC-backing in Panel B. As shown in Panel A, the coeﬃcients of VC-Backing
are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all speciﬁcations. Further, the
economic magnitude of the eﬀect of VC-backing is signiﬁcant: for example, Columns (1)
and (2) indicate that VC-backing is associated with an increase of 14.1% in the number of
headlines covering the IPO ﬁrm and an increase of 14.9% in the number of articles. As for
control variables, we ﬁnd that IPO ﬁrms underwritten by higher-ranked underwriters and
ﬁrms that have larger pre-IPO assets are associated with greater pre-IPO media coverage.
Collectively, these ﬁndings support our hypothesis H1. In Panel B, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃ-
cients of High-Rep-VC-Backing are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level in all speciﬁcations
and are signiﬁcantly larger than those of Low-Rep-VC-Backing as suggested by tests of dif-
ferences on the coeﬃcients of these two variables shown in the bottom row of Panel B. This
provides strong evidence supporting our conjecture that the eﬀect of VC-backing on investor
attention is stronger for high-reputation VC-backed IPOs than for low-reputation VC-backed
IPOs. These empirical ﬁndings are consistent with our hypothesis H2.
2.5.2 Instrumental Variable Analysis of the Relation between VC-Backing and
Investor Attention
VC-backing and investor attention may be endogenous for the following reason: unobservable
ﬁrm characteristics (such as ﬁrm intrinsic value or ﬁrm quality) may aﬀect VC-backing as
well as investor attention, so that the greater investor attention we document above for
VC-backed ﬁrms may be due to the underlying ﬁrm characteristics rather than due to VC-
backing itself. In order to address the above endogeneity concern, we use an instrumental
variable (IV) analysis. In our IV analysis, we instrument for VC-Backing using a plausibly
exogenous shock to the supply of venture capital.
In doing the above, we broadly follow the methodology of Samila and Sorenson (2011),
who use a similar instrument to study the eﬀect of venture capital in fostering innovation
and the creation of new ﬁrms. Similar to Samila and Sorenson (2011), our instrument is
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motivated by the following facts. First, institutional investors who are limited partners (LPs)
of the VC funds generally adopt an investing strategy that has a ﬁxed optimal asset allocation
ratio to distribute their investment over asset classes. For example, they may invest 60% in
equity, 30% in ﬁxed income, and 10% in alternative assets (such as venture capital, private
equity, and hedge funds). The managers of these LPs regularly rebalance their portfolio to
maintain allocation close to the ﬁxed optimal ratio. When the endowments they manage
earn higher returns, they are likely to shift assets to venture capital to maintain their asset
allocations. Second, these LPs exhibit a “home bias” when investing in venture capital, i.e.,
they tend to invest in venture capital funds headquartered close to them, we would expect
a highly positive correlation between the lagged endowment returns earned by LPs and
investments in VC funds whose headquarters are geographically close the LPs.58 Finally, it
has been well documented that VC funds have a strong tendency to invest locally (see, e.g.,
Sorenson and Stuart (2001)). Venture capitalists rely on social networks to ﬁnd investments
and must travel to their portfolio companies to monitor and advise them. Therefore, VCs
tend to prefer to invest in ﬁrms that are close to them. Collectively, the above facts imply
that higher endowment returns earned by LPs are likely to lead to more venture capital
investments in ﬁrms in the same states as the LPs in the next few years.
Therefore, we construct our instrument for VC-Backing, namely, LP Returns, by mul-
tiplying the national average returns to college and university endowments (an important
class of LPs) by the number of all LPs in each state that had invested in any venture capital
fund at least ten years earlier. Speciﬁcally, LP Returns for ﬁrms headquartered in state s in
year t is constructed using the following formula:
LP Returnss,t =
t−1∑
j=t−10
Endowment Returnsj × Ln(1 + LPs,j), (2.3)
58As Samila and Sorenson (2010 and 2011) argue, the assumption of “home bias” is likely to hold for a
number of reasons: institutional investors might feel more comfortable investing near home, and they might
have had prior interactions with the managers of local funds.
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where Endowment Returnsj is the returns to college and university endowments in year
j. We obtained the average annual returns data for college and university endowments,
from the website of the National Association of College and University Business Oﬃcers.59
Ln(1 + LPs,j) is the log of the number of LPs located in state s who had invested in any
venture capital fund at least ten years prior to year j: this data is collected from the SDC
Platinum database. The ten-year lag is meant to remove any endogeneity that might result
from LPs initiating investment in venture capital in response to a change in local economic
conditions. The product of the two provides an estimate of the investment gains that LPs
in a given state experience and hence of the amount of funds available for investments in
VC funds. As shown in (2.3), we then summed up ten years of inﬂows into VC funds prior
to the IPO year to create our instrument for the VC-Backing of an IPO ﬁrm.60
We report our 2SLS results for the eﬀect of VC-backing on investor attention (as proxied
by pre-IPO media coverage) in Table 3. Since our endogenous variable is binary, we use
a probit model in the ﬁrst stage and regress VC-Backing on our instrument LP Returns
controlling for the same set of control variables and ﬁxed eﬀects as described in earlier
sections, following Wooldridge (2010). In the second stage, we use the predicted probability
of VC-backing from the ﬁrst stage as an instrument. We report the ﬁrst-stage result in
Column (1) of Table 3. Consistent with our earlier conjecture, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient
of LP Returns is signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting that higher endowment returns earned by
LPs lead to greater chances of VCs backing private ﬁrms in the same state in the next few
years. In Column (1), we also report the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic (Kleibergen and
Paap (2006)), which directly tests whether our instrument predicts a suﬃcient amount of
the variance in the endogenous variable to identify our equations. Stock and Yogo (2005)
report a critical value of 16.38 for the IV estimates to have no more than 10% of the bias of
the OLS estimates for LIML estimation with one instrument and one endogenous variable
59See more details at http:www.nacubo.org.
60In untabulated results, we also construct our instrument by summing up the inﬂows of investment into
VC funds from ﬁve years prior to ten years prior. The results are qualitatively similar.
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and ours is 29.93, which is signiﬁcantly larger than the critical value.
Columns (2)-(3) report the second-stage results of the eﬀect of VC-Backing on pre-IPO
media coverage variables. In each speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient of VC-Backing is signiﬁcantly
positive and gets even larger compared to the OLS regression estimates as in Table 2, sug-
gesting that the positive relationship between VC-backing and investor attention around a
ﬁrm’s IPO that we documented in our baseline analysis is causal.
2.6 Analysis of the Relation between VC-Backing, Investor At-
tention, and IPO Characteristics
2.6.1 VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and Price Revision
In this section, we study the relationship between VC-backing, investor attention (as proxied
by pre-IPO media coverage), and the IPO oﬀer price revision, which corresponds to our
hypotheses H3A and H3B. We run the following regression:
Ln(PR) = α+βVC-Backing+γZ+year FE+industry FE+stock exchange FE+, (2.4)
where the dependent variable, Ln(PR), is the natural log of one plus the absolute value of
diﬀerence between the IPO oﬀer price and the midpoint of the original ﬁling range.
We present our empirical results for the above test in Table 4. Columns (1) reports
the regression result of Ln(PR) on the dummy variable for VC-backing. We ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcient of VC-Backing is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The economic magnitude
is signiﬁcant as well: VC-backing is associated with 0.014 increase in the Ln(PR), which
is equivalent to 14% of the median Ln(PR). These ﬁndings suggest a positive relationship
between VC-backing and the absolute value of the IPO oﬀer price revision, which is consistent
with the information extraction hypothesis H3A. Columns (2) and (3) present regression
results of the IPO oﬀer price revision on the two media coverage variables, Ln(Headlines) and
Ln(Articles), respectively. The coeﬃcients on Ln(Headlines) and Ln(Articles) are positive
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and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, suggesting that greater investor attention is associated with
a greater absolute value of IPO oﬀer price revision.61
As we argued in earlier sections, under the information extraction hypothesis, we would
expect VC-backed IPO ﬁrms receiving a higher level of investor attention to be associated
with a larger absolute value of IPO oﬀer price revision, even after controlling for the direct
eﬀect of VC-backing. To test this conjecture, we include the interaction of VC-Backing
and a dummy variable for greater investor attention (namely, High Headlines) and test the
following model:
Ln(PR) =α + βVC-Backing + λHigh Headlines+ θVC-Backing ×High Headlines
+ γZ + year FE + industry FE + stock exchange FE + . (2.5)
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 report the results for these interaction tests. We
ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients of the interaction terms, VC-Backing×High Headlines and VC-
Backing×High Articles, are signiﬁcantly positive. Consistent with the information extrac-
tion hypothesis, these ﬁndings suggest that VC-backed ﬁrms that have attracted greater
investor attention around their IPOs are likely to have even larger price revisions.
2.6.2 VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and Secondary Market Valuation
In this section, we analyze the eﬀect of VC-backing on the post-IPO immediate secondary
market valuations of IPO ﬁrms and the channel through which this may happen, correspond-
ing to our hypothesis H4. We begin our analysis with a univariate comparison of median
ﬁrm valuations in the immediate secondary market between VC-backed and non-VC-backed
61When we report our regression results of the relation between investor attention and price revision, we
tabulate only the results for the continuous versions of these variables: i.e., Ln(Headlines) in Column (2)
and Ln(Articles) in Column (3). In untabulated results, we ﬁnd that similar results hold when we measure
investor attention using dummiﬁed versions of these variables: i.e., High Headlines and High Articles. We
take a similar approach in reporting the results of our analysis of all other IPO characteristics, such as
secondary market and IPO valuations and IPO initial returns: i.e., we report regression results using only
the continuous versions of our two investor attention variables, though these results hold for the dummiﬁed
versions of these variables as well.
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ﬁrms. Though our main measures of secondary market valuation (and IPO market valua-
tion as well) are computed based on the price-to-sales multiple, we also compute valuation
measures based on price-to-EBITDA and price-to-earnings multiples, compare their medians
between VC-backed and non-VC-backed subsamples, and ﬁnd that these results are consis-
tent with our results using measures based on the price-to-sales multiple. We present these
univariate analysis results in Table 5.
Our univariate results in Panels A-C of Table 5 show that the VC-backed ﬁrms have
signiﬁcantly higher valuation in the post-IPO immediate secondary market compared with
non-VC-backed ﬁrms. The diﬀerences in the median valuations between VC-backed and
non-VC-backed ﬁrms are signiﬁcant both statistically (all at the 1% level) and economically.
A consistent pattern is observable across diﬀerent decades, suggesting that our results are
not driven by a particular period of time.62
We then move on to assess the relationship between VC-backing and secondary market
ﬁrm valuations by running multivariate regressions. We adopt the same regression models
as (2.4)-(2.5) in Section 2.6.1 but use Ln(RVS0), our measure of secondary market valuation
of an IPO ﬁrm relative to an industry peer, as the dependent variable.
Our results for the above multivariate regressions are reported in Table 6. Column (1)
shows that the coeﬃcient of VC-backing is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. In terms of economic magnitude, VC-backing is associated with a 36.9% increase in
RVS0. Columns (2) and (3) present the eﬀect of our investor attention proxies, Ln(Headlines)
and Ln(Articles), respectively. We ﬁnd that our investor attention proxies by themselves have
a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the post-IPO immediate secondary market valuations, which
is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Merton (1987) and the empirical ﬁndings of
Liu, Sherman, and Zhang (2014). With regard to control variables, we ﬁnd IPO ﬁrms with
more reputable underwriters and a smaller fraction of ﬁrm equity sold to the public have
62In untabulated results, we compare the median valuation of VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPO ﬁrms
on a yearly basis and ﬁnd that VC-backed ﬁrms have consistently higher valuations than non-VC-backed
ﬁrms. These results are not reported to conserve space and are available from the authors upon request.
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higher valuations, which is consistent with the existing IPO literature. Columns (4) and
(5) summarize the results for the interaction tests. We ﬁnd that in both speciﬁcations, the
coeﬃcients of the interaction terms (VC-Backing×High Headlines and VC-Backing×High
Articles) are signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting that there is an incremental positive eﬀect of
greater investor attention received by VC-backed ﬁrms on immediate post-IPO secondary
market valuations, even after controlling for the direct eﬀect of VC-backing. Collectively,
our empirical results provide strong evidence consistent with our hypothesis H4.
2.6.3 VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and IPO Market Valuation
We now turn to the study of the relationship between VC-backing and IPOmarket valuations,
which corresponds to our hypotheses H5A and H5B. As in the prior section, we begin our
analysis with a univariate comparison of the median IPO market valuations between VC-
backed and non-VC-backed ﬁrms using valuation measures based on price-to-sales, price-to-
EBITDA, and price-to-earnings multiples. We present these results in Panels D-F of Table
5. We ﬁnd that the median IPO market valuations are signiﬁcantly higher for VC-backed
ﬁrms than for non-VC-backed ﬁrms. The diﬀerences of median IPO valuations between VC-
backed and non-VC-backed IPO ﬁrms are signiﬁcant statistically (mostly at the 1% level)
as well as economically. A similar pattern remains persistent across diﬀerent decades.
We then conduct multivariate regressions to test the relation between VC-backing, in-
vestor attention, and IPO market valuations. We adopt the same regression models as in
Section 2.6.2, but use the IPO market valuation measure, Ln(RVO), as the dependent vari-
able. We report the results for these tests in Table 7. Column (1) shows that the coeﬃcient
of VC-Backing is positive and signiﬁcant both statistically and economically: VC-Backing
is associated with a 32.5% increase in RVO. In Columns (4) and (5), we report the results
for our interaction tests. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on VC-Backing×High Headlines is
positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, while the coeﬃcient on VC-Backing×High Articles is
positive but insigniﬁcant. These results provide evidence for the conjecture that VC-backed
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ﬁrms receiving higher investor attention are associated with higher valuations at the oﬀer
price even after controlling for the direct eﬀect of VC-backing. In general, the above ﬁndings
lend support for our hypothesis H5A.
2.6.4 VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and IPO Initial Returns
We now move on to the study of the relationship between VC-backing and IPO initial returns,
as captured by our hypotheses H6A and H6B. To assess the eﬀect of VC-backing on IPO
initial returns, we regress Initial Ret, which is deﬁned as the percentage change from the
oﬀer price to the ﬁrst-day closing price in the secondary market, on the VC-backing dummy,
investor attention measures as proxied by pre-IPO media coverage, and the interaction of
the VC-backing dummy and dummies for greater media courage, namely, High Headlines
and High Articles.
We present the results of the above tests in Table 8. Our results show that VC-backing
has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on IPO initial returns as presented in Column (1). The
economic magnitude is signiﬁcant as well: on average, VC-backing is associated with a 4.5%
increase in IPO initial returns, which is equivalent to 22.6% of the sample mean. Columns
(2) and (3) show that both media coverage variables, Ln(Headlines) and Ln(Articles), are
signiﬁcantly and positively related to the initial returns, suggesting that ﬁrms that have
attracted more investor attentions have higher initial returns. Columns (4) and (5) present
the regression results using VC-Backing × High Headlines and VC-Backing × High Articles
as the main explanatory variables, respectively. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of each of these
interaction terms is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, while the coeﬃcient of VC-
Backing becomes insigniﬁcant. These ﬁndings suggest that there is an incremental positive
eﬀect of greater investor attention on IPO initial returns, even after controlling for the direct
eﬀect of VC-backing. Collectively, these ﬁndings support our hypothesis H6B.
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2.6.5 VC Reputation, Investor Attention, and IPO Characteristics
We now turn to the study of the relationship between the reputation of lead VC investors
backing an IPO ﬁrm, investor attention, and various IPO characteristics such as the sec-
ondary market and IPO ﬁrm valuations, and IPO initial returns. We test the following
model:
Dep V ar = α + θ1High-Rep-VC-Backing ×High Headlines
+ θ2Low-Rep-VC-Backing ×High Headlines+ β1High-Rep-VC-Backing
+ β2Low-Rep-VC-Backing + λHigh Headlines+ γZ
+ year FE + industry FE + stock exchange FE + . (2.6)
We interact the two dummy variables for high-reputation and low-reputation VC-backing
with High Headlines (or High Articles) and use these interactions terms as the main ex-
planatory variables in our regressions. Following our discussion in 2.3.3, we expect θ1 to be
signiﬁcantly positive and larger than θ2.
We report our regression results for the relationship between VC reputation, investor
attention, and IPO characteristics in Table 9. Column (1), (4), and (7) report regression
results that use High-Rep-VC-Backing and Low-Rep-VC-Backing as the main explanatory
variables. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of high-reputation VC-backing on IPO initial returns is
signiﬁcantly larger than that of low-reputation VC-backing. The rest of Table 9 report the
results for our interaction tests. As shown in Columns (2), (5), and (8), the coeﬃcients
of High-Rep-VC-Backing×High Headlines are signiﬁcantly positive and signiﬁcantly larger
than those of Low-Rep-VC-Backing×High Headlines in the regressions for immediate post-
IPO secondary market valuation, IPO valuation, and initial returns. Our regressions using
the interaction terms between reputation variables and High Articles (as in Column (3), (6),
and (9)) provide qualitative consistent but weaker results. In general, our ﬁndings suggest
that high-reputation VC-backed IPO ﬁrms receiving greater investor attention have higher
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valuations in the secondary and IPO markets as well as higher initial returns compared to
low-reputation VC-backed IPO ﬁrms receiving greater investor attention. Thus the results
reported in this section provide additional support for our hypotheses H4, H5A, and H6B.
2.6.6 VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and Financial Market Player Participa-
tion
In this section, we study how VC-backing aﬀects the participation of ﬁnancial market players
(institutional investors and ﬁnancial analysts) in the IPO and in the immediate post-IPO sec-
ondary market using multivariate regression analyses. Our dependent variables are the natu-
ral log of the number of institutional investors holding the stock of the IPO ﬁrm (Ln(N Inst))
and the natural log of the number of analysts following the IPO ﬁrm (Ln(N An)) at the end
of the ﬁrst ﬁscal year after IPO.
Table 10 reports our ﬁndings on the participation of institutional investors in the IPO.
Column (1) reports the eﬀect of VC-backing on the number of institutional investors holding
the stock of the IPO ﬁrm. We ﬁnd VC-backing is positively associated with the number of
institutional investors. In terms of economic magnitude, VC-backing is associated with a
21.2% increase in the number of institutional investors. Columns (2) and (3) report the ef-
fect of our investor attention proxies, Headlines and Articles, on the number of institutional
investors, respectively. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of each of these proxies is positive and
signiﬁcant, consistent with Merton’s (1987) attention model as well as with Liu, Sherman,
and Zhang (2014)’s empirical ﬁndings. In Columns (4) and (5), we report the results for
our interaction tests. We ﬁnd the coeﬃcient of VC-Backing × High Headlines is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 10% level, while that of VC-Backing × High Articles is positive but
insigniﬁcant. This provides evidence for our conjecture that there is an incremental positive
eﬀect of higher investor attention received by VC-backed ﬁrms on institutional investor par-
ticipation, even after controlling for the direct eﬀect of VC-backing. As for control variables,
pre-IPO ﬁrm size and underwriter rank are positively related to the number of institutional
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investors holding the equity of the ﬁrm, while the fraction of equity sold in the IPO is nega-
tively related to the number of institutional investors. These empirical ﬁndings are consistent
with our hypothesis H7.
In Table 11, we turn to study the relationship between VC-backing, investor attention,
and the number of analysts following the IPO ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that VC-backing remains
positively and signiﬁcantly related to analyst coverage as shown in Column (1): VC-backing
increases analyst coverage by 13.6%. In Columns (2) and (3), we ﬁnd that each of our investor
attention proxies is signiﬁcantly and positively related to analyst coverage, indicating higher
pre-IPO investor attention is likely to lead to greater analyst coverage immediately after
IPO. In Columns (4) and (5), we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of VC-Backing × High Headlines
is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level, while that of VC-Backing × High Articles is
positive but insigniﬁcant. This provides evidence consistent with our conjecture that there
is an incremental positive eﬀect of higher investor attention received by VC-backed ﬁrms on
analyst coverage, even after controlling for the direct eﬀect of VC-backing. Collectively, the
above results are consistent with our hypothesis H8.
2.6.7 The Dynamics of Investor Attention and Secondary Market Valuation
In this section, we study the dynamics of IPO ﬁrms’ secondary market valuations over time,
from the close of the ﬁrst trading day in the secondary market up to three years after IPO,
corresponding to our hypotheses H9 and H10. We ﬁrst conduct a univariate analysis of the
secondary market valuations over time for VC-backed and non-VC-backed subsamples. Table
12 reports the median valuations in the secondary market at the close of the ﬁrst trading day,
as well as in one, two, and three years following the IPO date for VC-backed and non-VC-
backed IPO ﬁrms. Panel A presents the results using our main valuation measures, which
are computed based on the price-to-sales ratio. Panels B and C use alternative valuation
measures that are computed based on the price-to-EBITDA and price-to-earnings ratio,
respectively. The last two columns of all panels test the statistical diﬀerences in median
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valuations between VC-backed and non-VC-backed subsamples.
For all three panels, we ﬁnd consistent results that VC-backed IPO ﬁrms have higher
secondary market valuations compared to non-VC-backed ﬁrms at the close of the ﬁrst
trading day, as well as in one, two, and three years after IPO. The diﬀerences in medians
between VC-backed and non-VC-backed subsamples are statistically signiﬁcant, mostly at
the 1% level. Within each panel, we ﬁnd that the median valuations decrease over time
for both VC-backed and non-VC-backed ﬁrms. Moreover, VC-backed ﬁrms tend to have
a larger decrease in valuations over time compared to non-VC-backed ﬁrms. Further, the
diﬀerences in median valuations between VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPO ﬁrms become
smaller over time. This pattern is also depicted in Figure 2, in which we plot the medians of
secondary market valuations over time for VC-backed and non-VC-backed subsamples. The
upper panel uses the entire sample while the lower panel uses ﬁrms that have all three years
of data available. Both panels show that the diﬀerences in medians between VC-backed and
non-VC-backed ﬁrms tend to become smaller as time elapses subsequent to IPO.
We then move on to study the dynamics of secondary market valuations in a multivariate
regression setting. Speciﬁcally, we test the following models:
Ln(RV St) = α + β1T ime Trend+ β2T ime Trend× V C-Backing + Firm FE + i,t,
(2.7)
Ln(RV St) = α + β1T ime Trend+ β2T ime Trend× V C-Backing
+ β3T ime Trend× V C-Backing ×High Headlines
+ β4T ime Trend×High Headlines+ Firm FE + i,t. (2.8)
In the above regressions, Ln(RVSt) is the IPO ﬁrm’s valuation in the secondary market
in the t-th year after IPO, where t equals 0, 1, 2, and 3, and year 0 means at the close of the
ﬁrst trading day in the secondary market. Time Trend is a linear time trend, deﬁned as the
number of years after IPO, which equals to 0, 1, 2, or 3. VC-Backing is a dummy variable
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indicating that a ﬁrm is VC-backed. High Headlines (High Articles) is a dummy variable
indicating that the number of headlines (articles) covering the IPO ﬁrm in the two months
prior to the IPO date is above the sample median. We include the full expansion of the triple
interaction of Time Trend, VC-Backing, and High Headlines (or High Articles) in regression
(2.8).63 In order to alleviate the concern that our regression results for the dynamics of
secondary market valuations may be aﬀected by intrinsic value or quality of the ﬁrm, we
include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in the above regressions to control for ﬁrms’ intrinsic value, which
may be driven, for example, by VC-backed ﬁrms being of diﬀerent quality than non-VC-
backed ﬁrms. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level in the above regressions.
The coeﬃcients of our interest are β2 and β3.
We present our results for the above regressions in Panel A of Table 13. In Column
(1), we regress our measure for secondary market valuation, Ln(RVS)t, on time trend only
and ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant and negative relationship between the two, justifying
the inclusion of this variable in all the regressions reported in this table. In Column (2),
we include the interaction term of Time Trend and VC-Backing as the main explanatory
variable. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on this interaction term, β2, is negative and signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, which suggests that the valuation of VC-backed IPO ﬁrms will fall to a
greater extent than that of non-VC-backed ﬁrms and is consistent with our hypothesis H9.
In the last two columns, we further include the triple interaction term, Time Trend×VC-
Backing×High Headlines (High Articles). The coeﬃcients of Time Trend and of Time
Trend×VC-Backing are signiﬁcantly and negatively related to secondary market valuation.
Further, the coeﬃcient (β3) of Time Trend×VC-Backing×High Headlines (High Articles)
is negative in both Columns (4) and (5), with the one in Column (5) being statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This provides evidence that VC-backed ﬁrms receiving greater
investor attention are likely to experience larger decreases in valuations over time in the
secondary market. The above empirical ﬁndings are consistent with our hypothesis H10.
63VC-Backing, High Articles, High Headlines, VC-Backing×High Articles, and VC-Backing×High Head-
lines are absorbed by the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in this speciﬁcation.
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To study the impact of high-reputation versus low-reputation VC-backing on the dy-
namics of secondary market valuations, we interact High-Rep-VC-Backing and Low-Rep-
VC-Backing with Time Trend and High Headlines (High Articles) and report the results
for these interaction tests in Panel B of Table 13. In Column (1), our evidence suggests
that both high-reputation and low-reputation VC-backed IPO ﬁrms experience a fall in val-
uations as time passes, but there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the decreases in valuation
between high-reputation and low-reputation VC-backed ﬁrms. In Column (2), we ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcient of Time Trend×High-Rep-VC-Backing×High Headlines is negative and sig-
niﬁcant. Further, the coeﬃcient of Time Trend×High-Rep-VC-Backing×High Headlines is
larger in magnitude than that of Time Trend×Low-Rep-VC-Backing×High Headlines. In
Column (3), we ﬁnd qualitatively similar but weaker results using the interaction of time
trend, VC reputation dummies, and the article variable. The above empirical results suggest
that IPO ﬁrms backed by high-reputation lead VCs that have attracted higher investor at-
tention are likely to experience larger decreases in valuation over time than IPO ﬁrms backed
by low-reputation lead VCs that have attracted higher investor attention, consistent with
the investor attention channel of VC value creation in the IPO market.
2.6.8 Instrumental Variable Analysis: VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and
IPO Characteristics
Our OLS regression results show that VC-backed IPO ﬁrms are associated with higher abso-
lute values of price revision, have higher IPO and secondary market valuations, and higher
IPO initial returns. We also show that VC-backed IPO ﬁrms have greater participation by
institutional investors and have greater post-IPO analyst coverage. However, as argued ear-
lier in Section 2.5.2, VC-backing and IPO characteristics may be endogenous. In particular,
unobservables (such as the intrinsic value of the ﬁrm going public) may aﬀect VC backing
as well as IPO characteristics, so that the favorable IPO characteristics that we documented
earlier for VC-backed ﬁrms may be due to underlying ﬁrm characteristics rather than due
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to VC-backing itself. We therefore use the instrument (LP Returns) that we documented in
Section 2.5.2 for VC-backing to conduct an instrumental variable analysis to account for the
above endogeneity concern.
We report the second-stage results of our IV regression analysis for the eﬀect of VC-
backing on a variety of IPO characteristics (including IPO oﬀer price revision, secondary
market valuation, IPO market valuation, IPO initial returns, institutional investor partic-
ipation, and ﬁnancial analyst coverage) in Table 14. After controlling for the potential
endogeneity of VC-Backing and IPO characteristics using our IV analysis, we continue to
ﬁnd a highly positive relationship between VC-Backing and each of the above dependent
variables: the coeﬃcient on VC-backing is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level for all of
our second-stage regressions. These ﬁndings suggest that the relations between VC-backing
and the above favorable IPO characteristics are causal.
We have established using the above IV analysis in this section that VC-backing causally
aﬀects IPO characteristics such as IPO and immediate secondary market valuations and IPO
initial returns. We now turn to the channel through which this causal eﬀect operates. As
we showed using our OLS analysis of various IPO characteristics and our dynamic analysis
of post-IPO secondary market valuations, we argue here that at least one channel through
which this causal eﬀect operates is through investor attention. In this context, we note that
we have already established (using our IV analysis presented in Section 2.5.2) a positive
causal relationship between VC-backing and investor attention. Further, Liu, Sherman, and
Zhang (2014) has established (using an IV analysis where they use the number of special
news reports aired on the three major US television networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) as
an instrumental variable for investor attention) that investor attention is positively and
causally related to IPO characteristics such as the IPO ﬁrm’s long-term stock value.64 In
untabulated results, we have conducted a similar IV analysis using the number of special
64Liu, Sherman, and Zhang (2014) argue that these special news reports were exogenous events that drew
attention away from any IPO ﬁrms that were trying to attract a following and thus the number of these
special news reports is a valid instrumental variable for investor attention as proxied by media coverage. See
more details about the justiﬁcation of this instrument in their paper.
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news reports aired on the three major US television networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) in
the two months prior to IPO as an instrument for investor attention and ﬁnd that investor
attention is causally related to oﬀer price revision, IPO and secondary market valuations,
IPO initial returns, institutional investor participation, and post-IPO analyst coverage.65
Taken together, these two results imply that at least one channel through which the causal
eﬀect of VC-backing on IPO characteristics operates is by enhancing the investor attention
garnered by the IPOs of ﬁrms backed by them.
2.7 Conclusion
We propose and empirically analyze a new channel through which VCs may create incremen-
tal value at the time of IPO for the entrepreneurial ﬁrms that they invest in. We hypothesize
that the IPOs of VC-backed ﬁrms garner greater “investor attention” (in the sense of Mer-
ton (1987)), allowing the IPO underwriters of such ﬁrms to perform two information-related
roles more eﬃciently during the IPO book-building and road-show process: information
dissemination, where the lead underwriter disseminates noisy information about various as-
pects of the IPO ﬁrm to institutional investors; and information extraction, where the lead
underwriter extracts information useful in pricing the IPO ﬁrm equity from institutional
investors. Based on this investor attention channel, we develop testable implications for
the IPO characteristics of VC-backed ﬁrms and empirically test these implications. Using a
hand-collected dataset of pre-IPO media coverage as a proxy for investor attention, we ﬁrst
show that the IPOs of VC-backed ﬁrms indeed attract greater investor attention than those of
non-VC backed ﬁrms. Further, while the IPOs of high- and low-reputation VC-backed ﬁrms
attract greater investor attention than non-VC-backed ﬁrms, the IPOs of high-reputation
VC-backed ﬁrms attract greater investor attention than those of low-reputation VC-backed
ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that VC-backed ﬁrms are associated with larger absolute values of IPO oﬀer
price revisions; greater IPO and after-market valuations; larger IPO initial returns; greater
65Given space constraints, we choose not to present these results here. These results are available from
the authors upon request.
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institutional investor equity holdings; and greater analyst coverage immediately post-IPO.
Our dynamic analysis of IPO ﬁrm valuation in the three years post-IPO shows that the
valuation of VC-backed ﬁrms falls to a greater extent than those of non-VC backed ﬁrms
corresponding to investor attention fading with time, with the valuation of those VC-backed
ﬁrms that received the greatest investor attention at IPO falling to the greatest extent.
Our instrumental variable analysis shows that the positive relation we document between
VC-backing, investor attention, and various IPO characteristics is causal.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics for the sample of IPOs in the US from 1980 to 2009. We exclude equity 
offerings of financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes between 
4900 and 4999), unit offerings, closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs), rights issues, spin-offs, equity carve-outs, leverage buyouts, tracking stocks, issues with offer price 
less than $5, issues with incomplete information on offer price and the number of shares filed in an IPO, and 
duplicates. The IPO firm should issue common shares (with share code headers of 10 and 11 in CRSP). We further 
require that the issuing firm must be present on the Compustat annual industrial database for the fiscal year prior to 
the offering and at least for one year after the offering, as well as on the CRSP database within sixty days of the issue 
date. Headlines is the number of headlines that have mentioned the IPO firm in the two months prior to the IPO date.
Articles is the number of articles that have mentioned the IPO firm in the two months prior to the IPO date. VC-
Backing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is venture capitalist backed and 0 otherwise. RVO is the valuation 
of an IPO firm at offer relative to an industry peer. RVS0 is the valuation of the IPO firm at the close of the first 
trading day in the secondary market relative to an industry peer. Initial Ret is the percentage change from the offer 
price to the first-day closing price in the secondary market. Price Revision the absolute value of difference between 
the IPO offer price and the midpoint of original filing range. N_Inst is the number of institutions that hold the stocks 
of the firm at the end of the first fiscal year after IPO. N_An is the number of analysts providing earnings forecast at 
the end of the first fiscal year after IPO. CM Rank is the Carter-Manaster rank of the lead underwriter for the IPO firm. 
Ln(Asset) is the natural log of the firm’s pre-IPO assets. Fraction Sold is the fraction of firm equity sold in the IPO.
Variables N Mean Std. Dev Min 25th Median 75th Max
Headlines 4105 4.891 10.229 0.000 0.000 2.000 5.000 272.000
Articles 4105 29.662 94.924 0.000 2.000 9.000 32.000 4369.000
VC-Backing 4105 0.457 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
RVO 3100 4.629 12.434 0.023 0.774 1.659 3.971 254.512
RVS0 3100 6.273 19.189 0.026 0.838 1.911 4.773 342.800
Initial Ret 4070 0.199 0.428 -0.705 0.003 0.073 0.229 6.056
Price Revision 3964 0.160 0.176 0.000 0.048 0.105 0.227 2.100
N_Inst 3924 34.524 43.275 1.000 9.000 20.000 46.000 760.000
N_An 3502 4.302 3.561 1.000 2.000 3.000 6.000 43.000
CM Rank 3868 7.186 2.126 0.100 6.000 8.000 9.000 9.000
Ln(Asset) 4006 3.163 1.752 -3.912 2.080 3.077 4.138 11.823
Fraction Sold 4070 0.327 0.212 0.031 0.218 0.291 0.381 7.823
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Table 2: VC-Backing and Investor Attention
Panel A reports the OLS regression results of the effect of VC-backing on investor attention around a firm’s IPO (as 
proxied by pre-IPO media coverage); Panel B reports the OLS regression results of the effect of high- and low-
reputation VC-backing on investor attention. Ln(Headlines) is the natural log of one plus the number of headlines that 
have mentioned the IPO firm in the two months prior to the IPO date. Ln(Articles) is the natural log of one plus the 
number of articles that have mentioned the IPO firm in the two months prior to the IPO date. High Headlines is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of headlines that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median 
and 0 otherwise. High Articles is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles that have mentioned the IPO 
firm is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. VC-Backing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is venture 
capitalist backed and 0 otherwise. High-Rep-VC-Backing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the average market share 
of funds raised by the IPO firm’s lead VC investors is above the 75th percentile of the sample and 0 otherwise. Low-
Rep-VC-Backing is dummy variable equal to 1 if the average market share of funds raised by the IPO firm’s lead VC 
investors is equal to or below the 75th percentile of the sample and 0 otherwise. CM Rank is the Carter-Manaster rank 
of the lead underwriter for the IPO firm. Ln(Asset) is the natural log of the firm’s pre-IPO assets. Fraction Sold is the 
fraction of firm equity sold in the IPO. Constant, industry fixed effects based on Fama French 48 industry 
classifications, IPO year fixed effects, and stock exchange fixed effects are included in all regressions. All standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: The Effect of VC-Backing on Investor Attention (as Proxied by Media Coverage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Ln(Headlines) Ln(Articles) High Headlines High Articles
VC-Backing 0.141*** 0.149*** 0.054** 0.042*
(0.037) (0.041) (0.023) (0.022)
CM Rank 0.072*** 0.108*** 0.033*** 0.028***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004)
Ln(Asset) 0.021* 0.071*** 0.004 0.019***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005)
Fraction Sold -0.114 -0.052 -0.030 -0.015
(0.100) (0.069) (0.040) (0.017)
Observations 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696
Adjusted R-squared 0.409 0.664 0.318 0.542
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exchange FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: The Effect of VC Reputation on Investor Attention (as Proxied by Media Coverage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Ln(Headlines) Ln(Articles) High Headlines High Articles
High-Rep-VC-Backing 0.239*** 0.246*** 0.106*** 0.093***
(0.047) (0.065) (0.023) (0.028)
Low-Rep-VC-Backing 0.112*** 0.125*** 0.041* 0.030
(0.036) (0.042) (0.023) (0.022)
CM Rank 0.071*** 0.107*** 0.032*** 0.028***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004)
Ln(Asset) 0.020* 0.070*** 0.003 0.018***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005)
Fraction Sold -0.113 -0.051 -0.029 -0.014
(0.100) (0.068) (0.040) (0.017)
Observations 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696
Adjusted R-squared 0.410 0.665 0.319 0.543
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exchange FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
High-Rep VC- Backing –
Low-Rep-VC-Backing 0.127*** 0.121*** 0.065*** 0.063***
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Table 3: Instrumental Variable Analysis of the Effect of VC-Backing on Investor Attention
This table reports the Instrumental Variable regression results of the effect of VC-backing on investor attention 
around a firm’s IPO (as proxied by pre-IPO media coverage). Column (1) reports the first stage probit regression
result, i.e., regressing VC-Backing on our instrument, LP Returns, which is defined in Section 2.5.2. Columns (2) and 
(3) report the second-stage results of the effect of VC-backing on media coverage. VC-Backing is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm is venture capitalist backed and 0 otherwise. Ln(Headlines) is the natural log of one plus the 
number of headlines that have mentioned the IPO firm in the two months prior to the IPO date. Ln(Articles) is the 
natural log of one plus the number of articles that have mentioned the IPO firm in the two months prior to the IPO
date. CM Rank is the Carter-Manaster rank of the lead underwriter for the IPO firm. Ln(Asset) is the natural log of the
firm’s pre-IPO assets. Fraction Sold is the fraction of firm equity sold in the IPO. Constant, industry fixed effects 
based on Fama French 48 industry classifications, IPO year fixed effects, and stock exchange fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level and are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
1st Stage 2nd Stage 2nd Stage
VARIABLES VC-Backing Ln(Headlines) Ln(Articles)
LP Returns 0.323***
(0.116)
VC-Backing 0.644*** 0.692***
(0.154) (0.108)
CM Rank 0.219*** 0.044*** 0.080***
(0.020) (0.014) (0.010)
Ln(Asset) -0.153*** 0.046*** 0.099***
(0.027) (0.012) (0.014)
Fraction Sold -0.543* -0.014 0.060
(0.313) (0.079) (0.069)
Observations 3,331 3,331 3,331
Pseudo R-squared 0.266
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Exchange FE Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald Stat 29.93
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Table 4: VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and Offer Price Revision
This table reports the relationship between VC-backing, investor attention around a firm’s IPO (as proxied by pre-
IPO media coverage), and the absolute value of the offer price revision. Ln(PR) is the natural log of one plus the 
absolute value of the percentage difference between the IPO offer price and the midpoint of original filing range. VC-
Backing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is venture capitalist backed and 0 otherwise. Ln(Headlines) is the 
natural log of one plus the number of headlines that have mentioned the IPO firm in the two months prior to the IPO
date. Ln(Articles) is the natural log of one plus the number of articles that have mentioned the IPO firm in the two 
months prior to the IPO date. High Headlines is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of headlines that have 
mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. High Articles is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the number of articles that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. CM Rank is the 
Carter-Manaster rank of the lead underwriter for the IPO firm. Ln(Asset) is the natural log of the firm’s pre-IPO assets. 
Fraction Sold is the fraction of firm equity sold in the IPO. Constant, industry fixed effects based on Fama French 48 
industry classifications, IPO year fixed effects, and stock exchange fixed effects are included in all regressions. All 
standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ln(PR) Ln(PR) Ln(PR) Ln(PR) Ln(PR)
VC-Backing 0.014** 0.004 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln(Headlines) 0.014***
(0.002)
Ln(Articles) 0.017***
(0.003)
VC-Backing × High Headlines 0.022***
(0.007)
High Headlines 0.013**
(0.006)
VC-Backing × High Articles 0.022**
(0.010)
High Articles 0.020***
(0.007)
CM Rank 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(Asset) -0.002 -0.003 -0.003* -0.001 -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fraction Sold -0.022 -0.022 -0.023 -0.020 -0.018
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Observations 3,591 3,591 3,591 3,591 3,591
Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.107 0.112 0.109 0.104
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exchange FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: Univariate Comparisons of Secondary Market and IPO Valuations
This table reports the distribution of immediate secondary market and IPO valuations of our sample firms going 
public from 1980 to 2009. Panels A, B, and C present the medians of secondary market valuations at the close of the 
first trading day relative to an industry peer (RVS0), which are computed based on market price-to-sales, market price-
to-EBITDA, and market price-to-earnings multiple, respectively. Panels D, E, and F present the medians of IPO firm 
valuations relative to an industry peer (RVO), which are computed based on market price-to-sales, market price-to-
EBITDA, and market price-to-earnings multiple, respectively. The industry peer is a comparable publicly traded firm 
generated by the comparable firm approach. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively, for the differences in medians of valuations between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms.
VC-Backed IPOs Non-VC-Backed IPOs Test of Differences
Year No. of Issues Median No. of Issues Median Difference p-value
Panel A: RVS0 Based on Price/Sales Multiple
1980-1989 270 2.289 441 1.553 0.736*** 0.003
1990-1999 845 2.748 968 1.534 1.214*** 0.000
2000-2009 327 2.614 249 1.152 1.462*** 0.000
Whole Sample 1442 2.625 1658 1.488 1.137*** 0.000
Panel B: RVS0 Based on Price/EBITDA Multiple
1980-1989 209 1.783 393 1.347 0.436*** 0.005
1990-1999 520 2.158 807 1.311 0.847*** 0.000
2000-2009 130 2.099 212 0.947 1.152*** 0.000
Whole Sample 859 2.022 1412 1.282 0.740*** 0.000
Panel C: RVS0 Based on Price/Earnings Multiple
1980-1989 196 1.581 333 1.174 0.407*** 0.001
1990-1999 398 1.725 611 1.354 0.371*** 0.002
2000-2009 87 1.933 143 1.354 0.579** 0.041
Whole Sample 681 1.686 1087 1.267 0.419*** 0.000
Panel D: RVO Based on Price/Sales Multiple
1980-1989 270 2.182 441 1.398 0.783*** 0.000
1990-1999 845 2.352 968 1.362 0.990*** 0.000
2000-2009 327 2.294 249 1.041 1.253*** 0.000
Whole Sample 1442 2.297 1658 1.345 0.952*** 0.000
Panel E: RVO Based on Price/EBITDA Multiple
1980-1989 209 1.649 393 1.232 0.417*** 0.004
1990-1999 520 1.802 807 1.188 0.614*** 0.000
2000-2009 130 1.697 212 0.877 0.820*** 0.000
Whole Sample 859 1.761 1412 1.148 0.613*** 0.000
Panel F: RVO Based on Price/Earnings Multiple
1980-1989 196 1.455 333 1.091 0.364*** 0.007
1990-1999 398 1.420 611 1.185 0.234*** 0.006
2000-2009 87 1.465 143 1.179 0.286* 0.077
Whole Sample 681 1.436 1087 1.145 0.291*** 0.000
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Table 6: VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and Secondary Market Valuations
This table reports the relationship of VC-backing, investor attention around a firm’s IPO (as proxied by pre-IPO 
media coverage), and the valuation of an IPO firm in the immediate post-IPO secondary market. Ln(RVS0) is the 
natural log of the valuation of an IPO firm at the close of the first trading day in the secondary market relative to an 
industry peer. VC-Backing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is venture capitalist backed and 0 otherwise.
Ln(Headlines) is the natural log of one plus the number of headlines that have mentioned the IPO firm in the two 
months prior to the IPO date. Ln(Articles) is the natural log of one plus the number of articles that have mentioned the 
IPO firm in the two months prior to the IPO date. High Headlines is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of 
headlines that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. High Articles is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the number of articles that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 0 
otherwise. CM Rank is the Carter-Manaster rank of the lead underwriter for the IPO firm. Ln(Asset) is the natural log 
of the firm’s pre-IPO assets. Fraction Sold is the fraction of firm equity sold in the IPO. Constant, industry fixed 
effects based on Fama French 48 industry classifications, IPO year fixed effects, and stock exchange fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level and are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ln(RVS0) Ln(RVS0) Ln(RVS0) Ln(RVS0) Ln(RVS0)
VC-Backing 0.369*** 0.242*** 0.309***
(0.050) (0.055) (0.062)
Ln(Headlines) 0.115***
(0.031)
Ln(Articles) 0.085***
(0.029)
VC-Backing × High Headlines 0.285***
(0.090)
High Headlines 0.043
(0.061)
VC-Backing × High Articles 0.181**
(0.078)
High Articles 0.099
(0.079)
CM Rank 0.090*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.084*** 0.100***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015)
Ln(Asset) -0.237*** -0.267*** -0.271*** -0.233*** -0.259***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.030)
Fraction Sold -1.212*** -1.266*** -1.274*** -1.196*** -1.230***
(0.422) (0.450) (0.457) (0.406) (0.417)
Observations 2,890 2,890 2,890 2,890 2,890
Adjusted R-squared 0.223 0.214 0.213 0.228 0.221
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exchange FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and IPO Valuations
This table reports the relationship of VC-backing, investor attention around a firm’s IPO (as proxied by pre-IPO 
media coverage), and IPO valuation. Ln(RVO) is the natural log of the valuation of an IPO firm at offer relative to an 
industry peer. VC-Backing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is venture capitalist backed and 0 otherwise. 
Ln(Headlines) is the natural log of one plus the number of headlines that have mentioned the IPO firm in the two 
months prior to the IPO date. Ln(Articles) is the natural log of one plus the number of articles that have mentioned the 
IPO firm in the two months prior to the IPO date. High Headlines is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of 
headlines that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. High Articles is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the number of articles that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 0 
otherwise. CM Rank is the Carter-Manaster rank of the lead underwriter for the IPO firm. Ln(Asset) is the natural log 
of the firm’s pre-IPO assets. Fraction Sold is the fraction of firm equity sold in the IPO. Constant, industry fixed 
effects based on Fama French 48 industry classifications, IPO year fixed effects, and stock exchange fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level and are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ln(RVO) Ln(RVO) Ln(RVO) Ln(RVO) Ln(RVO)
VC-Backing 0.325*** 0.236*** 0.307***
(0.048) (0.054) (0.059)
Ln(Headlines) 0.095***
(0.028)
Ln(Articles) 0.068**
(0.027)
VC-Backing × High Headlines 0.194**
(0.084)
High Headlines 0.070
(0.058)
VC-Backing × High Articles 0.083
(0.078)
High Articles 0.128
(0.081)
CM Rank 0.089*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.084*** 0.100***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014)
Ln(Asset) -0.251*** -0.277*** -0.280*** -0.249*** -0.271***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.027)
Fraction Sold -1.128*** -1.177*** -1.184*** -1.117*** -1.145***
(0.380) (0.404) (0.410) (0.367) (0.379)
Observations 2,890 2,890 2,890 2,890 2,890
Adjusted R-squared 0.184 0.176 0.175 0.188 0.182
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exchange FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8: VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and IPO Initial Returns
This table reports the relationship between VC-backing, investor attention around a firm’s IPO (as proxied by pre-
IPO media coverage), and IPO initial returns. Initial Ret is the percentage change from the offer price to the first-day 
closing price in the secondary market. VC-Backing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is venture capitalist 
backed and 0 otherwise. Ln(Headlines) is the natural log of one plus the number of headlines that have mentioned the 
IPO firm in the two months prior to the IPO date. Ln(Articles) is the natural log of one plus the number of articles that 
have mentioned the IPO firm in the two months prior to the IPO date. High Headlines is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the number of headlines that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. High 
Articles is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the 
sample median and 0 otherwise. CM Rank is the Carter-Manaster rank of the lead underwriter for the IPO firm. 
Ln(Asset) is the natural log of the firm’s pre-IPO assets. Fraction Sold is the fraction of firm equity sold in the IPO. 
Constant, industry fixed effects based on Fama French 48 industry classifications, IPO year fixed effects, and stock 
exchange fixed effects are included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry
level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Initial Ret Initial Ret Initial Ret Initial Ret Initial Ret
VC-Backing 0.045*** -0.000 -0.014
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Ln(Headlines) 0.034***
(0.010)
Ln(Articles) 0.031***
(0.009)
VC-Backing × High Headlines 0.105***
(0.029)
High Headlines -0.023
(0.017)
VC-Backing × High Articles 0.122***
(0.037)
High Articles -0.039*
(0.021)
CM Rank 0.017** 0.017** 0.016** 0.015* 0.016**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Ln(Asset) -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.019*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Fraction Sold -0.166** -0.170** -0.172** -0.161** -0.157**
(0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.075) (0.075)
Observations 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696
Adjusted R-squared 0.233 0.235 0.235 0.237 0.238
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exchange FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 9: VC Reputation, Investor Attention, and IPO Characteristics
This table reports the relationship between VC reputation, investor attention, and IPO characteristics including 
secondary market and IPO valuations as well as IPO initial returns. Ln(PR) is the natural log of one plus the absolute
value of the percentage difference between the IPO offer price and the midpoint of original filing range. Ln(RVS0) is 
the natural log of the valuation of an IPO firm at the close of the first trading day in the secondary market relative to 
an industry peer. Ln(RVO) is the natural log of the valuation of an IPO firm at offer relative to an industry peer. Initial 
Ret is the percentage change from the offer price to the first-day closing price in the secondary market. High-Rep-VC-
Backing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the average market share of funds raised by the IPO firm’s lead VC 
investors is above the 75th percentile of the sample and 0 otherwise. Low-Rep-VC-Backing is dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the average market share of funds raised by the IPO firm’s lead VC investors is equal to or below the 75th 
percentile of the sample and 0 otherwise. High Headlines is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of headlines 
that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. High Articles is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the number of articles that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. 
CM Rank is the Carter-Manaster rank of the lead underwriter for the IPO firm. Ln(Asset) is the natural log of the
firm’s pre-IPO assets. Fraction Sold is the fraction of firm equity sold in the IPO. Constant, industry fixed effects 
based on Fama French 48 industry classifications, IPO year fixed effects, and stock exchange fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level and are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.
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Table 10: VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and Institutional Investor Participation
This table reports the relationship between VC-backing, investor attention around a firm’s IPO (as proxied by pre-
IPO media coverage), and the number of institutional investors holding the IPO firm’s equity. Ln(N_Inst) is the
natural log of the number of institutional investors that hold the stocks of the firm at the end of the first fiscal year 
after IPO. VC-Backing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is venture capitalist backed and 0 otherwise. 
Ln(Headlines) is the natural log of one plus the number of headlines that have mentioned the IPO firm in the two 
months prior to the IPO date. Ln(Articles) is the natural log of one plus the number of articles that have mentioned the 
IPO firm in the two months prior to the IPO date. High Headlines is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of 
headlines that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. High Articles is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the number of articles that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 0 
otherwise. CM Rank is the Carter-Manaster rank of the lead underwriter for the IPO firm. Ln(Asset) is the natural log 
of the firm’s pre-IPO assets. Fraction Sold is the fraction of firm equity sold in the IPO. Constant, industry fixed 
effects based on Fama French 48 industry classifications, IPO year fixed effects, and stock exchange fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level and are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ln(N_Inst) Ln(N_Inst) Ln(N_Inst) Ln(N_Inst) Ln(N_Inst)
VC-Backing 0.212*** 0.174*** 0.213***
(0.034) (0.037) (0.037)
Ln(Headlines) 0.066***
(0.012)
Ln(Articles) 0.075***
(0.015)
VC-Backing × High Headlines 0.080*
(0.042)
High Headlines 0.028
(0.049)
VC-Backing × High Articles -0.009
(0.054)
High Articles 0.086*
(0.048)
CM Rank 0.171*** 0.180*** 0.177*** 0.168*** 0.169***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Ln(Asset) 0.177*** 0.166*** 0.162*** 0.179*** 0.175***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Fraction Sold -0.171** -0.205** -0.208** -0.166** -0.171**
(0.076) (0.090) (0.092) (0.073) (0.074)
Observations 3,538 3,538 3,538 3,538 3,538
Adjusted R-squared 0.585 0.581 0.582 0.585 0.585
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exchange FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 11: VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and Financial Analyst Coverage
This table reports the relationship between VC-backing, investor attention around a firm’s IPO (as proxied by pre-
IPO media coverage), and the number of financial analysts that follow the firm after IPO. Ln(N_An) is the natural log 
of the number of analysts providing earnings forecast at the end of the first fiscal year after IPO. VC-Backing is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is venture capitalist backed and 0 otherwise. Ln(Headlines) is the natural log of 
one plus the number of headlines that have mentioned the IPO firm in the two months prior to the IPO date.
Ln(Articles) is the natural log of one plus the number of articles that have mentioned the IPO firm in the two months
prior to IPO. High Headlines is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of headlines that have mentioned the IPO 
firm is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. High Articles is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of 
articles that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. CM Rank is the Carter-
Manaster rank of the lead underwriter for the IPO firm. Ln(Asset) is the natural log of the firm’s pre-IPO assets. 
Fraction Sold is the fraction of firm equity sold in the IPO. Constant, industry fixed effects based on Fama French 48 
industry classifications, IPO year fixed effects, and stock exchange fixed effects are included in all regressions. All 
standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ln(N_An) Ln(N_An) Ln(N_An) Ln(N_An) Ln(N_An)
VC-Backing 0.136*** 0.110*** 0.110***
(0.016) (0.022) (0.027)
Ln(Headlines) 0.034***
(0.007)
Ln(Articles) 0.049***
(0.012)
VC-Backing × High Headlines 0.055*
(0.031)
High Headlines -0.000
(0.022)
VC-Backing × High Articles 0.048
(0.034)
High Articles 0.002
(0.028)
CM Rank 0.080*** 0.087*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 0.079***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Ln(Asset) 0.073*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.074*** 0.073***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Fraction Sold -0.093 -0.114* -0.115* -0.090 -0.090
(0.182) (0.186) (0.179) (0.185) (0.177)
Observations 3,180 3,180 3,180 3,180 3,180
Adjusted R-squared 0.282 0.274 0.278 0.282 0.282
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exchange FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 12: Univariate Comparisons of Secondary Market Valuations for VC-Backed and Non-VC-Backed 
IPO Firms over Time
This table presents the secondary market valuations of VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPO firms over time. Panels A, 
B, and C present the medians of secondary market valuations of IPO firms from the close of the first trading day in 
the secondary market up to three years after IPO, which are computed based on market price-to-sales, market price-
to-EBITDA, and market price-to-earnings multiple of an industry peer, respectively. The industry peer is a 
comparable publicly traded firm generated by the comparable firm approach. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, for the differences in median valuations between VC-
backed and non-VC-backed subsamples.
VC-Backed IPOs Non-VC-Backed IPOs Test of Differences
Number of Years 
after IPO
No. of 
Issues Median 
No. of 
Issues Median Difference p-value
Panel A: RVSt based on Price/Sales Multiple
0 1442 2.625 1658 1.488 1.137*** 0.000
1 1261 1.821 1556 1.182 0.640*** 0.000
2 1157 1.590 1345 1.015 0.575*** 0.000
3 997 1.305 1136 1.062 0.243*** 0.000
Panel B: RVSt based on Price/EBITDA Multiple
0 859 2.022 1412 1.282 0.740*** 0.000
1 738 1.704 1233 1.128 0.576*** 0.000
2 665 1.601 1036 1.027 0.574*** 0.000
3 576 1.470 898 1.047 0.424*** 0.000
Panel C: RVSt based on Price/Earnings Multiple
0 681 1.686 1087 1.267 0.419*** 0.000
1 588 1.487 964 1.093 0.394*** 0.000
2 480 1.373 764 1.068 0.306*** 0.000
3 411 1.301 613 1.142 0.158** 0.035
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Table 13: The Dynamics of Secondary Market Valuations over Time
Panel A reports the relationship between VC-backing, investor attention around a firm’s IPO (as proxied by pre-IPO 
media coverage), and the secondary market valuations of IPO firms from the close of the first trading day in the 
secondary market up to three years after IPO. Panel B reports the relationship between high- and low-reputation VC-
backing, investor attention, and the secondary market valuations over time. Ln(RVSt) is the natural log of the relative
valuation of an IPO firm in the secondary market in the t-th year after IPO, where t equals 0, 1, 2, and 3, and year 0 
means at the close of the first trading day in the secondary market. Time Trend is a linear trend, defined as the number
of years after IPO. VC-Backing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is venture capitalist backed and 0 otherwise.
High-Rep-VC-Backing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the average market share of funds raised by the IPO firm’s 
lead VC investors is above the 75th percentile of the sample and 0 otherwise. Low-Rep-VC-Backing is dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the average market share of funds raised by the IPO firm’s lead VC investors is equal to or 
below the 75th percentile of the sample and 0 otherwise. High Headlines is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
number of headlines that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. High Articles is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles that have mentioned the IPO firm is above the sample median and 
0 otherwise. Constant, firm fixed effects, and calendar year fixed effects are included in all regressions. All standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, 
**, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Panel A: VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and the Dynamics of Secondary Market Valuations over Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Ln(RVSt) Ln(RVSt) Ln(RVSt) Ln(RVSt)
Time Trend -0.152*** -0.106*** -0.104*** -0.114***
(0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
Time Trend × VC-Backing -0.097*** -0.085*** -0.060**
(0.024) (0.029) (0.028)
Time Trend × VC-Backing × High Headlines -0.024
(0.045)
Time Trend × High Headlines -0.005
(0.022)
Time Trend × VC-Backing × High Articles -0.077*
(0.042)
Time Trend × High Articles 0.019
(0.032)
Observations 10,496 10,496 10,496 10,496
Adjusted R-squared 0.071 0.074 0.074 0.074
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: High- and Low-Reputation VC-Backing, Investor Attention, and the Dynamics of Secondary Market 
Valuations over Time
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Ln(RVSt) Ln(RVSt) Ln(RVSt)
Time Trend -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.113***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Time Trend × High-Rep-VC-Backing -0.103*** -0.041 -0.068**
(0.026) (0.030) (0.027)
Time Trend × Low-Rep-VC-Backing -0.091*** -0.093*** -0.060*
(0.024) (0.029) (0.031)
Time Trend × High Headlines × High-Rep-VC-Backing -0.122***
(0.040)
Time Trend × High Headlines × Low-Rep-VC-Backing 0.003
(0.047)
Time Trend × High Headlines -0.004
(0.023)
Time Trend × High Articles × High-Rep-VC-Backing -0.070*
(0.035)
Time Trend × High Articles × Low-Rep-VC-Backing -0.067
(0.050)
Time Trend × High Articles 0.016
(0.032)
Observations 10,496 10,496 10,496
Adjusted R-squared 0.074 0.074 0.074
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Time Trend × High-Rep-VC-Backing –
Time Trend × Low-Rep-VC-Backing -0.012
Time Trend × High Headlines × High-Rep-VC-Backing –
Time Trend × High Headlines × Low-Rep-VC-Backing -0.125***
Time Trend × High Articles × High-Rep-VC-Backing –
Time Trend × High Articles × Low-Rep-VC-Backing -0.003
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Table 14: Instrumental Variable Analysis of the Effect of VC-Backing on IPO Characteristics
This table reports the second-stage results of the Instrumental Variable regressions for the effect of VC-backing on
various IPO characteristics. The instrumental variable used here is LP Returns, which is defined in Section 2.5.2. VC-
Backing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is venture capitalist backed and 0 otherwise. Ln(PR) is the natural 
log of one plus the absolute value of the percentage difference between the IPO offer price and the midpoint of 
original filing range. Ln(RVS0) is the natural log of the valuation of an IPO firm at the close of the first trading day in 
the secondary market relative to an industry peer. Ln(RVO) is the natural log of the valuation of an IPO firm at offer
relative to an industry peer. Initial Ret is the percentage change from the offer price to the first-day closing price in 
the secondary market. Ln(N_Inst) is the natural log of the number of institutions that hold the stocks of the firm at the 
end of the first fiscal year after IPO. Ln(N_An) is the natural log of the number of analysts providing earnings forecast 
at the end of the first fiscal year after IPO. CM Rank is the Carter-Manaster rank of the lead underwriter for the IPO 
firm. Ln(Asset) is the natural log of the firm’s pre-IPO assets. Fraction Sold is the fraction of firm equity sold in the 
IPO. Constant, industry fixed effects based on Fama French 48 industry classifications, IPO year fixed effects, and 
stock exchange fixed effects are included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 
industry level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd Stage 2nd Stage 2nd Stage 2nd Stage 2nd Stage 2nd Stage
VARIABLES Ln(PR) Ln(RVS0) Ln(RVO) Initial Ret Ln(N_Inst) Ln(N_An)
VC-Backing 0.079** 0.785*** 1.295*** 0.566*** 0.995*** 0.454***
(0.032) (0.229) (0.337) (0.082) (0.269) (0.157)
CM Rank 0.006** 0.004 0.020 -0.016** 0.121*** 0.059***
(0.003) (0.017) (0.029) (0.007) (0.025) (0.014)
Ln(Asset) 0.001 -0.173*** -0.183*** 0.004 0.216*** 0.088***
(0.002) (0.015) (0.042) (0.005) (0.023) (0.013)
Fraction Sold -0.005 -0.901*** -0.920*** -0.065* -0.032 -0.038
(0.015) (0.228) (0.289) (0.034) (0.094) (0.057)
Observations 3,258 3,140 2,571 3,331 3,204 2,951
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exchange FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Figure 2: Valuations of VC-Backed and Non-VC-Backed IPOs over Time
This figure depicts the median firm valuations of VC-backed and non-VC-backed firm IPOs over time from the IPO 
date up to three years after the first trading day in the secondary market. On the horizontal axis, time IPO is the firm’s
IPO date. Time 0 is the close of the first trading day in the secondary market, while times 1 through 3 correspond to 
exactly one, two, and three years after the first trading day in the secondary market.
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3 Top Management Human Capital, Inventor Mobil-
ity, and Corporate Innovation
3.1 Introduction
The eﬀectiveness of a ﬁrm’s top management team in investing and managing innovative
projects may determine the long-term success of the ﬁrm. Indeed, prior literature suggests
that ﬁrms’ investments in research and development (R&D) and their innovative output
(measured by patents and citations) may have a positive impact on the long-term ﬁnancial
health of the ﬁrm. Given this, there is surprisingly little analysis into how the human capital
or “quality” of the top management team of a ﬁrm may impact the ﬁrm’s innovative output.
We aim to ﬁll this gap in the literature.
One strand of theoretical literature suggests that higher quality management teams may
invest in long-run value enhancing projects (e.g., Chemmanur and Jiao (2012)). Given that
innovative projects are among such long-run value enhancing projects (e.g., Hirshleifer, Hsu,
and Li (2013) and Griliches (1990)), we expect that higher quality management teams will
invest in more innovative projects and will have a greater extent of innovative output, on
average. Further, they can accomplish this by having better foresight into the potential value
of innovative investment opportunities and by more eﬀectively managing innovative resources
such as physical assets (research equipment) and human capital (scientists and inventors).
For instance, they may provide an environment that fosters greater failure tolerance in the
sense of Manso (2011).66 Given this, ﬁrms with higher quality management teams may
attract inventors with greater skills to work for them.
The above arguments lead to several testable predictions. First, ﬁrms with higher
66An example of this is Google’s high-risk R&D venture called Google X. Media articles suggest that
“......Google X is the search giant’s factory for moonshots, those million-to-one scientiﬁc bets that require
generous amounts of capital, massive leaps of faith, and a willingness to break things.” See, Inside Google’s
Secret Labs, Bloomberg Businessweek, May 22, 2013.
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quality top management teams will invest more in R&D. Second, ﬁrms with higher quality
management teams will have a greater extent of innovation productivity (measured by the
number of patents) and higher quality innovation (measured by total citations and citations
per patent). Third, better management of innovative assets by higher quality management
teams will be reﬂected in a higher extent of innovative eﬃciency (e.g., patents per R&D
dollar) for such ﬁrms. Fourth, the eﬀect of management team quality on innovative output
will be stronger for ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial constraints and for ﬁrms in competitive industries.
Since such ﬁrms are at a disadvantage relative to other ﬁrms, the “leg-up” provided by a
higher quality top management team will enhance their future prospects more. Finally, ﬁrms
with higher quality management teams will have a larger net inﬂow of inventors (controlling
for R&D expenditures) and will hire higher quality inventors (as measured by their prior
track record of citations per patent).
An empirical analysis of the relationship between management quality and innovation
faces two challenges. First, measuring the human capital of a ﬁrm’s top management team
(which we refer to as management quality) involves subjective notions of what constitutes
a higher quality management team. Second, potential endogeneity can confound empirical
ﬁndings on the relation between management quality and innovation. In particular, there
may be endogenous matching between higher quality management teams and higher quality
ﬁrms. We overcome the ﬁrst challenge by creating a management team quality index from
various measures used previously in the literature, such as management team size, fraction
of managers with MBAs, the average employment- and education-based connections of each
manager in the management team, the fraction of members with prior work experience in
the top management team, the average number of prior board positions that each manager
serves on, and the fraction of managers with PhDs. These measures are adjusted for ﬁrm
size. We create our index of management quality using common factor analysis of the above-
mentioned measures of top management quality and extracting a single “management quality
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factor.”67
We overcome the second challenge related to endogeneity by using an instrumental
variable (IV) analysis. Our instrument is motivated by the following facts. First, potential
managers available for hire by a ﬁrm often come from established ﬁrms in the same industry
and may leave such ﬁrms as a result of acquisitions. In other words, there is a strong
correlation between the movement of managers across ﬁrms and the number of acquisitions
in the industry the ﬁrm belongs to. Second, the enforceability of non-compete clauses, which
are commonly used in the employment contracts for top management teams to prohibit
them from joining or founding a rival company within one or two years of leaving, aﬀects
the mobility of managers across ﬁrms. Motivated by the above facts, we instrument for
top management quality (as measured by our management quality factor) using a plausibly
exogenous shock to the supply of top executives available for hire by a ﬁrm, namely, the
number of acquisitions in the ﬁrm’s industry ﬁve years prior weighted by the an index
measuring the enforceability of non-compete clauses.
We analyze the relationship between management quality and ﬁrm performance using
a panel data set of 4,389 ﬁrms covering the period 1999 to 2009. We obtain the biographical
data on the top managers of ﬁrms from the BoardEx database, patent and citation informa-
tion from the patent data set created by Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoﬀman (2012)
based on data from the United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO), and inventor
information associated with each patent from the U.S. Patent Inventor Database (1975-
67Starting with the pioneering work of Becker (1964) and Ben-Porath (1967), the labor economics literature
has focused on the human capital of workers. The Becker view is that human capital increases a worker’s
productivity in all tasks, though possibly diﬀerentially in diﬀerent tasks, organizations, and situations. In
the Becker view, although the role of human capital in the production process may be quite complex, we can
think of it as representable by a unidimensional measure, such as a worker’s stock of knowledge or skills, and
this stock is directly part of the production function. When analyzing the human capital of the members of
a ﬁrm’s top management team, our view is that managerial human capital is multidimensional, consisting of
many diﬀerent aspects which we capture using the individual measures we mention here, and collapse into
one factor, making use of common factor analysis. Thus, our view of human capital is closer to the view of
the social psychologist Howard Gardner (see, e.g., Gardner (1983), and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for a
review). An advantage of such a multidimensional approach is that we are able to capture diﬀerences in not
only the quantity but also the quality of the human capital of the top management teams across ﬁrms. See,
e.g., Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) or Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan (2011), who make use of such
a multidimensional approach in their measurement of top management human capital (in other contexts).
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2010): see Li, Lai, D’Amour, Doolin, Sun, Torvik, Yu, and Fleming (2014) for a detailed
description of the latter database.
Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, we ﬁnd that higher quality
management teams invest more in R&D expenditures, showing that they devote a larger
amount of resources (input) toward innovative activities. Second, ﬁrms with higher quality
management teams have a greater extent of innovation output (measured by the number of
patents) and higher quality innovation output (measured by total citations and citations per
patent). Further, these eﬀects are economically signiﬁcant. For instance, a one inter-quartile
range increase in management quality increases ﬁrm patents by 12.8%. We ﬁnd similar re-
sults when we use individual proxies for management quality (such as team size, education,
connections, etc.) rather than our overall management quality factor. Third, we ﬁnd that
ﬁrms with higher quality management teams produce more patents and citations per R&D
dollar, that is, have greater innovative eﬃciency (see, e.g., Hershleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013)).
All the above results on the relation between management quality and corporate innovation
are conﬁrmed by our IV analysis making use of the instrument discussed above, thus indi-
cating that management quality has a positive and causal eﬀect on corporate innovation.
Finally, the relation between top management team quality and innovation is stronger for
ﬁrms in ﬁnancially constrained industries and for ﬁrms in more competitive industries.
We then investigate the mechanisms through which higher quality management teams
may foster greater innovation in their ﬁrms. We argue that higher quality management
teams may provide more resources to R&D, manage R&D resources better, and provide a
more failure tolerant climate for inventors to succeed in. This, in turn, may make ﬁrms with
higher management quality attractive to higher quality inventors. Thus, one way that higher
quality top management teams may enhance innovation is by hiring more and higher quality
inventors to work for the ﬁrm. Our ﬁfth result is consistent with this conjecture: we ﬁnd
that ﬁrms with higher quality management teams experience greater net inﬂows of inventors
(controlling for R&D expenditures), particularly of higher quality inventors. Inventors are
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deﬁned to be of higher quality if their record of past citations per patent is above that
of the median inventor in our sample. We also ﬁnd that the average citations per patent
of incoming inventors into ﬁrms with higher quality management teams is higher than the
average citations per patent of outgoing inventors from such ﬁrms.
Finally, we examine the nature of innovative strategies undertaken by ﬁrms with higher
quality management teams. In particular, we analyze whether ﬁrms with higher quality man-
agement teams engage more in exploratory innovative strategies (where they venture into
the development of newer technologies or pursue innovations in areas that are less familiar to
the ﬁrm) or in exploitative innovative strategies (where they may pursue innovations using
more conventional technologies or in areas that are more familiar to the ﬁrm). To analyze
this, we divide the patents obtained by ﬁrms into three categories based on whether their
citations fall into the group of patents receiving the highest number (top ten percent) of ci-
tations (“highly successful innovations”); no citations at all (“unsuccessful innovations”); or
somewhere in between (“moderately successful innovations”). If higher management quality
ﬁrms are engaged in “exploratory” strategies, which are more risky, we would expect such
ﬁrms to be associated with a larger number of highly successful and a larger number of
quite unsuccessful innovations compared to lower management quality ﬁrms. Alternatively,
if higher management quality ﬁrms are engaged in “exploitative” innovative strategies, we
would expect such ﬁrms to be associated with more moderately successful innovations com-
pared to those achieved by lower management quality ﬁrms. The evidence indicates that
higher quality management team ﬁrms pursue both exploratory and exploitative strategies:
we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher quality management teams have a larger number of successful
innovations, unsuccessful innovations, and moderately successful innovations. However, the
successful innovations increase to a greater extent with top management quality compared
to unsuccessful and moderately successful innovations.
We contribute to two strands in the literature. First, we contribute to the recent litera-
ture that has analyzed the determinants of innovation in ﬁrms theoretically as well as empiri-
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cally (e.g., Manso (2011) and Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming (2009)) and their impact on ﬁrm
performance (e.g., Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013); Gu (2005); Eberhart, Maxwell, and Sid-
dique (2004); Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004); Lerner (1994); and Griliches (1990)). Much
of the existing literature has focused on ﬁrm characteristics other than management quality
and their eﬀects on innovation. Some of these characteristics are: managerial compensation
(e.g., Lerner and Wulf (2007); Ederer and Manso (2013)); ﬁrms’ going public decisions (e.g.,
Bernstein (2015)); private equity or venture capital involvement (e.g., Lerner, Sorensen,
and Stro¨mberg (2011); Tian and Wang (2014); Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian (2014));
anti-takeover provisions (e.g., Atanassov (2013); Chemmanur and Tian (2014); Sapra, Sub-
ramanian, and Subramanian (2014)); institutional ownership (e.g., Aghion, Van Reenen,
and Zingales (2013)); and conglomerate structure (e.g., Seru (2014)). In a contemporaneous
paper, Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2015) analyzes how the general versus ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital of CEOs aﬀects corporate innovation. Ours is, however, the ﬁrst paper in
the literature to analyze the relation between top management team quality and corporate
innovation, thus moving the literature in a new direction.
Second, we contribute to the literature linking management quality and talent to ﬁrm
performance, investments, and ﬁnancing. For instance, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) study
the eﬀect of top managers on a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial and investment policies. They ﬁnd that
manager ﬁxed eﬀects explain some of the heterogeneity in the investment, ﬁnancial, and
organizational practices of ﬁrms. Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015) use a similar ﬁxed-eﬀects
methodology to investigate whether individual venture capitalists have repeatable invest-
ment skill and the extent to which their skill is impacted by the venture capital ﬁrm where
they work. They accomplish this by tracking the performance of individual venture capital-
ists’ investments over time as they move between ﬁrms. Chemmanur, Kong, and Krishnan
(2015) relate management quality measures similar to ours to ﬁrm stock performance, op-
erating performance, and valuation. They also ﬁnd that higher quality management teams
invest more in R&D expenditures. Unlike them, however, we focus on measures of innovative
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output, innovative eﬃciency, and inventor mobility. Further, we add to the above literature
by analyzing the mechanisms through which higher quality management teams may increase
innovation and by analyzing the nature of the innovative strategies adopted by ﬁrms with
higher versus lower top management team quality.68’69’70 We provide evidence suggesting
that higher quality managers may enhance innovation by attracting higher quality inven-
tors to work for their ﬁrm. Our evidence also suggests that higher quality managers are
not simply “buying” innovation through greater R&D expenditures, but obtain a higher
extent of innovative output per R&D dollar (higher “bang for the R&D buck”). Finally, we
demonstrate a causal relation between management quality and innovation.
Two important papers in the economics literature that have implications for our paper
are Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1991). Their theoretical analysis implies that larger management
teams are more likely to reject bad projects, since a project will be accepted only if several
group members agree that it is good. One of the implications of their theory is that per-
formance should be less variable when a greater number of executives have inﬂuence over
68Our paper is also related to Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) and Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan
(2009). These papers also make use of a management quality factor based on common factor analysis on
some individual proxies of management quality to study the relationship between management quality and
IPO characteristics (in the case of the former paper) and SEO characteristics and ﬁrm ﬁnancial policies
around the SEO (in the case of the latter paper). In contrast to Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), who study
ﬁrms going public, our focus in the current paper is on larger, more established ﬁrms and how management
quality relates to innovative output, innovative eﬃciency, and inventor mobility. Further, while the above
two papers make use of cross-sectional data hand-collected from IPO and SEO prospectuses respectively, our
paper makes use of a large panel data set that allows us to capture the time series variation in management
quality as well.
69In more distantly related research, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) use an innovative survey tool to
collect management practices data from various countries and show that measures of managerial practice
are strongly associated with ﬁrm-level productivity, proﬁtability, Tobin’s Q, and survival rates. See also
Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2012), who ran a management ﬁeld experiment on large
textile ﬁrms in India, and show that adopting better management practices raised productivity by 17%
on average in the ﬁrst year after the adoption of these practices. Unlike these papers, which study the
eﬀects of management practices using self-reported survey data, we are able to use publicly available data
on the characteristics of top management teams of ﬁrms to study the eﬀect of the human capital of top ﬁrm
management on innovation.
70Our paper also indirectly related to the literature on the determinants of CEO quality and how it aﬀects
ﬁrm performance (see, e.g., Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) and Malmendier and Tate (2005)). See
also Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012), who study the individual characteristics of CEO candidates for
companies involved in buyout and venture capital transactions and relate them to the subsequent performance
of their companies.
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corporate decisions.71 Finally, our paper is also related to the growing literature in organi-
zational economics linking the importance of agents across and within organizations. For
example, Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2010) ﬁnd that workers are more productive when
they work with higher ability co-workers and less productive when they work with lower
ability co-workers (see also Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005)).72
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the underlying theory
and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 outlines the data and the sample selection
procedure. Section 3.4 provides a discussion of our empirical results relating our measure of
management quality to innovation and innovative eﬃciency. Section 3.5 investigates possible
underlying mechanisms. Section 3.6 presents a discussion of our robustness test results.
Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Theory and Hypothesis Development
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the underlying theory and develop hypotheses for our em-
pirical tests. Our theoretical motivation partially follows Chemmanur and Jiao (2012), who
study a setting in which managers with greater talent or ability are able to create greater
long-run cash ﬂows by undertaking long-term projects. However, since their talent is private
information, and, since short-term projects come to fruition earlier, myopia or short-termism
induced by the stock market (for example, due to the possibility of rivals appearing and suc-
cessfully taking over the ﬁrm in the absence of favorable signals of project success in the short
run) impose pressures on them to undertake short-term rather than long-term projects (see
also Stein (1988) for another model of corporate myopia). However, more capable managers
also have an incentive to undertake long-term rather than short-term projects, since they
are able to create greater long-term value by doing so. In such a setting, the equity market
71The organizational behavior literature on the eﬀect of managerial discretion on ﬁrm performance is also
indirectly related to our paper: see Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) for a review.
72In a somewhat diﬀerent context, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) study the relationship between the per-
formance of mutual funds and the characteristics (age, experience, education, and Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT) scores) of their fund managers. They ﬁnd that managers who attended higher-SAT undergraduate
institutions had signiﬁcantly higher risk-adjusted excess returns.
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prices the equity of ﬁrms undertaking long-term projects at a discount, since they are not
able to fully observe true managerial ability; however, ﬁrms with managers having a higher
perceived quality (i.e., with a greater reputation for ability) suﬀer only a smaller valuation
discount if they undertake long-term projects. In summary, managers’ choice between long-
term and short-term projects is driven by the trade-oﬀ between the pressures induced by a
myopic stock market versus the ability (and desire) of more able managers to create greater
value in the long-run by undertaking long-term projects.73 Given that innovative projects are
long-term projects characterized by short-term failures and experimentation (that increases
the gestation time of these projects), managers with greater perceived ability will undertake
a greater proportion of long-term (innovative) projects.74
The above theoretical framework provides us with our ﬁrst set of testable implications.
First, top management teams with higher (perceived) quality are likely to devote a greater
amount of resources to innovation activities. Thus, ﬁrms with higher quality management
teams will be characterized by larger R&D expenditures, i.e., a larger input of their resources
into innovation activities. This is the ﬁrst hypothesis (H1) that we test here. Further, we
would expect such ﬁrms to be characterized by greater innovation output and higher quality
innovation output (after controlling for R&D expenditures). This is the second hypothesis
(H2) that we test there. Such ﬁrms will also be characterized by greater innovative eﬃciency
(i.e., greater innovation output and higher quality innovation output per dollar of R&D
capital investment). This is the third hypothesis (H3) that we test here.
We also test whether the relationship between management quality and innovation pro-
73Formally, in Chemmanur and Jiao (2012), the objective function of the manager is a weighted average of
the short-run and long-run stock price. Thus, while talented (higher ability) managers will suﬀer a discount
in the ﬁrm’s short-run stock valuation if they take a greater proportion of long-term projects (since their
equity will be priced in a pooling equilibrium with ﬁrms with less talented managers), more talented managers
have an incentive to undertake a greater proportion of long-term projects since these projects allow them to
create greater long-run value and thereby a higher long-run stock price.
74Note that, while the true quality of ﬁrm management may be private information, the management
quality as perceived by outsiders (captured by our management quality measures) aﬀects managers’ choice
of the proportion of innovative (long-term) projects to undertake. This is because, for managers with higher
perceived quality (i.e., with a greater reputation for being talented), the cost of undertaking long-term
projects (arising from a ﬁrm valuation discount in the short run) will be smaller, leading them to undertake
a larger proportion of long-term (innovative) projects.
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ductivity is stronger in some industries than in others. First, consider ﬁrms in ﬁnancially
constrained industries. Given their ﬁnancial constraints, such ﬁrms will have only a limited
amount of resources to devote to innovation. If the relation between management qual-
ity and innovation is partly driven by more eﬀective resource management on the part of
higher management quality ﬁrms, we would expect the relationship between management
quality and innovation to be stronger for ﬁrms in ﬁnancially constrained industries (H4).75
Next, consider ﬁrms in more competitive versus less competitive industries. Scientists and
engineers (inventors) in more competitive industries are likely to have greater outside em-
ployment opportunities, so that the talented inventors are likely to be in limited supply
in these industries. Therefore, since ﬁrms with higher quality management teams are able
to attract a greater proportion of these talented inventors in limited supply, we would ex-
pect that the relationship between management quality and innovation productivity to be
stronger in more competitive industries (H5).
We now analyze the channels through which ﬁrms with higher top management quality
are able to generate greater innovation productivity (i.e., greater innovation output for a
given amount of resources devoted to R&D expenditures). Consistent with our conjecture
that higher quality management teams may be able to manage their innovative activities
more eﬃciently, we hypothesize that ﬁrms with higher quality management teams are able
to hire more inventors for a given amount of R&D expenditures (H6). We further conjecture
that ﬁrms with higher quality management teams are likely to hire higher quality inventors,
who are more innovative (as measured by their prior track record of citations per patent).76
75The idea here is that, while ﬁrms in ﬁnancially unconstrained industries may be able to partially com-
pensate for not having higher quality management teams by devoting more resources to innovative activities
(for example, by buying higher quality equipment), ﬁrms in ﬁnancially constrained industries will be less
able to do so, so that the relationship between management quality and innovation will be stronger for the
latter category of ﬁrms.
76For instance, one way in which ﬁrms with higher quality management teams may be able to attract
higher quality inventors is by promoting a more failure tolerant work environment (in the sense of Manso
(2011)). Manso (2011) has argued that an important variable in encouraging innovation is failure tolerance.
While Manso (2011) does not distinguish between higher and lower quality ﬁrm management teams, if we
add the additional assumption that higher quality managers are also more failure tolerant, then it will be
the case that ﬁrms that have higher quality management teams will also have a more failure tolerant work
environment (more conducive to innovative activities).
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This is the next hypothesis that we test here (H7).
We now delve deeper into the possible diﬀerences in the innovation strategies adopted
by ﬁrms with higher versus lower management quality. One possibility is that higher man-
agement quality ﬁrms engage in more exploratory innovation strategies (in the sense of
Balsmeier, Fleming and Manso (2016)), so that they venture into the development of newer
technologies or pursue innovation in areas less familiar to the ﬁrm. Given that such an
exploratory strategy is more risky, under this scenario we would expect higher management
quality ﬁrms to be associated with a larger number of highly successful and a larger number
of quite unsuccessful innovations (as measured by citations per patent) compared to lower
management quality ﬁrms: in other words, in this case higher management quality ﬁrms will
have a larger number of patents in the two tails of the patent quality distribution (H8A). Al-
ternatively, higher management quality ﬁrms may engage more in “exploitative” innovative
strategies (also in the sense of Balsmeier, Fleming and Manso (2016)), implying that they
pursue innovations using more conventional technologies or in areas that are more familiar to
the ﬁrm. Under the latter scenario, we would expect ﬁrms with higher management quality
to be associated with more moderately successful innovations (again measured by citations
per patent) compared to those achieved by lower management quality ﬁrms (H8B).77
3.3 Data and Sample Selection
3.3.1 Sample Selection
Our sample is derived from multiple data sources. Our primary data source of the bio-
graphical information of senior managers is the BoardEx database. The BoardEx database
contains data on college education, graduate education, past employment history (including
beginning and ending dates of various roles), current employment status (including primary
employment and outside roles), and social activities (including memberships, positions held
77It is diﬃcult to predict from a priori theoretical considerations which of the above two scenarios will be
realized in practice. We will therefore leave this question to be resolved empirically.
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in various foundations and charitable groups, etc.). The main information we are making
use of in this paper is education, employment history, and demographic information. We
collect ﬁrm-year patent and citation information from the the patent data set created by
Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoﬀman (2012) (henceforth KPSS). We collect the inventor
information associated with each patent from the U.S. Patent Inventor Database (1975-2010)
(see Li, Lai, D’Amour, Doolin, Sun, Torvik, Yu, and Fleming (2014)). To calculate control
variables, we collect ﬁnancial statement items from Compustat and stock price informa-
tion from CRSP. To construct the instrumental variables as we described earlier, we collect
information on mergers and acquisitions from the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database.
The unique company-level identiﬁcation code in BoardEx is “Company ID”, which is
unique to BoardEx and cannot be used to merge with other databases such as Compustat
and CRSP. We link the BoardEx database to Compustat and CRSP in the following way.
BoardEx provides CIK, the International Security Identiﬁcation Number (ISIN), and the
company name. The “Company ID” in BoardEx is matched with the PERMNO in CRSP
by either CIK or CUSIP (which is derived from ISIN). After matching by CIK or CUSIP,
we check the accuracy of the matches by comparing the company name from BoardEx with
company names from CRSP and Compustat.
The KPSS patent data set provides detailed data for all patents that are granted by
United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO) over 1926-2011. We use the KPSS
patent data rather than NBER patent data, because the KPSS patent data enable us to
identify comprehensive patent portfolios of the ﬁrms that ﬁled application up to 2009, which
are granted up to 2011. The NBER patent data contain patents that have been granted
up to 2006 and most of them had application dates up to 2004. Since our BoardEx sample
starts from 1999, using the KPSS patent data increases our sample size signiﬁcantly.78 The
KPSS patent data provides PERMNO for the assignees of each patent. We use this to merge
the patent data with BoardEx as well as Compustat and CRSP. In the base case analysis,
78Although BoardEx data starts from 1997, data prior to 1999 is sparse (e.g., see Engelberg, Gao and
Parsons (2013)).
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we assign zero patents to ﬁrms in the BoardEx sample without any patenting activity. The
ﬁnal BoardEx-KPSS Patent-Compustat-CRSP merged ﬁle leaves us with 6,504 unique ﬁrms.
Using the BoardEx employment history ﬁle, we identify all the managers in each matched
company for each year from 1999 to 2009. We obtain the sample of senior managers from
BoardEx, which we deﬁne as managers with a title of VP or higher. The senior managers in
our sample can be broadly categorized in seven groups: CEOs, presidents, chairmen, other
chief oﬃcers (CFO, CIO, etc.), division heads, VPs, and others. We exclude all ﬁrm-years
that have the following characteristics: (i) there is only one manager in the management
team (since it is unlikely that large ﬁrms covered by BoardEx have only one senior man-
ager); (ii) there is no CEO for a ﬁrm in a certain year; (iii) there are more than 30 senior
managers in the management team (suggesting that perhaps certain titles are misleading
and we are overclassifying senior managers); (iv) ﬁnancial and utility ﬁrms, deﬁned by SIC
code from 6000 to 6999 and from 4901 to 4999, respectively; and (v) ﬁrm-years with missing
values for the relevant variables that we need to use. After these exclusions, we are left with
30,432 ﬁrm-year observations for 4,389 ﬁrms.
We then obtain the demographic and education information for each senior manager
from the BoardEx database. To obtain education-based connections, we classify all the
graduate degrees into four diﬀerent categories: business school (MBAs included), medical
school, law school, and other graduate (see, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008)).
3.3.2 Measures of Management Quality
3.3.2.1 Individual Proxies for Management Quality
We measure management quality and reputation along two dimensions. The ﬁrst is manage-
ment team resources, which refers to the human and knowledge resources (including both
education and relevant work experience) available to ﬁrm management. The second is based
on connections available to ﬁrm management, which capture their ability to reach out to
managers in other ﬁrms, thus enabling them to obtain not only valuable information from
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other ﬁrm managers, but also better terms when dealing with these ﬁrms as customers or
suppliers.
The management team resources available to the ﬁrm depend in part upon the number
of people in its management team. Therefore, our ﬁrst measure of team resources is the
size of the ﬁrm’s top management team (Team Size), measured by the number of oﬃcers
with the rank of vice president or higher. Management team resources also depend upon the
knowledge and education of its members. Thus, our second measure of management team
resources is the percentage of the management team with an MBA degree (MBA). A larger
management team and a higher percentage of the team with MBA degrees imply better
management quality. Our third measure is the fraction of the top management team with a
Ph.D. degree. In some innovative ﬁrms (e.g., technology or biotech ﬁrms), some of the top
management team may have Ph.D. degrees, which may help them in choosing the appropriate
innovative projects for their employees to work on (even if they themselves are not personally
involved in developing the innovation) as well as for hiring the “right” employees (scientists
and engineers) who may develop innovation for their ﬁrm. Another contributing factor that
increases management team resources is relevant work experience, which we measure in two
ways. First, we look at the percentage of the management team who have served as vice
presidents or higher prior to joining the current ﬁrm (Prior Work Experience). Second, we
also use the number of outside board positions that each manager has served on averaged
across all managers (Prior Board Experience). Clearly, prior board experience can also be a
useful asset when managing a ﬁrm, since managers may have acquired experience in solving
important problems when serving as board members of previous ﬁrms that they have worked
for. In summary, the greater the value of the above variables, the better is the management
quality. Three of the above proxies (Team Size, MBA, and Prior Work Experience) are
similar to those used by Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) and Chemmanur, Paeglis, and
Simonyan (2011).
We measure management connections in two ways. First, we look at connections built
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up by members of the management team based on their work experience so far (Employment
Connections). For each manager, total employment-based connection is calculated as the
number of senior managers or directors that each senior manager in the management team
has worked with so far. If individuals have worked together in the same company previously
during an overlapping time period, they are deﬁned as connected. In summary, the variable
Employment Connections is deﬁned as the number of employment-based connections of the
top management team divided by Team Size. Second, we look at the connections built up
by members of the ﬁrm’s top management team during their graduate education, which
may often last through their entire career (Education Connections). For each manager,
total education-based connection is calculated as the number of senior managers or directors
that each senior manager in the management team has been in graduate school with. If
individuals study in the same educational institution, have degrees in the same education
category (described above), and graduate within one year of each other, they are deﬁned
as connected. In summary, the variable Education Connections is deﬁned as the number of
education-based connections of the top management team divided by Team Size.
In addition, we create the variable Average Tenure as the average number of years that
each senior manager has worked in a ﬁrm, and use it as a control variable.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the management quality measures that we de-
scribe above. For the median ﬁrm in our sample, there are seven senior managers in the
management team; 20 percent of the senior management team has an MBA degree; 10
percent of the senior management team has prior work experience as a senior manager at
another ﬁrm; zero percent of the senior management team have sat on boards of other ﬁrms;
and zero percent of the senior management team has a PhD degree. The median level of
Education Connections is zero and that of Employment Connections is 15.4. The median
number of years that each manager has worked in a ﬁrm is 5.2 years.
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3.3.2.2 Common Factor Analysis on Individual Management Proxies
Each of the variables (proxies) described above is likely to have its unique limitations as a
measure of the underlying management quality, and is therefore unlikely to be a compre-
hensive measure of management quality by itself. Therefore, we use common factor analysis
to capture the variation common to our seven observable measures of management qual-
ity. More precisely, the aim of our factor analysis is to account for, or explain, the matrix
of covariances between our individual management quality measures using as few factors as
possible. Next, we rotate the initial factors so that each individual management quality mea-
sure has substantial loadings on as few factors as possible. This methodology is consistent
with the implementation of common factor analysis in the literature.79
All the management quality measures are aggregated to the level of the management
team, and are likely to be correlated with ﬁrm size. Therefore, in order to ensure that these
measures are independent of ﬁrm size, we use ﬁrm size and industry-adjusted variables in
our common factor analysis. Speciﬁcally, we conduct the following regression for each of the
six proxies of management quality:
Measurei,t = α[Ln(firm size)i,t] + β[Ln(firm size)i,t]
2 + Industry FE + Y ear FE + i,t,
(3.1)
where i indexes the ﬁrm and t indexes the year of the observation. Industry (deﬁned at 2-
digit SIC code level) and year ﬁxed eﬀects are included. We use the residuals from the above
regression as the ﬁrm size- and industry-adjusted measures of the management quality.
Table 2 presents the results of the common factor analysis. The common factor analysis
leads to seven factors. Panel A of Table 2 reports the eigenvalues of each factor. Factors with
79We adopt common factor analysis rather than principal component analysis as our method of choice
for identifying a single management quality factor. The aim of common factor analysis is to account for
or to “explain” the matrix of covariances between our seven individual management quality proxies using
the minimum number of factors. In contrast, the aim of principal component analysis is to break down the
above covariance matrix into a set of orthogonal components equal to the number of the individual proxies.
Given that our objective here is to identify a factor that embodies the underlying unobservable construct,
namely, “management quality,” we believe that the former method is more appropriate here.
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higher eigenvalues account for a greater proportion of the variance of the observed variables.
Only the ﬁrst factor has an eigenvalue that is larger than one. Further, we ﬁnd that this
ﬁrst factor explains 80 percent of the variation of our individual management quality proxies
(the eigenvalue of the ﬁrst factor as a proportion of the sum of the eigenvalues of all seven
factors). This suggests that the ﬁrst factor is the most important one, providing us with
a distinct (unique) measure of management quality. We term this factor the management
quality factor (MQF ).80
Factors with higher eigenvalues account for a greater proportion of the variance of the
observed variables. Only the ﬁrst factor has an eigenvalue that is greater than one. This
suggests that the ﬁrst factor is the most important, providing us with a distinct measure of
management quality. We term this factor the management quality factor (MQF ).81
Panel B reports the loadings on the ﬁrst factor for each individual management quality
variable. The loadings indicate that all individual management quality measures load posi-
tively on the ﬁrst factor. Consistent with this, the second column of Panel B ﬁnds positive
correlations between the ﬁrst factor and each of the seven management quality measures.
The third column of Panel B of Table 2 reports the communality of each variable with the
common factor, which measures the proportion of the variance of each variable that is ac-
counted for by the common factors. Communality is bounded between zero and one, and
higher values indicate that a larger proportion of the variation in the variable is captured by
the common factors.
80In a robustness check that we describe later, we address the possibility that our results are driven by the
presence of Team Size in the management quality factor, and not the other quality measures. To address
this concern, we recalculate the management quality factor by excluding Team Size from the common factor
analysis. We show that our results are similar when we use the ﬁrst factor derived from this alternative
model.
81In a robustness check that we describe later, we address the possibility that our results are driven by the
presence of Team Size in the management quality factor, and not the other quality measures. To address
this concern, we recalculate the management quality factor by excluding Team Size from the common factor
analysis. We show that our results are similar when we use the ﬁrst factor derived from this alternative
model.
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3.3.2.3 Validity of Management Quality Factor
This subsection addresses the concern whether management quality factor (MQF ) actually
measures the quality of a management team. If MQF actually captures the overall quality
of the management team, one immediate implication is that management teams with higher
MQF should be paid more than those with lower MQF. To test this implication, we make
use of the compensation data in the BoardEx database. BoardEx provides the annual com-
pensation information for a ﬁrm’s senior managers, which includes salary, bonus, the value
of shares awarded, value of LTIP (Long Term Incentive Plan) awarded, and value of options
awarded at the manager-ﬁrm-year level. However, the coverage of the compensation data
is smaller than the coverage of individual measures that are used to calculate MQF, as the
compensation information of many managers is missing in BoardEx. We therefore only focus
on the managers that have available compensation information in BoardEx.
For each ﬁrm, we construct three diﬀerent measures of compensation: Average Total
Compensation, Average Cash Compensation, and Equity Compensation/Total Compensation.
Average Cash Compensation is deﬁned as the average amount of cash compensation for a
management team, where cash compensation includes base cash salary and bonus. Average
Total Compensation is deﬁned as the average amount of total compensation for a manage-
ment team, where total compensation, in addition to cash compensation, also includes the
equity compensation, consisting of the value of shares awarded, the value of LTIP awarded,
and the value of options awarded. Equity Compensation/Total Compensation is deﬁned as
the fraction of equity compensation out of total compensation. We test the following model:
Ln(Compensationi,t) = α + βMQFi,t + γZi,t + Industry FE + Y ear FE + i,t, (3.2)
where Ln(Compensationi,t) are the natural logarithm of the above three compensation mea-
sures for the management team in ﬁrm i in year t. We take logs due to the right skewed
distribution. Z is a set of control variables, which is described in details in Section 3.3.5. We
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report the results for the above regressions in Table 3. Columns (1)-(3) present regression
results with the average total compensation, average cash compensation, and fraction of eq-
uity compensation out of total compensation as the dependent variables, respectively. As we
expected, the coeﬃcients on MQF are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level for
two out of three speciﬁcations. The economic magnitude of the eﬀect of MQF is signiﬁcant
as well. For instance, a one inter-quartile range increase in MQF is associated with 5.8%
increase in the average total compensation The positive and signiﬁcant relationship between
our MQF and management team compensation suggests that MQF is a valid measure for
management quality.
3.3.3 Measures of Innovation
Following the existing literature (e.g., Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoﬀman (2012); Seru
(2014)), we use patent-based metrics to capture ﬁrm innovativeness. While we also use R&D
expenditures as a measure of investments in innovative activity, patent-based measures are
widely-used proxies of innovation output. We obtain patent data from the database created
by KPSS. This database provides detailed information of more than six million patents
granted by the USPTO from 1926 to 2011. KPSS have matched assignees in the patent data
set with CRSP PERMNOs if the assignee is a public corporation or subsidiary of a public
corporation.
Patent data are subject to two types of truncation problems. First, patents are recorded
in the dataset only after they are granted and the lag between patent applications and patent
grants is signiﬁcant (about two years on average). As we approach the last few years for
which there are patent data available, we observe a smaller number of patent applications
that are eventually granted. Many patent applications ﬁled during these years were still
under review and had not been granted by 2011. We partially mitigate this bias by restricting
our analyses to two years before the patent data ends (i.e., in 2009). Further, following Hall,
Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg (2001) and Seru (2014), we correct this bias by dividing each patent
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for each ﬁrm-year by the mean number of patents for all ﬁrms for that year in the same
3-digit technology class as the patent. The second type of truncation problem is stemming
from citation counts. Patents tend to receive citations over a long period of time, so the
citation counts of more recent patents are signiﬁcantly downward biased. Following Hall,
Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg (2001) and Seru (2014), this bias is accounted for by scaling citations
of a given patent by the total number of citations received by all patents in that year in
the same 3-digit technology class as the patent. Note that the above methodology gives
us class-adjusted measures of patents and citations, which adjust for trends in innovative
activity in particular industries.
We construct three measures for a ﬁrm’s annual innovative output based on the patent
application year.82 The ﬁrst measure, Ln(Patents), is the natural logarithm of one plus
the class-adjusted patent count for a ﬁrm in a given year. Speciﬁcally, this variable counts
the total number of (class-adjusted) patent applications ﬁled that year that were eventually
granted. However, a simple count of patents may not distinguish breakthrough innovations
from incremental technological discoveries. Therefore, we consider two additional measures.
The second measure, Ln(Citations), is the natural logarithm of one plus the class-adjusted
total number of citations received by the ﬁrm’s patents ﬁled in a given year. The third
measure, Ln(Citations/Patent), is constructed by taking natural logarithm of one plus the
total number of class-adjusted citations a ﬁrm receives on all the patents it applies for in a
given year and normalizing it by one plus the total number of class-adjusted patents applied
for in that year. We take the natural logarithm because the distribution of patents and
citations are right skewed. To avoid losing observations with zero patents or zero citations,
we add one to the actual values. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of our innovation
measures. The median R&D to assets (R&D/Assets) ratio in our sample is 1 percent.
Further, an average (median) ﬁrm in our sample has 0.860 (0) class-adjusted patent. An
average (median) ﬁrm in our sample has 0.034 (0) class-adjusted citation.
82Consistent with the innovation literature (e.g., Griliches, Pakes, and Hall (1988)), the application year
is more relevant for our purposes than the grant year since it is closer to the time of the actual innovation.
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3.3.4 Measures of Inventor Mobility
To identify the inventor mobility, we collect inventor information of each patent from the U.S
Patent Inventor Database (1975-2010) (provided by Li, Lai, D’Amour, Doolin, Sun, Torvik,
Yu, and Fleming (2014)) from the Harvard Business School Dataverse. The U.S. Patent
Inventor Database includes inventor names, inventor addresses, assignee names, application
and grant date for each patent. More importantly, it identiﬁes unique inventors over time
so that we could possibly track the moves of each inventor. Following Marx, Strumsky, and
Fleming (2009), we identify mobile inventors as changing employers if he has ever ﬁled two
successive patent applications that are assigned to diﬀerent ﬁrms (or organizations). As
we need at least two patents to detect a move, inventors that have ﬁled a single patent
throughout their career are necessarily excluded from our analysis.
For a given ﬁrm, an inventor’s move-in year is the year when he ﬁled his ﬁrst patent in
this ﬁrm; the inventor’s move-out year is that when he ﬁled his ﬁrst patent in the subsequent
ﬁrm. For the inventor’s very last employer, we assume that the inventor stayed with that ﬁrm
and did not move out.83 For example, in the inventor database, an inventor named Christo-
pher L. Holderness ﬁled two patent applications till 2010. He ﬁled patent applications with
Corning Inc. in 1999 and then with Dell Inc. in 2003. Thus, for Corning, Mr. Holderness’s
move-in year is 1999 and move-out year is 2003; and for Dell, Mr. Holderness’s move-in year
is 2003, and he has stayed with Dell since 2003. Once we identify each mobile inventor’s
move-in and move-out year, we aggregate the number of mobile inventors that move in and
move out at the ﬁrm-year level to obtain the total inﬂows and outﬂows of mobile inventors
for a given ﬁrm in a year. We deﬁne the diﬀerence between the natural logarithm of one
plus the inﬂow and the natural logarithm of one plus the outﬂow as the net inﬂow of mobile
inventors (Net Inﬂow t).
To examine the moves of inventors with diﬀerent innovative ability, we classify the
83As a robustness check, we redeﬁne the dates that the inventor moved out of his last employer as one
or two years after he ﬁled his last patent in that ﬁrm. Our results remain qualitatively similar with this
alternative deﬁnition.
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mobile inventors into two groups, namely, high-quality and low-quality inventors. For each
inventor, we look at the average quality of his historical patents, i.e., the citations per patent
for all the patents he ﬁled prior to the current year. If an inventor’s historical citations
per patent is higher than the sample median, he is considered as a high-quality inventor;
otherwise, he is a low-quality inventor. We aggregate the mobility measures of high-quality
(low-quality) inventors at the ﬁrm-year level to get the annual inﬂow and outﬂow of the
high-quality (low-quality) inventors for a ﬁrm.
We use the quality of incoming (outgoing) inventors as in a given year as another
measure of the quality of inventors joining (leaving) a ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, the measure of
average quality of incoming inventors for ﬁrm i in year t, Incoming Quality i,t, is the natural
logarithm of one plus the average historical citations per patent of all inventors that move
into the ﬁrm in year t. The measure for average quality of outgoing inventors for ﬁrm i
in year t, Outgoing Quality i,t, is the natural logarithm of one plus the average historical
citations per patent of all inventors that move out. Net Quality Change i,t is deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between Incoming Quality i,t and Outgoing Quality i,t, which captures the change
in inventor quality at the ﬁrm-year level.
3.3.5 Other Variables
Following the innovation literature, we obtain ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial information from Compustat
and price data from CRSP and control for a number of ﬁrm characteristics that could aﬀect
ﬁrms’ innovation output. We compute all variables for ﬁrm i over its ﬁscal year t. The
controls include Ln(Assets), which is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets;
M/B, which is the Tobin’s Q, deﬁned as market value of assets divided by the book value
of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as the book value of assets plus the
market value of common stock less the book value of common stock; ROA, which is deﬁned
as operating income before depreciation divided by total assets; CAPEX/Assets, which is
deﬁned as capital expenditures over total assets; HHI, which is the value of Herﬁndahl-
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Hirschman Index in the ﬁrm’s industry (deﬁned at the 2-digit SIC code level) in each year;
Stock Return, which is the ﬁrm’s prior 12 months annual compounded stock return; and
Average Tenure, which is the average number of years that each manager has worked in a
ﬁrm. To minimize the eﬀect of outliers, we winsorize all independent variables at the 1st
and 99th percentiles. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the control variables described
above. Median ﬁrm size in our sample is  323 million, suggesting that our sample consists
of mainly mid-size and large ﬁrms. The median ﬁrm in our sample has an ROA of 10.2%,
CAPEX-to-assets ratio of 3.5%, Tobin’s Q of 1.6, and annual stock return of 3.3%.
3.4 Empirical Tests and Results
3.4.1 The Eﬀect of Management Quality on R&D Expenditures
We expect that ﬁrms with higher quality management teams are likely to devote a greater
amount of resources to innovative activities, i.e., management quality is positively associated
with innovation input. In this section, we empirically test this hypothesis (H1) by estimating
the following regression:
R&D/Assetsi,t+n = α + βMQFi,t + γZi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + i,t, (3.3)
where i indexes ﬁrm and t indexes time and n equals one, two or three. The management
quality measure, MQF is measured for ﬁrm i over its ﬁscal year t. Z is a vector of control
variables that could aﬀect a ﬁrm’s innovation output, which includes Ln(Assets),M/B, ROA,
CAPEX/Assets, Stock Return, HHI, and Average Tenure. We include year dummies and 2-
digit SIC industry dummies.84,85 In all regressions throughout the paper, standard errors are
clustered at the ﬁrm level.
84Our results are insensitive to deﬁning industry dummies at 3-digit or 4-digit SIC code level.
85For robustness, we also examine the same regressions controlling for industry, year and state ﬁxed
eﬀects, industry×year ﬁxed eﬀects, and industry×state×year ﬁxed eﬀects. We report results controlling for
industry×state×year ﬁxed eﬀects in Table A3 in the Internet Appendix. We ﬁnd that the results remain
qualitatively similar to those reported here.
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Table 4 reports the regression estimation results for regression (3.3). Columns (1)-
(3) correspond to R&D to assets ratios of one, two and three years ahead of the year in
which management quality (i.e., MQF ) is measured. The coeﬃcients of MQF in all three
speciﬁcations are positive and both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. For example,
the coeﬃcient in Column (1) suggests that a one inter-quartile range increase in MQF is
associated with an increase of 0.74 percentage point in R&D/Assets for next year, which
is equivalent to 70% of the sample median. These results suggest that a ﬁrm’s innovation
input, as measured by R&D expenditures, is positively associated with its management
quality, consistent with hypothesis H1.
3.4.2 The Eﬀect of Management Quality on Corporate Innovation
In this section, we test the relationship between management quality and corporate innova-
tion output, in terms of both quantity (as measured by the number of patents) and quality (as
measured by citations and citations per patent), which corresponds to our second hypothesis
(H2). We estimate the following models:
Ln(Patents)i,t+n = α + βMQFi,t + γZi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + i,t, (3.4)
Ln(Citations)i,t+n = α + βMQFi,t + γZi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + i,t, (3.5)
Ln(Citations/Patent)i,t+n = α + βMQFi,t + γZi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + i,t, (3.6)
where i indexes ﬁrm and t indexes time and n equals one, two or three. Since the innovation
process takes time, we examine the eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s management quality on its innovation
as of one, two, and three years after the year in which MQF is measured. Z is the set of
control variables similar to those in the previous section, but now also includes R&D/Assets.
Panels A, B, and C of Table 5 report the OLS estimation results for regressions (3.4),
(3.5) and (3.6), respectively. Across all speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients on MQF are positive
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and signiﬁcant, both statistically and economically.86 For example, Column (1) in Panel A
of Table 5 suggests that a one inter-quartile range increase in MQF is associated with a
12.8% increase in the next year’s adjusted number of patents. Table 6 reports the results
for regressions where we regress the three innovation output measures on each individual
management quality measure.87 Speciﬁcally, we use the values of Team Size, MBA, PhD,
Prior Work Experience, Prior Board Experience, Employment Connections, and Education
Connections as independent variables in Columns (1) through (7) across all panels in Table
6.88 Except for Prior Work Experience and Prior Board Experience, we ﬁnd positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀects of each individual management quality measure on all three innovation
output measures. These eﬀects are economically signiﬁcant as well. For instance, a one
inter-quartile range increase in MBA corresponds to a 4% increase in patenting activity.
The ﬁndings in this section support our hypothesis H2, that is, management quality has a
positive impact on the quantity and quality of the ﬁrm’s innovation output.
3.4.3 Identiﬁcation: Instrumental Variable Analysis
We empirically test whether there is a link between management quality and corporate in-
novation. Therefore, for our baseline analyses, we conduct OLS regressions of our innovation
measures on our management quality measures described above. However, the management
quality of a ﬁrm may be endogenously related to corporate innovation. For instance, higher
quality managers may choose to work for higher quality ﬁrms. In other words, there may
be endogenous matching between management quality and ﬁrm quality. In order to address
the above endogeneity concern, we use an instrumental variable (IV) analysis.
The instrument in our IV analysis is motivated by the following facts. First, incoming
managers often come from established ﬁrms, and these ﬁrms are dominant players in the
86In a robustness check we describe later, we conduct these regressions using the sample of ﬁrms that have
ﬁled at least one patent application throughout our sample period of 1999-2009. Our results (see Table A1
in the Internet Appendix) are qualitatively similar to those reported here.
87Note that the coeﬃcients and standard errors in Panel C of Table 6 are multiplied by 100 for ease of
reading.
88Our results are qualitatively similar when we use size-adjusted individual management quality measures.
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acquisition market. In other words, there is a strong correlation between the movement of
managers across ﬁrms and the number of acquisitions in the industry the ﬁrm belongs to.
Inspired by Ewens and Marx (2014), we count the number of acquisitions of public targets
made by established ﬁrms in the industry the sample ﬁrms belong to ﬁve years prior as
a proxy for the shock to the supply of outside managers in that industry.89 The ﬁve-year
lag stems from the popular retention contracts employed by the acquirers for target ﬁrms.
These contracts often compensate the managers of target ﬁrms for lost compensation for up
to ﬁve years and provide strong incentives for these managers to stay with the target ﬁrms
for another few years. The expiration of these contracts generates a source of variation to
the supply of managers available for hire. Second, the enforceability of non-compete clauses,
which are commonly used in employment contracts for top management and prohibit them
from joining or founding a rival company within one to two years of leaving, aﬀects the
mobility of managers across the ﬁrms.90 Bishara, Martin, and Thomas (2015) analyze an
extensive sample of CEO employment contracts and show that 80% of these contracts contain
non-compete clauses, often with a broad geographic scope. A growing body of work (e.g.,
Garmaise (2009) and Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming (2009)) shows that higher enforceability
of these non-compete clauses constrains employees’ mobility (including those of managers).
The enforceability of such non-compete clauses exhibits both cross-state and time series
variation, which leads to variation in the mobility of managers that is unlikely to be related
to corporate innovation. Based on the above facts, we construct an instrumental variable
which proxies for a plausibly exogenous shock to the supply of managers available for hire by
ﬁrms, making use of the strong correlation between industry acquisitions and the movement
of top managers as well as the exogenous variation in the ability of managers to move.
Speciﬁcally, the instrumental variable for the management quality (MQF ) of the top
89In an alternative speciﬁcation, we also used the number of acquisitions during the two to ﬁve year period
prior to the current year and ﬁnd broadly similar results.
90Since these non-compete clauses become operational only when top managers leave their prior ﬁrms, the
enforceability of these non-compete clauses can be thought as a measure of the friction facing top managers
when they attempt to join the current ﬁrm.
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management team in a ﬁrm i in industry j in year t is computed as follows:
Instrument j,t =
∑
s
Acquisitionsj,s,t−5 × (−Enforceability Index s,t), (3.7)
where j, s, and t index industry, state, and year, respectively. Acquisitionsj,s,t−5 is the
number of acquisitions made by established (public) companies in industry j in state s in
year t−5. The information on mergers and acquisitions required to construct this variable is
collected from the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions Database. Again, the ﬁve-year lag allows for
the expiration of retention contracts that work as “golden handcuﬀs” for managers and thus
Acquisitionsj,s,t−5 works as a measure for the supply of managers from state s in industry j
in year t.
Enforceability Index s,t is the index on the enforceability of non-compete agreements
generated by Garmaise (2009).91 It ranges from zero (e.g., California) to nine (e.g., Florida
after 1997), and higher values of this index for a state indicates higher enforceability of
the non-compete agreements and thus less mobility of the managers from this state. The
multiplication term, Acquisitionsj,s,t−5 × (−Enforceability Index s,t), therefore proxies for the
supply of managers who are able to move across ﬁrms and available for hire from state s in
industry j in year t. We then aggregate this variable at the industry-year level and use this
as an instrument for top management quality in a ﬁrm in industry j in year t. We expect
higher values of this instrument to be positively correlated with top management quality
(MQF ).
To instrument for the management quality (MQF ) of ﬁrm i in industry j in year t, we
91Garmaise (2009) considers 12 questions analyzed by Malsberger (2004), which is the central resource
describing noncompetition law in 50 US states and the DC, and assigns 1 point to each jurisdiction for
each question if the jurisdiction’s enforcement of that dimension of noncompetition law exceeds a certain
threshold.
159
therefore run the ﬁrst-stage regression as follows:
MQFi,j,t = α + βInstrument j,t + δAcquisitionsj,t−5
+ γZi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + State FE + i,t. (3.8)
In both the ﬁrst and second stages of our IV regressions, we include the total number
of acquisitions in the sample ﬁrm’s industry ﬁve years prior (Acquisitionsj,t−5) to control
for the eﬀect of an industry wide shock (e.g., merger waves) on innovation. We also include
ﬁxed eﬀects for the state in which the ﬁrm is headquartered to alleviate the concern that
the relation between top management quality and innovation may be driven by other state-
level factors. We expect the instrument to be positively and signiﬁcantly related with our
management quality factor, thus satisfying the relevance condition of a valid instrument.
Further, since we control for the direct eﬀect of merger waves on innovation, our instrument
is unlikely to aﬀect innovation through channels other than through aﬀecting the supply of
managers. Therefore, the exclusion restriction is also likely to be satisﬁed.
Column 1 of Panel A in Table 7 reports the results of the ﬁrst stage of our IV analysis.
The coeﬃcient of the instrument is positive (as predicted) and is statistically signiﬁcant at
the one percent level. The ﬁrst-stage F-statistic is 40.09, which is signiﬁcant at the one
percent level. These ﬁndings conﬁrm that the relevance condition for the instrument is
satisﬁed. Columns (2)-(5) of Panel A report the second-stage results of our 2SLS regressions
using one, two, and three year ahead patent counts as our dependent variables. Panel B
and Panel C correspond to second-stage results using the total number of citations and
the number of citations per patent as dependent variables, respectively. We ﬁnd that, after
controlling for the potential endogeneity betweenMQF and innovation using our IV analysis,
our management quality factor still has a signiﬁcantly positive impact on ﬁrms’ patent
counts, total number of citations, and citations per patent in all speciﬁcations. Broadly, our
results suggest that management quality is positively and causally related to the quantity
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and quality of ﬁrms’ innovation output.
3.4.4 The Eﬀect of Management Quality on Innovative Eﬃciency
Having established that ﬁrms with higher quality management teams are characterized by
greater innovation input as well as greater innovation output and higher quality innovation
output, we move on to test whether such ﬁrms are able to use R&D resources more eﬃciently
in producing innovation output. This corresponds to our third hypothesis (H3). We con-
struct two measures for innovative eﬃciency for our empirical tests. Following Hirshleifer,
Hsu, and Li (2013), innovative eﬃciency here refers to the ability of the ﬁrm to generate
patents and citations per dollar of R&D expenditures. The two measures for innovative
eﬃciency, Patents/R&D (Citations/R&D) is the natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of
adjusted patent counts (adjusted number of citations) scaled by ﬁrm’s R&D capital in the
past ﬁve years. Following Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) and Lev, Sarath, and
Sougiannis (2005), we deﬁne a ﬁrm’s R&D capital as cumulative R&D expenses assuming
an annual depreciation rate of 20%. Speciﬁcally, they are deﬁned by the following formula:
Patents/R&Di,t = Ln(1 +
Patentsi,t∑4
k=0(1− 0.2 ∗ k) ∗R&Di,t−k
), (3.9)
Citations/R&Di,t = Ln(1 +
Citationsi,t∑4
k=0(1− 0.2 ∗ k) ∗R&Di,t−k
), (3.10)
where Patentsi,t and Citationsi,t denote the adjusted number of patents that ﬁrm i ﬁled
in year t and the adjusted number of citations received by those patents; R&Di,t denotes
ﬁrm i’s R&D expenses in ﬁscal year t.
Table 8 reports the OLS regression results for the eﬀect of management quality on inno-
vative eﬃciency.92 Columns (1)-(3) correspond to regressions using Patents/R&D one, two
and three years from now as dependent variables, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) correspond
92This table does not have R&D/Assets as a control since the dependent variable is already normalizedby
R&D expenditures. In unreported tests, we control these regressions for R&D/Assets and ﬁnd qualitatively
similar results. Results available from authors upon request.
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to regressions using Citations/R&D one, two, and three years from now as dependent vari-
ables, respectively.93 We ﬁnd the coeﬃcients on management quality factor are positive and
signiﬁcant across all speciﬁcations. We also conduct IV analyses for innovative eﬃciency us-
ing the same instrumental variables as described in earlier sections.94 In untabulated results,
we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients of MQF for these regressions remain positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. Collectively, our evidence indicates that ﬁrms with higher management quality
are better at getting more “bang for the buck,” i.e, use R&D resources more eﬃciently in
generating higher innovation output.
3.4.5 The Eﬀect of Management Quality on Corporate Innovation: Interaction
Tests
In this section, we dig deeper into whether the relation between management quality and
innovation productivity is stronger in some industries than in others. We thus conduct
interaction tests based on hypotheses H4 and H5, which predict that management team
quality will have a stronger eﬀect for ﬁrms in ﬁnancially constrained industries and for
ﬁrms in more competitive industries, respectively. In order to test the above hypotheses,
we ﬁrst interact MQF in our regressions with Constrained, a dummy variable that is equal
to one if the ﬁrm operates in an industry for which the median value of external ﬁnancial
dependence (as calculated in Rajan and Zingales (1998)) is positive and zero otherwise. Also,
we interact MQF with HHI, which is the value of Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index in the ﬁrm’s
industry (deﬁned at the 2-digit SIC code level) in each year.
Table 9 reports the results for the interaction tests with one year ahead innovation
measures as dependent variables. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report the regression results for
the interaction of MQF and Constrained as well as Constrained as additional independent
variables. The coeﬃcient estimates on MQF are signiﬁcantly positive for all three measures
93Note that the coeﬃcients and standard errors in Columns (4)-(6) of Table 8 are multiplied by 100 for
ease of reading.
94The IV regression results for innovative eﬃciency are not reported in order to save space. These results
are available from authors upon request.
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of innovation output, consistent with our previous results. More importantly, the coeﬃcients
on the interaction term (MQF×Constrained) are also signiﬁcantly positive for Ln(Patents)
and Ln(Citations) at the one percent level. This evidence suggests that ﬁrms with higher
quality management are able to select better projects, use resources more eﬃciently, and
generate greater innovation output in adverse ﬁnancing environments.
We report results of the interaction tests for MQF and HHI in Columns (4), (5), and
(6) in Table 9. As before, the coeﬃcient estimates on MQF are signiﬁcantly positive for all
three innovation measures. Further, the coeﬃcients on the interaction term (MQF×HHI )
are negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that the positive impact of management quality on
innovation becomes more pronounced as industry competition increases. Thus, the results
in this section are consistent with our hypotheses H4 and H5.
3.5 Possible Mechanisms: Inventor Mobility
Our evidence thus far is consistent with management quality having a positive relation with
corporate innovation. In this section, we discuss the possible underlying mechanisms through
which this may occur. As argued before, higher quality management teams may provide more
R&D resources, manage R&D resources better, and provide a more risk-tolerant climate for
inventors to succeed in. This, in turn, may make ﬁrms with higher management quality
more attractive to higher quality inventors. Thus, one way that higher quality management
teams may enhance innovation is by hiring more and higher quality inventors to work for
the ﬁrm. We test these conjectures below.
3.5.1 Management Quality and Net Inﬂow of Inventors
To assess the relation between management quality and the net inﬂow of inventors that move
into the ﬁrm at the ﬁrm-year level, which corresponds to our hypothesis H6, we test the
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following model:
Net Inﬂow i,t+n = α+ βMQFi,t + γZi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + State FE + i,t, (3.11)
where i indexes ﬁrm and t indexes time and n equals one, two or three. Z is a vector of
control variables used in prior tests. As before, we include year dummies and 2-digit SIC
industry dummies. Moreover, since location may impact inventors’ decisions of moving into
or out of a ﬁrm, we include state dummies for the state of the ﬁrm’s headquarter in all
regressions in this section.
Table 10 reports results for the above model. Across all speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients
of interest on MQF are signiﬁcantly positive. For instance, Column (1) of Table 10 suggests
that a one inter-quartile range increase in MQF is associated with 0.05 increase in Net
Inﬂow. The economic magnitude of the eﬀect is large given that the sample mean of Net
Inﬂow is 0.21. These ﬁndings support our hypothesis H6, and suggest that one mechanism
through which higher quality management teams enhance ﬁrm innovation is by attracting
more inventors to work for the ﬁrm.
In an untabulated analysis, we include the net inﬂow of inventors in the OLS regressions
for the innovation output of ﬁrms. Therefore, we regress our innovation measures on the
net inﬂow of inventors and our management quality factor (MQF ), while including the
same of set of control variables as in Table 5, year ﬁxed eﬀects, industry ﬁxed eﬀects, and
state ﬁxed eﬀects. This test allows us to check whether MQF still has a direct (residual)
eﬀect on innovation after controlling for the net inﬂow of inventors. We ﬁnd that, whereas
the coeﬃcient estimates on the net inﬂow of inventors are all positive and signiﬁcant, the
coeﬃcients on MQF are still positive and signiﬁcant at the one percent level. However,
the magnitudes of the coeﬃcient estimates on MQF are reduced quite substantially once we
include the net inﬂow of inventors (for example, the coeﬃcient estimate onMQF is decreased
by 28% when Ln(Patents)t+1 is the dependent variable and the decrease is statistically
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signiﬁcant at the one percent level), suggesting that the eﬀect of management quality on
innovation is at least partly driven by the net inﬂow of inventors.
3.5.2 Management Quality and High-and Low-quality Inventors
In this section, we move on to test whether higher quality managers are better at attracting
higher quality inventors. Speciﬁcally, we test the following models:
Net Inﬂow of High i,t+n =αH + βHMQFi,t + γHZi,t + Industry FE + Year FE
+ State FE + i,t, (3.12)
Net Inﬂow of Low i,t+n =αL + βLMQFi,t + γLZi,t + Industry FE + Year FE
+ State FE + i,t,% (3.13)
where i indexes ﬁrm and t indexes time and n equals one, two or three. The same vector of
control variables and same set of dummy variables are included as in the prior section. We
also statistically test whether the coeﬃcient on MQF in the regression (3.12) is positive and
signiﬁcantly larger than that in regression (3.13), i.e., βH > 0 and βH > βL.
Panel A of Table 11 reports the regression estimation results using Net Inﬂow of High i,t
and Net Inﬂow of Low i,t as dependent variables calculated at one, two, and three years
subsequent to the current year. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on MQF are positive using
both dependent variables, indicating that management quality has positive impacts on the
net inﬂow of both high-quality and low-quality inventors. More importantly, the eﬀect of
MQF on the net inﬂow of high-quality inventors is economically 10 times larger than on the
net inﬂow of low-quality inventors across all time horizons. We test the statistical signiﬁcance
of the diﬀerence for the coeﬃcients onMQF for high quality versus low quality inventors and
report the test results in Panel B of Table 11. All the diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant
at the one percent level. Collectively, these ﬁndings provide further evidence that higher
quality managers are indeed able to hire a greater number of high-quality inventors than
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low-quality inventors, consistent with our hypothesis H7.
In order to further analyze whether hiring high quality inventors is indeed a channel
through which ﬁrms with higher quality management teams spur innovation, we include
the net inﬂow of high quality inventors in the OLS regressions for the innovation output of
ﬁrms. If higher quality inventors are driving the relation between management quality and
innovation, we would expect that the coeﬃcient estimates of the net inﬂow of high quality
inventors to be signiﬁcantly positive, while the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients on MQF to be
signiﬁcantly lower.
Table 12 reports the results of these regressions. Panels A, B, and C use the number of
patents, the total number of citations, and citations per patent as the dependent variable,
respectively. The same set of control variables as in Table 5, year ﬁxed eﬀects, industry ﬁxed
eﬀects, and state ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all the regressions in Table 12. Consistent with
our conjecture, we ﬁnd that the net inﬂow of high quality inventors is signiﬁcantly positive at
the one percent level in all the regressions in the above three panels. Further, the coeﬃcients
on the management quality factor (MQF ) have much smaller magnitudes compared with the
coeﬃcients from regressions in which the net inﬂow of higher quality inventors is not included
(that is, compared to our Table 5 results), suggesting that the eﬀect of MQF on corporate
innovation is partially mediated through hiring higher quality inventors. For instance, the
coeﬃcient on MQF with the subsequent year adjusted patents as the dependent variable
is 0.096 when we control for high-quality inventor inﬂow, whereas it is 0.146 without this
control (in Table 5, Panel A), reﬂecting a 34 percent decline. More interestingly, we ﬁnd
that the coeﬃcients on MQF are smaller in the regressions where the net inﬂow of high
quality inventors is included compared to the case where the net inﬂow of all inventors is
included.95 Collectively, these results provide evidence consistent with our conjecture that
one mechanism through which higher quality management teams aﬀect corporate innovation
through hiring higher quality inventors.
95In untabulated analysis, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerences between the coeﬃcients on MQF in these two sets
of regressions are statistically signiﬁcant.
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3.5.3 Management Quality and Average Inventor Quality
We further investigate whether management quality is positively associated with the change
in the average inventor quality for a ﬁrm. As before, the quality for each inventor is mea-
sured as the citations per patent for the patents he has ﬁled prior to the current year. To
understand the eﬀect of management quality on a ﬁrm’s average inventor quality, we consider
the following model:
Net Quality Change i,t+n =α + βMQFi,t + γZi,t + Industry FE + Year FE
+ State FE + i,t. (3.14)
Recall that Net Quality Change i,t is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between Incoming Quality i,t
and Outgoing Quality i,t, which captures the net change in average inventor quality of the
ﬁrm’s inventor team in a given year.
Table 13 reports the OLS regression results for the above model, using the the net change
in average inventor quality (Net Quality Change) measured over the subsequent one, two and
three years, respectively.96 The coeﬃcients on MQF are both positive and signiﬁcant at the
one percent level for all speciﬁcations. The economic magnitude of the impact is signiﬁcant as
well. For instance, Column (1) of Panel A suggests that a one inter-quartile range increase
in MQF leads to a net increase in the next year’s average inventor quality equivalent to
15% of the sample mean of this variable. In untabulated analyses, we conduct same tests
using Incoming Quality and Outgoing Quality measured in one, two, and three years from
now as the dependent variables, respectively. We ﬁnd that, across all time horizons, the
coeﬃcients on MQF for Incoming Quality i,t and Outgoing Quality i,t are both signiﬁcantly
positive. This suggests that, for higher management quality ﬁrms, the newly-hired inventors
as well as laid-oﬀ inventors are more innovative compared with those for lower management
quality ﬁrms. Therefore, our results provide supporting evidence that higher management
96Note that coeﬃcients and standard errors in Table 13 are multiplied by 100 for ease of readability.
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quality is associated with a greater increase in the average inventor quality of a ﬁrm, again
consistent with our hypothesis H7.
3.5.4 Management Quality and Corporate Innovation Strategies
In this section, we further investigate the possible diﬀerences in the innovation strategies
adopted by ﬁrms with higher versus lower management quality. As we have conjectured
earlier, if ﬁrms with higher quality management teams engage in more explorative innovative
strategies, such ﬁrms should have a greater number of patents in the two tails of the patent
quality distribution, i.e., very successful and very unsuccessful patents. On the other hand,
if ﬁrms with higher quality management teams adopt more exploitative strategies, such ﬁrms
will have more moderately successful patents. To understand ﬁrms’ innovative strategies,
we categorize our sample pool of patents applied between 1999 and 2009 in to three groups:
(i) Top 10%, deﬁned as patents receiving the number of citations in the top 10% among all
patents in the same 3-digit technology class and application year; (ii) No Cites, deﬁned as
those receiving zero citation till 2009; and (iii) Moderate Cites, deﬁned as those receiving at
least one citation but not in the top 10%. Balsmeier, Fleming, and Manso (2014) follow a
similar approach in their study of the relation between the independence of ﬁrms’ corporate
boards and their innovation strategies. Using the number of patents in each category, we
estimate the following models:
Top 10% i,t+n = α + βMQFi,t + γZi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + i,t, (3.15)
No Cites i,t+n = α + βMQFi,t + γZi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + i,t, (3.16)
Moderate Cites i,t+n = α + βMQFi,t + γZi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + i,t. (3.17)
Table 14 reports the results for the above regressions. Columns (1), (2), and (3) across
all panels of Table 14 correspond to regression results using the natural logarithm of one plus
the number of patents in the aforementioned three groups as dependent variables (Top 10%,
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No Cites, and Moderate Cites), respectively. Panels A, B, and C correspond to regression
results using one, two and three year ahead dependent variables, respectively. The same set
of control variables used in Table 5 are included in all speciﬁcations and coeﬃcient estimates
on the controls are not reported in order to save space (available from authors upon request).
Columns (4), (5), and (6) report the tests of statistical diﬀerencew between coeﬃcient es-
timates across the regression models in Columns (1), (2), and (3). In all speciﬁcations in
Table 14, we ﬁnd the coeﬃcients on MQF are positive and statistically and economically
signiﬁcant. These results indicate that ﬁrms with higher quality management teams engage
in both explorative and exploitative innovative strategies. Such ﬁrms are able to produce
more patents in all three categories.
Further, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on MQF in Columns (1) and (2) are signiﬁcantly
larger than that in Column (3), suggesting that ﬁrms with higher management quality ﬁrms
may engage more in explorative innovative strategies, thus producing more patents in the
two tails of the patent quality distribution. More interestingly, the coeﬃcients in Column
(1) are much bigger than those in Column (2) or (3). We also conduct IV analyses for these
regressions using the same instrumental variable as described in earlier sections and the
results are qualitatively similar to the OLS regression results reported in Table 14.97 These
ﬁndings suggest that management quality has a more pronounced eﬀect on successful patents
than on unsuccessful patents or average patents, i.e., ﬁrms with higher quality management
teams are better at motivating successful patents that are highly cited afterwards. Broadly,
the results in this section support both hypotheses H8A and H8B.
97The IV results for the innovative strategies are not reported in order to save space. These results are
available from authors upon request.
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3.6 Robustness Tests
3.6.1 Sample of Innovative Firms
We use the entire BoardEx-KPSS patent-Compustat-CRSP merged sample in our main
analysis and assign zero patents to those ﬁrms without any patent record following prior
studies (see, e.g., Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) and Seru (2014)). One concern of measurement
error may be that some ﬁrms in our sample may not engage in any innovative activities (i.e.,
such ﬁrms may not appear as a patent assignee in the patent dataset). Thus, we re-estimate
our baseline regressions using a sample consisting of innovative ﬁrms only, which refer to
ﬁrms that have ﬁled at least one patent application over our sample period of 1999-2009. We
therefore alleviate the measurement error concern by studying a more accurate but smaller
sample. The results are reported in Table A1 of our Internet Appendix.98 The positive
relation between our management quality factor and all three measures of innovation output
continue to hold in this sample.
3.6.2 Alternative Management Quality Factor
In this section, we re-run our common factor analysis using all proxies other than manage-
ment team size. We do this to ensure that our results are not driven by any team size-speciﬁc
eﬀects. Thus, we re-estimate the management quality factor after excluding team size and
re-run the regressions between this alternative management quality factor and corporate
innovation.
The results of these tests are reported in Table A2 of our Internet Appendix. Panels
A, B, and C report the OLS regression results using the number of patents, total number
of citations and citations per patent as dependent variables, respectively. We ﬁnd that,
consistent with our previous results, all three measures of innovation output are positively
related to this alternative management quality factor.
98While we use our full set of control variables in our regressions in Tables A1, A2, and A3, we do not
show the coeﬃcient estimates for these controls to conserve space.
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3.7 Conclusion
We analyze the eﬀect of the human capital or “quality” of the top management of a ﬁrm on
its innovation activities. We extract a “management quality factor” using common factor
analysis on various individual proxies for the quality of a ﬁrm’s management team, such
as management team size, fraction of managers with MBAs, the average employment- and
education-based connections of each manager in the management team, fraction of members
with prior work experience in a top management position, the average number of prior
board positions that each manager serves on, and the fraction of managers with doctoral
degrees. Firms with higher quality management teams not only invest more in innovation (as
measured by R&D expenditures), but also have a greater quantity and quality of innovation,
as measured by the number of patents and citations per patent, respectively. We control for
the endogenous matching of higher quality managers and higher quality ﬁrms using an IV
analysis where we use a plausibly exogenous shock to the supply of new managers available
for hire by a ﬁrm (which, in turn, will aﬀect of the quality of a ﬁrm’s top management team)
as an instrument for top management human capital. An important channel through which
higher management quality ﬁrms achieve greater innovation success is by hiring a larger
number of inventors (controlling for R&D expenditures), and also by hiring higher quality
inventors (as measured by their prior record of citations per patent). Finally, we show that
higher quality management team ﬁrms seem to pursue both exploratory and exploitative
innovations.
While our empirical evidence suggests that higher quality managers are able to make
better innovative investments and implement them more ably by (among others) hiring
higher quality inventors, we do not wish claim that this is the sole channel through which
higher quality top management teams are able to generate a larger number of, and higher
quality, innovations for their ﬁrms. A complementary channel through which higher quality
management teams may be able to generate greater innovation productivity for their ﬁrms
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is through greater risk-taking: higher quality managers may have less fear of failure so
that they are more willing to explore, investing more in innovations. Consistent with this
conjecture, there is some evidence that risk-taking CEOs inﬂuence innovation success (see,
e.g., Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang (2014)). However, there is no evidence so far in the literature
documenting this risk-taking channel in the context of the top management teams of ﬁrms.
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Table 3: The Effect of Management Quality Factor on Management Team Compensation
This table reports the OLS regression results of various executive compensation measures on management quality 
factor (MQF). For each firm-year, Ln(Average Total Compensation) is the natural logarithm of the amount of 
total compensation divided by the number of managers. Ln(Average Cash Compensation) is the natural logarithm 
of the amount of cash compensation divided by the number of managers. Equity/Total Compensation is defined as 
the fraction of equity compensation out of total compensation. Total compensation includes cash compensation 
and equity compensation. Cash compensation consists of base cash salary and bonus. Equity compensation 
consists of the value of shares awarded, value of LTIP awarded, and value of options awarded. Ln(Assets) is the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets; M/B is Tobin’s Q, defined as market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as the book value of assets plus the market 
value of common stock less the book value of common stock; ROA is defined as operating income before 
depreciation divided by total assets; CAPEX/Assets is defined as capital expenditures divided by total assets; 
R&D/Assets is defined as research and development expenses divided by total assets; Stock Return is the firm’s
annual stock return; HHI is the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; and Average Tenure is the average number 
of years that each manager has worked as VP or higher in this firm. Constant, year fixed effects, and 2-digit SIC 
industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm 
level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Average Total Compensation)
Ln(Average Cash 
Compensation)
Equity/Total 
Compensation
MQF 0.063*** 0.011 0.027***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.004)
Ln(Assets) 0.472*** 0.254*** 0.064***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.003)
M/B 0.478*** 0.119*** 0.090***
(0.029) (0.019) (0.008)
ROA -0.047 0.131** -0.001
(0.075) (0.062) (0.026)
CAPEX/Assets 0.049 -0.325** 0.051
(0.210) (0.153) (0.059)
R&D/Assets 0.366*** 0.001 0.079*
(0.130) (0.084) (0.045)
Stock Return 0.150*** 0.063*** 0.018***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.004)
HHI 1.035*** -0.613* 0.522***
(0.393) (0.336) (0.162)
Average Tenure -0.019*** 0.005 -0.009***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Observations 12,240 12,232 12,370
Adjusted R-squared 0.530 0.462 0.193
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4: The Effect of Management Quality on R&D Expenditures
This table reports the OLS regression results of the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets (R&D/Assets) on 
management quality factor (MQF). R&D/Assets is defined as research and development expenses divided by total 
assets; Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets; M/B is Tobin’s Q, defined as market value of 
assets divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as the book value of 
assets plus the market value of common stock less the book value of common stock; ROA is defined as operating 
income before depreciation divided by total assets; CAPEX/Assets is defined as capital expenditures divided by
total assets; Stock Return is the firm’s annual stock return; HHI is the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; and 
Average Tenure is the average number of years that each manager has worked as VP or higher in this firm.
Constant, year fixed effects, and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. All standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Variable R&D/Assetst+1 R&D/Assetst+2 R&D/Assetst+3
MQF 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(Assets) -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
M/B 0.057*** 0.043*** 0.039***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ROA -0.216*** -0.198*** -0.194***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
CAPEX/Assets -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.047***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Stock Return -0.000 -0.006*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HHI 0.029* 0.014 0.007
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
Average Tenure -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 27,688 23,741 19,887
Adjusted R-squared 0.559 0.493 0.472
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: The Effect of Management Quality on the Quantity and Quality of Corporate Innovation
This table reports the OLS regression results of quantity and quality of corporate innovation on management 
quality factor (MQF). Panels A, B, and C report regression results with the number of patents, the total number of 
citations, and the number of citations per patent as dependent variables, respectively. Ln(Patents) is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the truncation-adjusted number of patents that a firm filed in a given year; Ln(Citations) is 
the natural logarithm of one plus the total adjusted number of citations received by the firm’s patents filed in a 
year; Ln(Citations/Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of citations per patent. Three-
Year Ln(Patents) is the natural logarithm of one plus the truncation-adjusted number of patents that a firm filed 
over the next three years; Three-Year Ln(Citations) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total adjusted number 
of citations received by the firm’s patents filed over the next three years; Three-Year Ln(Citations/Patent) is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of citations per patent received by the firm’s patents filed over 
the next three years. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets; M/B is Tobin’s Q, defined as 
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as the 
book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the book value of common stock; ROA is 
defined as operating income before depreciation divided by total assets; CAPEX/Assets is defined as capital 
expenditures divided by total assets; R&D/Assets is defined as research and development expenses divided by 
total assets; Stock Return is the firm’s annual stock return; HHI is the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; and
Average Tenure is the average number of years that each manager has worked as VP or higher in this firm.
Constant, year fixed effects, and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. All standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: The Effect of MQF on the Number of Patents
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Patents)t+1 Ln(Patents)t+2 Ln(Patents)t+3
MQF 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.128***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Ln(Assets) 0.146*** 0.142*** 0.138***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
M/B 0.113*** 0.121*** 0.122***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
ROA -0.010 0.002 0.005
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
CAPEX/Assets -0.043 -0.021 -0.008
(0.064) (0.066) (0.070)
R&D/Assets 0.234*** 0.190*** 0.157***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Stock Return -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
HHI 0.109 0.067 -0.026
(0.183) (0.191) (0.182)
Average Tenure 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 27,688 24,519 21,250
Adjusted R-squared 0.390 0.384 0.375
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B: The Effect of MQF on the Total Number of Citations
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Citations)t+1 Ln(Citations)t+2 Ln(Citations)t+3
MQF 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln(Assets) 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
M/B 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ROA -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CAPEX/Assets -0.006 -0.007 -0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
R&D/Assets -0.000 -0.005 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Stock Return -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HHI -0.021 -0.034 -0.035
(0.032) (0.033) (0.031)
Average Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 27,688 24,519 21,250
Adjusted R-squared 0.256 0.251 0.241
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: The Effect of MQF on the Citations per Patent
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Citations/Patent)t+1 Ln(Citations/Patent)t+2 Ln(Citations/Patent)t+3
MQF 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Assets) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M/B 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAPEX/Assets -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
R&D/Assets 0.001** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Return -0.000* -0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HHI -0.005** -0.005** -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Average Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 27,688 24,519 21,250
Adjusted R-squared 0.140 0.139 0.136
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: The Effect of Individual Management Quality Measures on Corporate Innovation
This table reports the OLS regression results of corporate innovation on individual management quality factor 
variables. Panels A, B, and C report regression results with the number of patents, the total number of citations,
and the number of citations per patent as dependent variables, respectively. Ln(Patents) is the natural logarithm of 
one plus the truncation-adjusted number of patents that a firm filed in a given year; Ln(Citations) is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the total adjusted number of citations received by the firm’s patents filed in a year; 
Ln(Citations/Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of citations per patent. Team Size is 
the number of managers (VP or higher) in a firm’s management team; MBA is the fraction of the managers that
have MBA degrees; PhD is the fraction of the managers that have PhD degrees; Prior Work Experience is the 
fraction of top managers that have experience working as VP or higher in other companies; Prior Board 
Experience is the average number of board positions that each manager has served on; Employment Connections 
is the average number of connections that each manager has through prior employment (if two managers worked 
in the same previous company during overlapping time periods, either as managers or directors, those two are 
defined as connected); Education Connections is the average number of graduate connections that each manager 
has through education (if two managers graduate from the same university with the same degree within one year 
of each other, those two are defined as connected). Control variables are the same as in Table 5 in all regressions 
and coefficient estimates on controls are not reported to save space. Constant, year fixed effects, and 2-digit SIC 
industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm 
level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Coefficients and standard errors in Panel C
are multiplied by 100. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.
Panel A: The Effect of Individual Management Quality Measures on the Number of Patents
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Team Size 0.029***
(0.003)
MBA 0.120***
(0.033)
PhD 0.356***
(0.057)
Prior Work Experience 0.035
(0.035)
Prior Board Experience -0.002
(0.026)
Employment Connections 0.013***
(0.001)
Education Connections 0.012***
(0.002)
Observations 27,688 27,688 27,688 27,688 27,688 27,688 27,688
Adjusted R-squared 0.389 0.370 0.374 0.369 0.369 0.391 0.372
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B: The Effect of Individual Management Quality Measures on the Total Number of Citations
Variable (1) (2) (7) (3) (6) (5) (4)
Team Size 0.004***
(0.000)
MBA 0.013***
(0.005)
PhD 0.021***
(0.007)
Prior Work Experience -0.006
(0.005)
Prior Board Experience -0.002
(0.003)
Employment Connections 0.002***
(0.000)
Education Connections 0.001***
(0.000)
Observations 27,688 27,688 27,688 27,688 27,688 27,688 27,688
Adjusted R-squared 0.261 0.240 0.240 0.239 0.239 0.259 0.242
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: The Effect of Individual Management Quality Measures on the Number of Citations per Patent
Variable (1) (2) (7) (3) (6) (5) (4)
Team Size 0.013***
(0.002)
MBA 0.059**
(0.027)
PhD 0.112***
(0.042)
Prior Work Experience -0.004
(0.028)
Prior Board Experience -0.024
(0.018)
Employment Connections 0.005***
(0.001)
Education Connections 0.005***
(0.002)
Observations 27,688 27,688 27,688 27,688 27,688 27,688 27,688
Adjusted R-squared 0.140 0.136 0.136 0.135 0.135 0.139 0.136
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: The Effect of Management Quality on Corporate Innovation: Instrumental Variable Analysis
This table reports the IV regression results of corporate innovation on management quality factor (MQF). The 
instrumental variables we use is described in Section 3.4.3. Column (1) of Panel A reports the first-stage result,
i.e., regressing MQF on the instrument and other controls. Columns (2)-(4) of Panel A report the second-stage 
results of the IV regressions using a firm’s number of patents applied in a given year as dependent variables.
Panels B and C report second-stage results using the total number of citations and the number of citations per 
patent as dependent variables, respectively. Ln(Patents) is the natural logarithm of one plus the truncation-
adjusted number of patents that a firm filed in a given year; Ln(Citations) is the natural logarithm of one plus the 
total adjusted number of citations received by the firm’s patents filed in a year; Ln(Citations/Patent) is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of citations per patent. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s
total assets; M/B is Tobin’s Q, defined as market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the 
market value of assets is computed as the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the 
book value of common stock; ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by total assets;
CAPEX/Assets is defined as capital expenditures divided by total assets; R&D/Assets is defined as research and 
development expenses divided by total assets; Stock Return is the firm’s annual stock return; HHI is the industry 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; and Average Tenure is the average number of years that each manager has worked 
as VP or higher in this firm. Constant, year fixed effects, and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level and are reported in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.
Panel A: First and Second-Stage Results of the Number of Patents on MQF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable MQF Ln(Patents)t+1 Ln(Patents)t+2 Ln(Patents)t+3
Instrument 0.002***
(0.000)
MQF 0.627*** 0.414*** 0.239
(0.147) (0.139) (0.161)
Acquisitions(t-5) 0.010*** 0.000 0.001** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Ln(Assets) 0.069*** 0.110*** 0.121*** 0.128***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
M/B 0.167*** 0.028 0.067** 0.097***
(0.017) (0.028) (0.026) (0.031)
ROA -0.195*** 0.082** 0.055 0.021
(0.032) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035)
CAPEX/Assets -0.729*** 0.337** 0.191 0.089
(0.095) (0.135) (0.121) (0.124)
R&D/Assets 0.213*** 0.048 0.072 0.072
(0.058) (0.059) (0.052) (0.051)
Stock Return -0.049*** -0.005 -0.010 -0.010
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Average Tenure -0.036*** 0.021*** 0.013** 0.006
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
HHI -0.104 0.232 0.208 0.155
(0.274) (0.243) (0.226) (0.197)
Observations 25,945 25,945 23,096 20,119
Adjusted R Squared 0.107
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B: Second-Stage Results of Total Number of Citations on MQF
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Citations)t+1 Ln(Citations)t+2 Ln(Citations)t+3
MQF 0.083*** 0.058** 0.057**
(0.021) (0.024) (0.028)
Acquisitions(t-5) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Assets) 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M/B 0.001 0.006 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
ROA 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
CAPEX/Assets 0.046** 0.024 0.022
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
R&D/Assets -0.018** -0.016** -0.016**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Stock Return 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Average Tenure 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HHI 0.001 -0.008 -0.001
(0.039) (0.038) (0.035)
Observations 25,945 23,096 20,119
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Second-Stage Results of Citations per Patent on MQF
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Citations/Patent)t+1 Ln(Citations/Patent)t+2 Ln(Citations/Patent)t+3
MQF 0.004** 0.004** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Acquisitions(t-5) -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Assets) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M/B -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAPEX/Assets 0.002 0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
R&D/Assets -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Stock Return 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average Tenure 0.000** 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HHI -0.004 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 25,945 23,096 20,119
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 9: The Effect of Management Quality on Corporate Innovation: Interaction Tests
This table reports the main regression results interacted with relevant variables. Columns (1)-(3) summarize the 
regression results with MQF interacted with industry financial constraints, using the number of patents, the total 
number of citations, and the number of citations per patent for a firm in a given year as dependent variables,
respectively. Constrained is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the value of external finance dependence 
is larger than zero and zero otherwise. External finance dependence for an industry (defined at 2-digit SIC level) 
in a given year is defined by the method outlined in Rajan and Zingales (1998). Columns (4)-(6) summarize 
regression results with management quality factor (MQF) interacted with industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), using the number of patents, the total number of citations, and the number of citations per patent for a firm 
in a given year as dependent variables, respectively. Ln(Patents) is the natural logarithm of one plus the 
truncation-adjusted number of patents that a firm filed in a given year; Ln(Citations) is the natural logarithm of 
one plus the total adjusted number of citations received by the firm’s patents filed in a year; Ln(Citations/Patent)
is the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of citations per patent. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm 
of the firm’s total assets; M/B is Tobin’s Q, defined as market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, 
where the market value of assets is computed as the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock 
less the book value of common stock; ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by total 
assets; CAPEX/Assets is defined as capital expenditures divided by total assets; R&D/Assets is defined as research 
and development expenses divided by total assets; Stock Return is the firm’s annual stock return; and Average 
Tenure is the average number of years that each manager has worked as VP or higher in this firm. Constant, year 
fixed effects, and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at the firm level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 10: The Effect of Management Quality on the Net Inflow of Inventors
This table reports the OLS regression results of the net inflow of inventors for a firm in a given year on 
management quality factor (MQF). For any inventor that filed patents in different firms or organizations, we 
assume a move occurred in the year when he filed the first patent in that firm. For a firm, the inventor’s move-in 
year and move-out year are the year when the inventor filed the first patent in this firm and the year when he filed 
the first patent in the subsequent firm. The inflow and outflow of inventors are defined as the natural logarithm of 
one plus the total number of inventors that move in and that move out aggregated at the firm-year level. Net 
Inflow is defined as the difference between the inflow and outflow of inventors as measured above. Ln(Assets) is 
the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets; M/B is Tobin’s Q, defined as market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as the book value of assets plus the market 
value of common stock less the book value of common stock; ROA is defined as operating income before 
depreciation divided by total assets; CAPEX/Assets is defined as capital expenditures divided by total assets; 
R&D/Assets is defined as research and development expenses divided by total assets; Stock Return is the firm’s 
annual stock return; HHI is the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; and Average Tenure is the average number 
of years that each manager has worked as VP or higher in this firm. Constant, year fixed effects, 2-digit SIC 
industry fixed effects, and state fixed effects are included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Net Inflowt+1 Net Inflowt+2 Net Inflowt+3
MQF 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.054***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ln(Assets) 0.073*** 0.067*** 0.060***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
M/B 0.076*** 0.080*** 0.076***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
ROA 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.050***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
CAPEX/Assets 0.123** 0.104** 0.070
(0.050) (0.048) (0.050)
R&D/Assets 0.356*** 0.257*** 0.196***
(0.039) (0.035) (0.036)
Stock Return -0.025*** -0.016*** -0.007*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
HHI 0.344** 0.273* 0.136
(0.146) (0.140) (0.156)
Average Tenure -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 25,945 23,096 20,119
Adjusted R-squared 0.255 0.244 0.234
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 11: The Effect of Management Quality on the Net Inflow of High Quality and Low Quality Inventors
This table reports the OLS regression results of the net inflow of high-quality and net inflow of low-quality 
inventors for a firm in a given year on management quality factor (MQF) and tests the statistical difference of 
coefficient estimates. Panel A reports the effect of MQF on the net inflow of high-quality inventors and the net 
inflow of low-quality inventors. Net Inflow of High is the difference between the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of high-quality inventors that move into the firm and the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
high-quality inventors that move out of the firm in a given year; Net Inflow of Low is the difference between the
natural logarithm of one plus the number of low-quality inventors that move into the firm and the natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of low-quality inventors that move out of the firm in a given year. Inventor 
quality is measured by the number of citations scaled by total number of patents that he has filed prior to the 
current year. An inventor is considered as a high-quality inventor if his prior track record of citations per patent is
above the sample median. Otherwise, an inventor is considered as a low-quality inventor. Panel B reports the 
difference between the coefficient estimates using Net Inflow of High and Net Inflow of Low as dependent 
variables and tests their statistical differences. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets; M/B is 
Tobin’s Q, defined as market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets 
is computed as the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the book value of common 
stock; ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by total assets; CAPEX/Assets is defined 
as capital expenditures divided by total assets; R&D/Assets is defined as research and development expenses 
divided by total assets; Stock Return is the firm’s annual stock return; HHI is the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index; and Average Tenure is the average number of years that each manager has worked as VP or higher in this 
firm. Constant, year fixed effects, 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects, and state fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level and are reported in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.
Panel A: Net inflow of High-Quality and Low-Quality Inventors (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Net Inflow of Hight+1
Net Inflow of 
Lowt+1
Net Inflow of 
Hight+2
Net Inflow of 
Lowt+2
Net Inflow of 
Hight+3
Net Inflow of 
Lowt+3
MQF 0.054*** 0.004*** 0.053*** 0.004*** 0.056*** 0.004***
(0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
Ln(Assets) 0.078*** 0.004*** 0.071*** 0.004*** 0.064*** 0.003***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
M/B 0.079*** 0.002*** 0.084*** 0.003*** 0.080*** 0.003***
(0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001)
ROA 0.050*** 0.001 0.053*** 0.001 0.051*** 0.002*
(0.016) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001)
CAPEX/Assets 0.123** 0.004 0.112** 0.003 0.082 -0.003
(0.051) (0.004) (0.050) (0.004) (0.051) (0.004)
R&D/Assets 0.356*** 0.013*** 0.264*** 0.008*** 0.206*** 0.008**
(0.040) (0.004) (0.036) (0.003) (0.038) (0.003)
Stock Return -0.025*** -0.001** -0.018*** -0.000 -0.008* -0.001**
(0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
HHI 0.393*** -0.001 0.313** 0.001 0.161 0.001
(0.151) (0.011) (0.145) (0.010) (0.162) (0.010)
Average Tenure -0.004*** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000 -0.002* 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 25,945 25,945 23,096 23,096 20,119 20,119
Adjusted R-squared 0.263 0.063 0.253 0.061 0.241 0.060
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Difference between Net Inflow of High Quality and Low Quality Inventors (OLS)
Differencet+1 Differencet+2 Differencet+3
Difference 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.052***
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Table 12: The Effect of the Net Inflow of High Quality Inventors on Corporate Innovation
This table reports the OLS regression results of corporate innovation on the net inflow of high quality inventors 
and management quality factor (MQF). Panels A, B and C report regression results with the number of patents,
the total number of citations, and the number of citations per patent as dependent variables, respectively.
Ln(Patents) is the natural logarithm of one plus the truncation-adjusted number of patents that a firm filed in a 
given year; Ln(Citations) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total adjusted number of citations received by 
the firm’s patents filed in a year; Ln(Citations/Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of 
citations per patent. Net Inflow of High is the difference between the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
high-quality inventors that move into the firm and the natural logarithm of one plus the number of high-quality 
inventors that move out of the firm in a given year. Control variables are the same as in Table 5 in all regressions and 
results are not reported to save space. Constant, year fixed effects, 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects, and state fixed 
effects are included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level and are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: MQF, Net Inflow of High Quality Inventors, and the Number of Patents
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Patents)t+1 Ln(Patents)t+2 Ln(Patents)t+3
Net Inflow of High 0.572*** 0.526*** 0.466***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
MQF 0.096*** 0.093*** 0.090***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Observations 25,945 23,096 20,119
Adjusted R-squared 0.578 0.559 0.528
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: MQF, Net Inflow of  High Quality Inventors, and the Total Number of Citations
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Citations)t+1 Ln(Citations)t+2 Ln(Citations)t+3
Net Inflow of High 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.051***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
MQF 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 25,945 23,096 20,119
Adjusted R-squared 0.372 0.360 0.334
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: MQF, Net Inflow of  High Quality Inventors, and the Number of Citations per Patent
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Citations/Patent)t+1 Ln(Citations/Patent)t+2 Ln(Citations/Patent)t+3
Net Inflow of High 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MQF 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,945 23,096 20,119
Adjusted R-squared 0.181 0.184 0.184
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 13: The Effect of Management Quality on Net Change in the Average Quality of Inventors
This table reports the OLS regression results of the change in the average quality of inventors for a firm in a given 
year on management quality factor (MQF). Incoming Quality is the natural logarithm of one plus the average 
quality of all the inventors that move into the firm in a given year. Outgoing Quality is natural logarithm of one 
plus the average quality of all the inventors that move out of the firm in a given year. Net Quality Change is 
defined as the difference between Incoming Quality and Outgoing Quality. Inventor quality is measured by the 
number of citations scaled by total number of patents that he has filed prior to the current year. Ln(Assets) is the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets; M/B is Tobin’s Q, defined as market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as the book value of assets plus the market 
value of common stock less the book value of common stock; ROA is defined as operating income before 
depreciation divided by total assets; CAPEX/Assets is defined as capital expenditures divided by total assets; 
R&D/Assets is defined as research and development expenses divided by total assets; Stock Return is the firm’s
annual stock return; HHI is the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; and Average Tenure is the average number 
of years that each manager has worked as VP or higher in this firm. Constant, year fixed effects, 2-digit SIC 
industry fixed effects, and state fixed effects are included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Coefficients and 
standard errors are multiplied by 100. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Net Quality Changet+1 Net Quality Changet+2 Net Quality Changet+3
MQF 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Ln(Assets) 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M/B 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ROA 0.010 0.007 0.012
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
CAPEX/Assets 0.074** 0.086** 0.034
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039)
R&D/Assets 0.102*** 0.056** 0.038
(0.031) (0.027) (0.028)
Stock Return -0.008* -0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
HHI -0.204 -0.161 -0.101
(0.156) (0.144) (0.148)
Average Tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 25,945 23,096 20,119
Adjusted R-squared 0.087 0.083 0.079
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 14: The Effect of Management Quality on Highly Successful, Unsuccessful, and Moderately 
Successful Innovations
This table reports OLS regression results of the number of very successful, unsuccessful and moderately successful 
patents on management quality factor (MQF). Panels A, B, and C correspond to the regression results with dependent 
variables that are one, two and three years ahead, respectively. Top 10% is the natural logarithm of one plus the firm’s
number of patents that received cites within the top 10% among all patents in the same 3-digit patent class and 
application year; No Cites is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents that received no citation; Moderate 
Cites is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents that received at least one citation but below the top 10% 
among all patents. Columns (1)-(3) report the regression coefficients using Top 10%, No Cites and Moderate Cites as 
dependent variables, respectively; Columns (4)-(6) report and test the significance of difference between any two of the 
coefficient estimates in Columns (1)-(3). Control variables are the same as in Table 5 in all regressions and results are 
not reported to save space. Constant, year fixed effects, and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level and are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: The Effect of MQF on One-year-ahead patenting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Top 10%t+1 No Citest+1 Moderate Citest+1 Dif (1)-(2) Dif (1)-(3) Dif (2)-(3)
MQF 0.338*** 0.146*** 0.134*** 0.192*** 0.204*** 0.012**
(0.027) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.005)
Observations 27,688 27,688 27,688
Adjusted R-squared 0.417 0.359 0.378
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: The Effect of MQF on Two-year-ahead patenting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Top 10%t+2 No Citest+2 Moderate Citest+2 Dif (1)-(2) Dif (1)-(3) Dif (2)-(3)
MQF 0.335*** 0.148*** 0.130*** 0.187*** 0.205*** 0.018***
(0.029) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.006)
Observations 24,519 24,519 24,519
Adjusted R-squared 0.409 0.357 0.369
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: The Effect of MQF on three-year-ahead patenting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Top 10%t+3 No Citest+3 Moderate Citest+3 Dif (1)-(2) Dif (1)-(3) Dif (2)-(3)
MQF 0.332*** 0.146*** 0.126*** 0.186*** 0.206*** 0.020***
(0.031) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.006)
Observations 21,250 21,250 21,250
Adjusted R-squared 0.400 0.354 0.355
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
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Internet Appendix (Not to Be Published)
Table A1: Robustness Test: The Effect of Management Quality on Corporate Innovation for Innovative 
Firms Only
This table reports the OLS regression results of corporate innovation on management quality factor (MQF) using 
innovative firms only. Innovative firms are defined as firms that have filed at least one patent application over the 
sample period of 1999-2009. Panels A, B, and C report regression results with the number of patents, the total 
number of citations, and the number of citations per patent as dependent variables, respectively. Ln(Patents) is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the truncation-adjusted number of patents that a firm filed in a given year; 
Ln(Citations) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total adjusted number of citations received by the firm’s
patents filed in a year; Ln(Citations/Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of citations 
per patent. Control variables are the same as in Table 5 in all regressions and results are not reported to save space.
Constant, year fixed effects, and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. All standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: The Effect of MQF on the Number of Patents
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Patents)t+1 Ln(Patents)t+2 Ln(Patents)t+3
MQF 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.136***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 15,251 13,742 12,118
Adjusted R-squared 0.426 0.423 0.416
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: The Effect of MQF on the Total Number of Citations
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Citations)t+1 Ln(Citations)t+2 Ln(Citations)t+3
MQF 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 15,251 13,742 12,118
Adjusted R-squared 0.292 0.286 0.274
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: The Effect of MQF on the Number of Citations per Patent
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Citations/Patent)t+1 Ln(Citations/Patent)t+2 Ln(Citations/Patent)t+3
MQF 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 15,251 13,742 12,118
Adjusted R-squared 0.110 0.113 0.113
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table A2: Robustness Test: MQF without Team Size
This table reports the OLS regression results for corporate innovation with management quality factor without 
team size (MQF-No Team Size) as the key independent variable. MQF-No Team Size is defined in the same way 
as MQF except that we exclude team size in the common factor analysis. Panels A, B, and C report regression 
results with the number of patents, the total number of citations, and the number of citations per patent as 
dependent variables, respectively. Ln(Patents) is the natural logarithm of one plus the truncation-adjusted number 
of patents that a firm filed in a given year; Ln(Citations) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total adjusted 
number of citations received by the firm’s patents filed in a year; Ln(Citations/Patent) is the natural logarithm of 
one plus the adjusted number of citations per patent. Control variables are the same as in Table 5 in all regressions 
and results are not reported to save space. Constant, year fixed effects, and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level and are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: The Effect of MQF-No Team Size on the Number of Patents
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Patents)t+1 Ln(Patents)t+2 Ln(Patents)t+3
MQF-No Team Size 0.083*** 0.077*** 0.068***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 27,688 24,519 21,250
Adjusted R-squared 0.375 0.368 0.359
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: The Effect of MQF-No Team Size on the Total Number of Citations
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Citations)t+1 Ln(Citations)t+2 Ln(Citations)t+3
MQF-No Team Size 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 27,688 24,519 21,250
Adjusted R-squared 0.242 0.237 0.227
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: The Effect of MQF-No Team Size on the Number of Citations per Patent
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Citations/Patent)t+1 Ln(Citations/Patent)t+2 Ln(Citations/Patent)t+3
MQF-No Team Size 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 27,688 24,519 21,250
Adjusted R-squared 0.136 0.135 0.131
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
195
Table A3: Robustness Test: Controlling for Industry×Year×State Fixed Effects
This table replicates the baseline regression results of corporate innovation on management quality factor (MQF)
as in Table 5 controlling for industry×year×state fixed effects. Panel A, B, and C report the OLS regression results 
with the number of patents, the total number of citations, and the number of citations per patent as dependent 
variables, respectively. Ln(Patents) is the natural logarithm of one plus the truncation-adjusted number of patents 
that a firm filed in a given year; Ln(Citations) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total adjusted number 
of citations received by the firm’s patents filed in a year; Ln(Citations/Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus 
the adjusted number of citations per patent. Control variables are the same as in Table 5 in all regressions and 
results are not reported to save space. Constant and industry×year×state fixed effects are included in all
regressions. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level and are reported in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.
Panel A: The Effect of MQF on the Number of Patents
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Patents)t+1 Ln(Patents)t+2 Ln(Patents)t+3
MQF 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.157***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 25,945 23,096 20,119
Adjusted R-squared 0.370 0.365 0.351
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year×State FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: The Effect of MQF on the Total Number of Citations
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Citations)t+1 Ln(Citations)t+2 Ln(Citations)t+3
MQF 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 25,945 23,096 20,119
Adjusted R-squared 0.237 0.232 0.217
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year×State FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: The Effect of MQF on the Number of Citations per Patent
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ln(Citations/Patent)t+1 Ln(Citations/Patent)t+2 Ln(Citations/Patent)t+3
MQF 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 25,945 23,096 20,119
Adjusted R-squared 0.153 0.144 0.133
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year×State FE Yes Yes Yes
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